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As the founder and leader of the Falange Española (Spanish Phalanx), José Antonio Primo de 
Rivera has been almost universally held by historians specialising in fascist studies as the only 
important figure of Spanish fascism. Primo de Rivera’s movement, a paramilitary organisation 
that publicly endorsed the toppling of the democratic Spanish Republic, was noted for its 
inflammatory rhetoric and violent actions. Yet, Primo de Rivera has recently been described by 
eminent American historian of fascism Stanley Payne as ‘everybody’s favourite fascist’. 
This thesis argues that historians of twentieth century Spanish politics have 
overwhelmingly idealised Primo de Rivera in a manner incongruent with the long-standing 
mainstream academic hostility towards fascism. He has been depoliticised and reified into an 
upstanding ‘gentleman’, yet still understood as the only ‘important’ fascist in Spanish history. 
His violent rhetoric has been classed as ‘poetic’, and his violent actions as heroic in spite of 
their alignment with traditional understandings of fascism. This image has been reinforced by 
the centrality of Francisco Franco, long-held by most mainstream historians to be non-fascist 
in character, to acrimonious historical polemic over the nature and legacy of Spanish fascism. 
This thesis demonstrates that the confused and misleading nature of this historical assessment 
of Primo de Rivera has not been adequately addressed by historians. With Primo de Rivera 
upheld as an aberration from ‘normal’ fascism, deeper critical inquiry into the role fascism 
played during the Second Spanish Republic, and subsequent Franco dictatorship, has been 
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As the founder and leader of the Falange Española (Spanish Phalanx), José Antonio Primo de 
Rivera (1903-1936) has been almost universally held by historians specialising in fascist studies 
as the only important figure of Spanish fascism.1 Many historians have even seen his 
personality as inextricable from the very concept of Spanish fascism.2 Primo de Rivera’s 
movement, a paramilitary organisation that publicly endorsed the toppling of the democratic 
Spanish Republic, was noted for its inflammatory rhetoric and violent actions. This violence 
has been understood as an important factor in the political destabilisation which led to the 
Spanish Civil War and decades of dictatorship under General Francisco Franco (1892-1975). 
Yet, Primo de Rivera has recently been described by eminent American historian of fascism 
Stanley Payne (b.1934) as ‘everybody’s favourite fascist’.3  
Primo de Rivera’s personal charm has been well documented, his rhetoric has been 
classed as poetic, and his death has been viewed as a needless tragedy. In 1999, prominent 
British historian Paul Preston (b.1946) claimed that ‘the attractions of [Primo de Rivera’s] 
personality have seduced more than one Anglo-Saxon scholar’.4 The relevance of this 
seduction, mentioned only in passing by Preston, was demonstrated five years later in Fascists 
(2004) by American sociologist Michael Mann (b.1942). In this highly-acclaimed book, which 
denounced fascism as a fundamentally evil force, Mann nevertheless outlined an image of 
Primo de Rivera that fits within Preston’s notion of seduction.5 Mann claimed that Primo de 
Rivera’s ‘poetic and sentimental style, squeamishness, and political innocence typified the kind 
of “moral fascist” who rarely survived at the top of fascist movements’.6 Mann did not clarify 
what he meant by squeamishness, political innocence or even ‘moral fascist’, or offer evidence 
to support the use of these terms. Instead, he referred to a well-established historical 
perspective of Primo de Rivera as fundamentally distinct from norms of fascist leadership. This 
thesis critiques the manner in which historians have consistently portrayed Primo de Rivera in 
a positive light, through an examination of his personal leadership of the Falange, his 
relationship with violence, and the legacy of Francoism.  
                                                          
1 I have supplied the dates of birth and death of relevant figures where possible. 
2 Nathanael Greene, Fascism (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1968), 247. 
3 Stanley Payne, Spain: A Unique History (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2011), 202. 
4 Paul Preston, ¡Comrades! Portraits from the Spanish Civil War (London: HarperCollins, 1999), 77. 
5 Michael Mann, Fascists (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 4. 
6 Ibid., 334. 
2 
 
Fascism is among the most nebulous of political concepts, with academics unable to 
define the term without controversy.7 Fascism is understandably reviled for its association 
with the material and human destruction of the Second World War, and of the genocidal 
horrors perpetrated by Nazi Germany in the Holocaust. Fascism as a form of government, 
therefore, has been thoroughly discredited. Even its nature as an ideology has been contested. 
Regardless of definitional concerns, the idea of a ‘generic fascism’ has become widely 
accepted in English-language historiography. This conceptualisation categorises the myriad of 
aggressively nationalistic and purportedly totalitarian movements as members of the same 
general political phenomenon. Even though many of these groups had highly idiosyncratic 
elements, ‘fascism’ is thus understood as a ‘generic’ category, beyond the specific examples of 
the regimes of Italy and Germany. While the work of influential British historian Roger Griffin 
(b.1948) has forcefully argued for treating fascism as a genuine ideology, some historians still 
feel that to acknowledge fascism this way risks rehabilitating its elitist, violent ideals and de-
emphasising the practical consequences of fascist rule.8  
This shift towards an emphasis on ideology has not softened academic denunciation of 
fascism itself. Griffin demonstrated the mainstream historical perception of fascism when he 
pleaded his case for the publication of a collected volume of fascist texts in 1995: 
 
A Reader devoted to fascism might thus be construed as endowing with a bogus aura 
of serious theoretical content, and even dignity, something which is best regarded as a 
perversion of human mind and spirit. Yet there is no reason in principle why primary 
sources relating to negative aspects of the human condition should be any less worthy 
of scholarly or general interest than positive ones.9 
 
He twice emphasised the dangers of fascism. There were ‘scores of other fascist movements 
which fortunately for humanity have withered on the vine before achieving power’, and 
‘fortunately for humanity only two fascist movements have been in a position to attempt to 
implement their total solutions to society’s alleged woes’.10 Griffin’s critique of fascism is 
representative of the mainstream academic tradition. 
This thesis seeks to explore how and why, in a historiography so generally hostile to 
the ideals and practice of fascism, one fascist leader has been comparatively lionised by 
                                                          
7 Roger Griffin, The Nature of Fascism (London: Routledge, 1991),1. 
8 Dave Renton, Fascism: Theory and Practice (London: Pluto Press, 1999). 
9 Roger Griffin, Fascism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 1. 
10 Ibid., v.;  Ibid., 7. 
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academics. Its research and perspective are thus inspired by a series of questions: Given the 
near universal academic condemnation of fascism as a political force, what are the reasons for 
historical idealisation of José Antonio Primo de Rivera as the main embodiment of Spanish 
fascism? What justifications have historians used to maintain this position? Why has this ‘soft’ 
image of Primo de Rivera been so resilient across almost eight decades of scholarship? What 
can this continued sympathy for him demonstrate about the historiography of fascism more 
generally? In short: Why has Primo de Rivera been spared the historical denunciation typically 
seen in the case of fascist leaders? The thesis argues that, while he is almost universally 
categorised as a genuine fascist leader, he has nevertheless typically been ‘depoliticised’. He is 
routinely upheld as a sympathetic individual, distinct from the typical condemnations 
associated with fascist leadership.  
This thesis is structured around two important criteria from the most influential 
definition of fascism: the typology outlined by Stanley Payne in Fascism (1980).11 Payne has 
also been the predominant historian on the topic of Spanish fascism, so his perspective is of 
immense importance. The first criterion examined is charismatic leadership, and the second is 
the exaltation of violence. Neither criterion has been effectively applied by historians to Primo 
de Rivera’s leadership. After demonstrating these points, the thesis expands in scope to 
consider why these idealised visions of Primo de Rivera have persisted. The bitterly contested 
legacy of the fate of the Spanish Republic and the subsequent Franco regime has insulated 
Primo de Rivera from the most negative elements of the label of fascism.  
To my knowledge, such an inquiry into Primo de Rivera as a fascist leader has not 
previously been attempted on this scale, or from the perspective of generic fascism. The only 
significant study of how historians have represented Primo de Rivera came in the final years of 
the Francoist regime. In 1974, Spanish historian Luis Álvarez Gutiérrez published ‘Ensayo 
Bibliografico sobre José Antonio Primo de Rivera’ (Bibliographic Essay about José Antonio 
Primo de Rivera).12 Álvarez Gutiérrez focused on Francoist literature, which he lamented was 
generally propagandistic in nature, written by ‘admiring panegyrists’.13 While he did 
acknowledge both Payne and American historian Herbert Southworth (1908-1999), Álvarez 
Gutiérrez did not significantly engage with the Anglophone literature, nor did he use fascism 
as a framework of critique. The scope of this thesis is thus much wider than that of Álvarez 
Gutiérrez’ and is based more systematically within the framework of generic fascist studies.  
                                                          
11 Stanley Payne, Fascism (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1980). 
12 Luis Álvarez Gutiérrez, “Ensayo Bibliografico sobre José Antonio Primo de Rivera,” in Estudios de 
Historia Contemporanea, ed. Vicente Palacio Atard (Madrid: Instituto Jeronimo Zurita del C.S.I.C, 1974). 
13 Ibid., 442. 
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An important point to address is that Anglophone historiography has almost 
universally followed the Falangist and Francoist model of addressing Primo de Rivera not by 
his surname, as is traditional in historical study, but as ‘José Antonio’. This nomenclature was 
first suggested by Primo de Rivera himself, and was widely adopted within his lifetime.14 He is 
the only modern Spanish historical figure who is generally known by his first name.15 While 
this does serve the convenient purpose of distinguishing him from his father, the military 
dictator of Spain in the 1920s, in almost all situations context would make it clear which 
individual was being discussed, thus rendering this form of distinction unnecessary.16 As much 
of the idealising force has come from portraying Primo de Rivera as a sympathetic gentleman, I 
will reject this convention and refer to him by his surname in line with standard historical 
practice.  
 
Historical Background of the Spanish Republic, Civil War and Franco Regime  
To appreciate the significance of the academic response to Primo de Rivera, it is necessary to 
locate it within the context of Spanish political history. After a period of semi-liberal rule from 
1874, the Spanish government was overthrown in a 1923 military coup by General Miguel 
Primo de Rivera (1870-1930), José Antonio’s father. Ruling paternalistically, General Primo de 
Rivera led Spain until 1930. While historians have been ambivalent towards the political 
efficacy of his rule, they have generally portrayed him as amongst the most benevolent of all 
dictators.17 After losing the support of the Spanish political elite, he fled to France in early 
1930 and died a few months later. The resulting power vacuum unsettled the political support 
of King Alfonso XIII (1886-1941), who fled Spain in 1931 after municipal elections elected pro-
Republican candidates on a wave of anti-monarchical sentiment. The Second Spanish Republic 
was thus proclaimed in April 1931. The new government was idealistic and reformist in 
character.  
While progressive forces hailed the new Republic as the embodiment of humanistic 
ideals, many conservative Spaniards, especially those allied with the entrenched authority of 
the Catholic Church, watched with apprehension and dismay. Various Rightist groups 
coalesced to oppose the principles of liberal democracy. Such groups included the long-
feuding monarchists of Renovación Española (Spanish Renewal), who were dedicated to the 
                                                          
14 Stanley Payne, Falange: A History of Spanish Fascism (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961), 56. 
15 Stanley Payne, “Fascist Italy and Spain,” Mediterranean Historical Review 13 (1998): 104. 
16 Some level of confusion has been seen in the indices of some historical works, however. See Burnett 
Bolloten, The Spanish Civil War (London: The University of North Carolina Press, 1991) for an example of 
repeated errors of differentiation of the two men. 
17 Shlomo Ben-Ami, Fascism from Above (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), viii. 
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return of Alfonso XIII, and the Carlist Comunión Tradicionalista (Traditionalist Communion), 
who fought for a pretender named Alfonso Carlos (1849-1936) with their violent Requetés 
militia. The most important Rightist group was the Confederación Española de Derechas 
Autonómas (Spanish Confederation of Autonomous Right-wing Groups, CEDA), including its 
youth wing, the Juventudes de Acción Popular (Youths of Popular Action, JAP). The CEDA was 
an organisation that was superficially tolerant of liberal democratic norms, yet its leader – José 
María Gil Robles (1898-1980) – publicly explained that this was merely a technique of 
‘accidentalism’.18 This position argued that the political structure of the Spanish state was not 
important, and thus the Republic did not necessarily need to be opposed, as long as the 
political results were in line with conservative ideals. Accidentalism was contrasted with 
‘catastrophism’, which argued that even if the Republic achieved conservative goals legally, 
the institution itself was antithetical to Spanish society and thus should be rejected by force.19 
Thus the Comunión Tradicionalista, for example, was catastrophist in orientation. The true 
nature and intentions of Gil Robles and the CEDA have been a topic of passionate historical 
debate, especially due to the JAP’s aping of fascistic style with aggressive slogans and mass 
rallies. Almost all historians agree that amongst this collection of Right-wing organisations, 
none can be considered ‘fully’ fascist in nature, as did they did not fulfil enough of the criteria 
of fascism.20 One of these criteria was the need for a charismatic leader, with Gil Robles 
dismissed as unfit for such consideration due, among other things, to his ‘podgy’ 
appearance.21 
Though the Falange Española was the only Spanish fascist organisation that achieved 
any significance, it was not Spain’s first such group. While some histories acknowledge that 
the earliest form of fascism in Spain was espoused by Ernesto Giménez Caballero (1899-1988), 
an avant-garde poet inspired by Mussolini, most historians have either ignored him or 
dismissed him as strange and unimportant.22 The first important fascist organisation is 
understood to be the Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional-Sindicalista (Unions of the National-
Syndicalist Offensive, JONS), founded in 1931 by Ramiro Ledesma (1905-1936) and Onésimo 
Redondo (1905-1936), a post-office worker and beet-farmer respectively. These two men have 
                                                          
18 Paul Preston, “The ‘Moderate’ Right and the Undermining of the Second Republic in Spain 1931-
1933,” European Studies Review 3:4 (1973): 370. 
19 Paul Preston, The Coming of the Spanish Civil War (London: Macmillan, 1978), 42. 
20 Stanley Payne, Spain’s First Democracy (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1993), 168. 
21 Gabriel Jackson, The Spanish Republic and the Civil War, 1931-1939 (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1965), 178. 
22 Douglas Foard, “The Forgotten Falangist: Ernesto Giménez Caballero,” Journal of Contemporary 
History 10:1 (1975): 3.  
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been represented by historians as ‘typical’ fascists: harsh, uncompromising and violent.23 The 
JONS, directly inspired by the German Nazi Party, was small and unsuccessful, barely able to 
undertake basic functions, let alone gain a significant following. Yet, it gained importance in 
early 1934 through a merger with the Falange Española of Primo de Rivera.  
Primo de Rivera founded his own fascist movement towards the end of 1933 in an 
attempt to lead Spain towards its supposed ‘universal destiny’.24 It was originally to be named 
Fascismo Español, which made its political inspirations and intentions clear. However, Primo 
de Rivera changed his mind after realising that this name, with its foreign origin, would imply a 
‘non-Spanish’ character unsuitable for a Spanish nationalist movement.25 The new name 
maintained the initials, however, which spelled the Spanish word for ‘faith’, ‘fe’. After the 
Falange Española struggled in relative obscurity for a few months, Primo de Rivera and 
Ledesma arranged the merger for practical reasons. Both their organisations had sought and 
received funding from catastrophist financiers, especially industrialists and bankers from 
Bilbao. Yet, this money was insufficient for their goals and, given the similarity in fascist ideals 
of the two movements, a joint operation was seen as more financially sensible. The new 
organisation was entitled the Falange Española de las JONS, but in practice historians have 
simply continued to use ‘Falange’. The name of the organisation demonstrates the dominance 
of Primo de Rivera, rather than of Ledesma or Redondo. While this naming practice has the 
potential to cause confusion, the period of pre-merger Falange Española operation only lasted 
a few months. As such, a specific focus on differentiating these movements through precise 
nomenclature has not been a historical priority. Subsequently, in this thesis, ‘Falange’ refers to 
the post-merger organisation in operation between 1934 and 1936, with ‘Falange Española’ 
used specifically to refer to Primo de Rivera’s original movement. The Falange outlined a 
platform of its ideas, known as the Twenty-Seven Points. While these will be explored in detail 
below, it is worth stating that they have been understood as representing a typical form of 
fascism. 
Historians agree that the only legitimately fascist movements in Spain were the JONS, 
Falange Española and, subsequently, the Falange. Yet, at the time, liberals and Leftists 
ascribed the label of fascism to large swathes of the Spanish Right. This was primarily because, 
although the Falange was strident in its rhetoric, its membership was tiny compared to other 
                                                          
23 Stanley Payne, “José Antonio Primo de Rivera,” in José Antonio Primo de Rivera, ed. Enrique de 
Aguinaga et al., trans. by Cristina Pagès Boune (Barcelona: Ediciones B, 2003), 183. 
24 John Hammerback, “José Antonio’s Rhetoric of Fascism,” Southern Communication Journal 59:3 
(1994): 185. 
25 Payne, Falange, 36. 
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political organisations in Spain. Even at its Republican height, the Falange never had more 
than 25,000 members, up to 70% of whom were under the age of 21.26 This was dwarfed by 
the CEDA, which claimed 700,000 members.27 In 1933, the CEDA won the first national 
election since the Republic’s initial foundation in 1931, but as Gil Robles was an immensely 
controversial figure, he was not installed as Prime Minister. When he was offered a cabinet 
position in 1934, the Left was so outraged at this ‘fascist’ leader being granted power that an 
anti-fascist uprising was launched across Spain in protest. The uprising immediately failed 
almost everywhere, except for some peasant mining communities in Asturias, a province in 
the north of Spain. The army was called in to crush the uprising. Primo de Rivera offered his 
Falangist militia to assist in the repression but was rebuffed by the government. Nevertheless, 
Falangists followed their leader’s wishes and were involved in violent reprisals in an unofficial 
capacity.28  
During the period 1934 to 1936, the Falange’s political influence was limited to a 
violent escalation of attacks and reprisals against Left-wing activists. Socialist and anarchist 
youths, seeing how fascism was taking hold elsewhere in Europe, sought to prevent the 
Falange accomplishing the same goal in Spain. Thus, they attacked Falangist newspaper-sellers 
and attendees at public Falangist gatherings. Within a few months of the beginning of these 
attacks, Primo de Rivera authorised retaliation. This cycle of violence contributed to the 
increasing political tensions within the Spanish Republic as it approached the elections of 
1936. Primo de Rivera had been elected to parliament in 1933, but as an independent running 
on a platform of being his father’s son, rather than as a Falangist. With no significant 
representation in Spanish parliament, due to the lack of electoral support for the Falange, the 
movement had no major political impact beyond its role in street violence.  
In early 1936, in a climate of immense political polarisation, a grand coalition of 
liberal-Leftists won the national elections and formed government as a Popular Front. This was 
a significant blow to the accidentalism of the CEDA. Public support for catastrophist 
alternatives escalated dramatically in the face of the threat of the supposed Communism of 
the newly elected government, even though the Communist Party had little authority within 
the coalition.29 Thousands of members of the JAP abandoned their movement which, though 
                                                          
26 Ibid., 81. 
27 Pamela Radcliff, Modern Spain: 1808 to the Present (Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell, 2017), 162. 
28 Sheelagh Ellwood, “Falange Española, 1933-9: From Fascism to Francoism,” in Spain in Conflict 1931-
1939, ed. Martin Blinkhorn (London: SAGE, 1986), 212. 
29 The issue of the strength and intentions of the Spanish Communist Party remains highly controversial. 
See Stanley Payne, The Spanish Civil War, the Soviet Union and Communism (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2004) for a recent and polemically anti-Communist take on the topic. 
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fascist in style, had never systematically engaged in political violence, and went over to the 
Falange. Around this time, Primo de Rivera was arrested and imprisoned on the charge of 
possessing illegal weapons, and the Falange itself was criminalised. This did little to stop its 
subversive activities, and Primo de Rivera was still able to communicate effectively with his 
movement from within prison.  
The Civil War began in July 1936, after military conspirators led by Franco launched an 
unsuccessful coup. Though Primo de Rivera was not a major figure in this conspiracy, he was 
peripherally involved in the planning and offered his militia in support of the effort. As the 
Falange became an auxiliary force in the war, its membership swelled even further. Primo de 
Rivera was executed by a Republican firing squad in November 1936, four months after the 
outbreak of the war. Franco was secretly pleased by this news because he viewed Primo de 
Rivera as a dangerous potential rival.30 In 1937, Franco forcibly co-opted the Falange into a 
new official state party, formed by a merger with various other Right-wing groups such as the 
Carlists. This organisation, the Falange Española Tradicionalista y de las JONS, is generally 
understood to have been swiftly ‘de-fascistised’ and bureaucratised by Franco. Yet, this new 
state apparatus, generally known simply as the Movimiento Nacional, nominally upheld the 
fascist values outlined by the Falange. It officially adopted twenty-six of the ’Twenty-Seven 
Points’ that articulated the Falange’s fascist platform. The missing point – that the Falange 
must always be the dominant partner in any political co-operation – was quietly dropped. 
The Spanish Civil War was immediately hailed by liberal observers across Europe as 
the first anti-fascist war. It thus became a rallying point for those with liberal and Leftist 
values. Fearful of the threat of Communism, the British government joined a non-intervention 
pact with France, Italy, Germany and the USSR. This pact has long been denounced by 
proponents of the Spanish Republic as ‘malevolent neutrality’, dooming Spanish democracy by 
refusing to defend it.31 In practice, Italy and Germany intervened significantly on behalf of 
Franco, sending money and arms. Italy sent thousands of ground troops and assisted in 
blockading Republican ports, while the German Condor Legion famously bombed the city of 
Guernica.32 The Soviet Union sent advisors and munitions to the Republic, but this assistance 
was on a far smaller scale than that given by Italy and Germany. By early 1939, Franco’s rebels 
had seized the whole of Spain and declared a new dictatorship. 
                                                          
30 Paul Preston, A Concise History of the Spanish Civil War (London: Fontana Press, 1996), 134. 
31 Douglas Little, Malevolent Neutrality (London: Cornell University Press, 1985), 8. 
32 Paul Preston, “Mussolini’s Spanish Adventure: From Limited Risk to War,” in The Republic Besieged, 
ed. Paul Preston et al. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1996), 22. 
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 After the death of Primo de Rivera, his image was adopted by Franco as the focus of 
an intense posthumous personality cult. Even though Primo de Rivera had hated Franco and 
his staid military values, Franco nevertheless enshrined him as primary martyr of the new 
regime. The cult of ‘El Ausente’ (The Absent One) was pervasive: Primo de Rivera’s name was 
carved into every major church in Spain, arterial roads were renamed in his honour, and the 
anniversary of his death became a national day of mourning.33 The cult lasted until Franco’s 
death in 1975.  
The legacy of Spain’s transition from dictatorship to democracy, occurring uneasily 
from Franco’s death through the early 1980s, still casts a long shadow over contemporary 
Spanish politics and academia. Many academics believe that a ‘pacto del olvido’ (pact of 
forgetting) was deliberately sought by Left and Right alike to ensure a peaceful period of 
transition.34 With the fratricidal conflict of the Civil War looming in the general consciousness, 
it was therefore politically expedient to grant an amnesty for all political crimes of the 
twentieth century, even though almost all of them were committed in Franco’s name. The 
Francoist political bureaucracy was still in control of Spain upon Franco’s death, and this 
amnesty was instrumental in allowing a democratic system to be established. Since the early 
2000s, any semblance of this pact has dissipated.35 Leftist and anti-Franco political figures have 
sought to reclaim the ‘historical memory’ of the hundreds of thousands of Francoist victims, 
long-ignored by the Spanish authorities. This supposed politicisation of history, with 
proponents instead prioritising ‘memory’, has caused a polemical backlash from conservative 
academics and politicians who dismiss ‘memory studies’ as antithetical to an ideal of 
‘objective’ history.36 In this politically charged atmosphere, recent historiography on issues 
relating to the Republic and Civil War has often been marked by personal hostility.  
During the Civil War and ever since, many Anglophone academics and public figures 
took up the cause of the Spanish Republic as a literal force for ‘good’ in an apocalyptic struggle 
against fascistic ‘evil’. The fact that ‘good’ was vanquished by ‘evil’ has ensured that the 
Spanish Republic has been mythologised as a heroic lost cause. Almost eighty years after the 
fall of the Republic, the legacy of the Civil War still dominates the Spanish political landscape. 
This context makes it only more fascinating that the figure of José Antonio Primo de Rivera, 
dedicated as he was to the quashing of democratic liberalism, remains so widely idealised.  
                                                          
33 John Crow, Spain: The Root and the Flower (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), 344. 
34 Carolyn Boyd, “The Politics of History and Memory in Democratic Spain,” The Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science 617 (2008): 135. 
35 Madeleine Davis, “Is Spain Recovering its Memory? Breaking the Pacto del Olvido,” Human Rights 
Quarterly 27 (2005): 866.  




This thesis is largely historiographical in nature. It examines how historians have approached 
the topic of José Antonio Primo de Rivera and Spanish fascism. It has encapsulated a very 
broad field of research, across four main types of sources: works focusing specifically on 
Spanish fascism, works about Spanish political history, works focusing on other variants of 
fascism, and works about generic fascism more broadly. 
The first set of sources, those directly relating to Primo de Rivera and the Falange, are 
the most obviously relevant to this thesis. In examining these sources, it is possible to 
understand how historians have most clearly approached Primo de Rivera and Spanish 
fascism, as this topic was their explicit concern. There are comparatively few such sources, 
compared to the broader literature around the Spanish Republic, Civil War and Franco regime. 
As a result, a small number of works have dominated, referenced repeatedly over the decades 
as established authorities on the topic. Most notable for this thesis is the work of Stanley 
Payne, as he has been both the leading historian of Spanish fascism and among the most 
sympathetic historians towards Primo de Rivera.  
The second set of sources involves the immense literature on the Spanish Republic, 
Spanish Civil War and Franco regime. Primo de Rivera and the Falange are comparatively 
incidental in these historical works, but this does not make them less important for this study. 
In fact, the way academics have addressed Primo de Rivera in an incidental sense is an 
important representation of general academic perspectives. Because they were not 
necessarily experts in the intricacies of Spanish fascism, or at least not interested in exploring 
detailed nuances at that time, their summaries of Primo de Rivera are enlightening. These 
works are often widely read. Each example presents us with a concise synthesis of the author’s 
understanding of Spanish fascism. In practice, there is significant overlap in authorship with 
the first set of sources.  
This thesis also explores historical perspectives on other variants of fascism to 
demonstrate the unusual nature of the historical position taken towards Primo de Rivera. The 
primary point of comparison is with the historiography of Oswald Mosley, leader of the British 
Union of Fascists (BUF). This comparison was chosen both for the historical similarities 
between the two fascist leaders, and the historiographical importance of Mosley to 
Anglophone literature on fascism. Mosley was the only other fascist leader who had an 
aristocratic background and a similarly ‘refined’ public image. Neither Mosley nor Primo de 
Rivera led their movements to victory, and neither one was thrust into power by Hitler’s 
European conquests. Importantly, in assessing the Anglophone historical response to Primo de 
11 
 
Rivera, the choice of Mosley is informative. As his movement has been a highly popular topic 
of British historians’ study of fascism, their perspectives on him can be readily compared with 
Anglophone perspectives on Primo de Rivera.37 The figures of Primo de Rivera and Mosley 
have been compared before, but only in a historical rather than historiographical manner.38 
The response of Anglophone historians to the figure of Mosley, whose fascist movement 
directly threatened their own nation, is thus an important gauge of Anglophone historical 
perspectives on fascism more generally.  
Finally, I have undertaken extensive study regarding how historians have 
conceptualised fascism. The two most influential definitions of fascism, by Payne and Griffin, 
have been given prominence and will be explored subsequently. Beyond these examples, 
however, the literature on fascism that has been consulted for this thesis is vast.  
 
Methodology  
This thesis involves the critical reading of historical works about Primo de Rivera and Spanish 
fascism through the lens of generic fascism. I have examined historical works on other national 
varieties of fascism, as well as works devoted more specifically to fascism as a generic concept. 
This methodology is inherently comparative, and this thesis involves a form of ‘asymmetrical 
comparison’ as outlined by German historian Jürgen Kocka (b.1941). While historiographies of 
fascists and fascisms elsewhere are invoked to illustrate key points, the main focus of this 
thesis remains the Spanish case. Some historians have raised concerns with the methodology 
of asymmetrical comparison, as it potentially runs the risk of overreliance on secondary 
literature on topics outside the field of expertise of the historian doing the comparison.39 
Another issue highlighted by Kocka is that the choice of comparison can be selective, and thus 
potentially misleading.40 Yet, Kocka specifically justifies the value of asymmetrical comparison 
in postgraduate dissertations. As dissertations are limited in scope and space, asymmetrical 
comparison is the only plausible mechanism for including any comparative features at all.41  
 Given the vastness of Spanish material on the topic of Primo de Rivera, it is necessary 
to explain why this thesis focuses primarily on Anglophone literature. I must emphasise that I 
have examined key Spanish-language sources, including recent academic debates over the 
                                                          
37 Stanley Payne, A History of Fascism, 1914-1945 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1995), 305. 
38 See Stephen Cullen, “Leaders and Martyrs: Codreanu, Mosley, and José Antonio,” History 71 (1986): 
408-430. 
39 Jürgen Kocka, “Comparison and Beyond,” History and Theory 42 (2003): 41. 
40 Jürgen Kocka, “Asymmetrical Historical Comparison: The Case of the German Sonderweg,” History and 




relevance of fascism in defining Francoism. Unless otherwise indicated, translations of these 
Spanish sources are my own. There are three major reasons for the predominant emphasis on 
English-language sources. Firstly, due to Francoist censorship from the mid-1930s through to 
the early-1970s, Spanish historians were limited in their output.42 Archives were only 
accessible to authorised individuals, who were often regime functionaries rather than trained 
historians.43 Histories of the Falange and Primo de Rivera during this time were hagiographic 
and devoted to justifying the rule of Franco rather than exploring genuine historical issues. 
Most of these works had no significant academic impact outside Franco’s regime, and hold no 
historical authority today. The formative years of the field of twentieth-century Spanish 
history, therefore, were entirely dominated by non-Spanish historians. The concern regarding 
academic freedom has dissipated since Spain’s transition to democracy, and since then 
Spanish historians have come to the fore. While Payne has been dismissive of the quality of 
Spanish scholarship, it is nevertheless accepted as genuinely historical in nature, rather than 
ahistorical propaganda.44 Thus, the Spanish-language sources that have been utilised in this 
thesis are generally from the 1990s and later. 
 Secondly, the absence of academic histories of Spain produced under the Franco 
regime meant that Anglophone perspectives were considered significant within Spain itself. 
Ruedo Iberico, a post-Civil War publishing house based in Paris and run by Spanish exiles, 
operated a clandestine operation to translate English-language histories and smuggle them 
into Spain.45 These books were highly prized by Spanish intellectuals for their relative 
objectivity in respect to Francoist material.46 Even amongst Spanish historians, the 
foundational texts on Spanish fascism and the Spanish Civil War remain those by the 
Anglophone authors known as Hispanists.47 Their works have been immensely influential in 
Spain.48 
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 Finally, the idea of fascism as a generic phenomenon is itself mostly an Anglophone 
conception. Italian Fascism and German Nazism both have vast historiographies within their 
respective countries, yet Italian and German historians overwhelmingly focus on own their 
national histories, eschewing systematic comparison.49 This is not to say that they necessarily 
embrace any notion of an uncritical Sonderweg, the idea of a purely unique national historical 
path. Yet, they normally see no real utility in explaining the history of Mussolini or Hitler 
through reference to failed imitators elsewhere in Europe. Therefore, the fact that both 
Spanish history and fascist studies have been dominated by Anglophone authors, with 
significant overlap between these two fields, means that to understand the historiography of 
Spanish fascism through the lens of generic fascism it is necessary to focus on English-language 
material.  
As this thesis involves critiquing the general position of Anglophone historiography, it 
is useful to introduce some of the key figures in this field. As previously mentioned, the most 
important historian of Spanish fascism is undoubtedly Stanley Payne. His book Falange: A 
History of Spanish Fascism (1961) (subsequently Falange) was the foundational bedrock of 
academic study of Primo de Rivera and his movement. Payne is one of the Anglophone 
authors specifically accused by Preston of being ‘seduced’ by Primo de Rivera.50 Earlier writers 
were sympathetic towards Primo de Rivera, but Payne’s Falange was the first dedicated 
historical study of this topic and has thus been the most influential historical text. It remains to 
this day the most popular reference point for the history of the Falange.51 Falange was an 
adaptation of Payne’s PhD thesis, based on newspaper-focused research and oral interviews 
with Spanish political figures within Spain during the late 1950s.52 While Payne claims that he 
was initially highly sympathetic towards the Spanish Left, as was the norm within liberal 
Anglophone scholarship, he grew disillusioned by his discussions with Leftist Spanish political 
figures who rejected responsibility for political violence.53 In recent years, Payne has distanced 
himself from the tone of the language surrounding Primo de Rivera in Falange, claiming that 
his own youth and historical inexperience had led him to get carried away with the personal 
charm of Primo de Rivera.54 Yet, he has not disavowed the conclusions drawn in that book, 
only its enthusiastic tone. As he continued to publish prolifically on the topic of Spain’s 
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twentieth-century political history, Payne became increasingly hostile to the Spanish Republic 
and its ideals, and in recent works has explicitly blamed Leftists for its failure.55 This 
perspective has ensured a relatively positive image of Primo de Rivera in Payne’s influential 
texts. Most recently, Payne has endorsed the side of the ‘revisionist’ Right in Spain’s ongoing 
historical memory conflict. He has denounced the entire university system for oppressing 
‘objective’ historians through a pervasive culture of ‘political correctness’ and ‘cultural 
Marxism’ (a far-Right conspiracy theory detailing the forces of multiculturalism plotting the 
downfall of Western civilisation).56 As Payne has been overwhelmingly dominant in the 
historiography of Spanish fascism, this thesis places great importance on the examination and 
evolution of his work. 
The Hispanist who was most openly sympathetic towards an idealised image of Primo 
de Rivera was British historian Hugh Thomas (1931-2017). Unsurprisingly, he too was 
specifically criticised by Preston.57 Thomas’ magnum opus was The Spanish Civil War (1961), 
which remains popular through subsequent revisions and reprinting. In the original edition, 
written before the release of Payne’s Falange, Thomas portrayed the figure of Primo de Rivera 
relatively positively, but there was still some sense of ominousness surrounding his role as the 
leader of a fascist movement.58 Yet, with the second edition of 1965, he tweaked much of the 
prose regarding Primo de Rivera. Payne’s Falange was now directly attributed as the basis of 
Thomas’ perspective on Primo de Rivera, which had become more overtly positive.59 Thomas 
wrote three significant works on the topic of Spanish fascism between 1966 and 1972: a 
journal article about Primo de Rivera, a journal article about Spanish fascism more broadly, 
and the first collected English translation of Primo de Rivera’s own works. Thomas became 
increasingly explicit in his depiction of Primo de Rivera as a sympathetic figure, which 
culminated in a summary of Primo de Rivera as ‘an attractive figure’ mourned as a tragic 
Shakespearean hero.60  
 While the perspective of Payne has remained dominant in the historiography of 
Spanish fascism, there has been an undercurrent of historical opposition to Payne’s position. 
The first, and most outspoken, of these critics was Herbert Southworth (1908-1999). 
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Southworth was a highly controversial figure within academia, as he was dedicated to 
opposing – in a piercing style – the historical untruths espoused by the official historians of the 
Franco regime.61 An avowed Leftist, his mission was to uphold the values of the fallen Spanish 
Republic.62 He held a personal vendetta against traditional figures of Anglophone Hispanism 
like Payne due to their seeming tolerance for Francoist historians. Southworth was particularly 
incensed by the historical credibility offered by Payne and others to Ricardo de la Cierva (1926-
2015), the official Francoist state historian.63 De la Cierva’s job involved the heavy-handed 
censorship of Spanish historical output to reinforce the legitimacy of Franco’s rule, which 
discredited him as an academic in the eyes of Southworth. In response, conservative historians 
sought to rebuke Southworth by refusing to acknowledge him as a respectable historian, 
instead dismissing him as a ‘librarian’.64 While Southworth held a PhD from the Sorbonne, he 
had never taken up any academic position at a university, and thus was considered an outsider 
by critics.65 Though Southworth was more interested in denouncing Franco as dictator than 
Primo de Rivera and the Falange, when his work turned to the topic of Primo de Rivera he was 
scathing. His position was more in line with typical academic hostility towards fascism than the 
sympathetic views of his colleagues, yet he was generally criticised for being too polemical in 
nature, and thus his insights were mostly ignored.66 
The only major Anglophone historical study undertaken about Primo de Rivera from a 
critical perspective was by Irish historian Ian Gibson (b.1939) with En Busca de José Antonio (In 
Search of José Antonio) (1980).67 While more reservedly ‘academic’ in tone than the blustering 
Southworth, Gibson nonetheless agreed with Southworth’s assessment: that no ‘satisfactory’ 
study of Primo de Rivera had ever been undertaken, and that previous Anglophone material 
was unjustifiably apologetic.68 While Gibson’s research was thorough, he was unable to find a 
publisher interested in releasing his work in its original English. This reduced the impact of his 
book on Anglophone historiography.  
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 The last historian of major focus in this thesis is Paul Preston. The doyen of British 
Hispanism, his perspective is quite distinct from Payne’s.69 While Preston’s scathing critique of 
Franco has been influential, Payne nonetheless remains the authority on the Falange of Primo 
de Rivera. Preston’s first foray into examining Spanish fascism was The Spanish Right Under 
the Second Republic (1971).70 Written and published while Preston was still a graduate 
student, this short book considered Primo de Rivera both respectable and harmless. It is 
important as a representative synthesis of historical perspectives on Primo de Rivera at the 
time. In recent years, however, Preston has explicitly disowned the conclusions made in this 
text, declaring them ‘pretty dreadful’.71 He has since developed a much more critical 
perspective on the Spanish Right. While his chapter on Primo de Rivera in 1999 which criticised 
Anglophone historians for being ‘seduced’ by the fascist leader remains today the most 
mainstream criticism of Primo de Rivera, the historiography has not dramatically shifted from 
the traditional perspective of Primo de Rivera as a comparatively respectable fascist. 
Intriguingly, even though Preston is the most strident mainstream critic of Primo de Rivera, he 
admits that Primo de Rivera’s opposition to Franco inherently makes him more sympathetic.72 
Using this methodology, my thesis argues that the figure of José Antonio Primo de 
Rivera has been treated unusually positively by Anglophone historiography, in a manner 
incongruent with the overwhelming academic hostility towards the dangers fascism has posed 
to liberal democratic society. It demonstrates this through two case studies of how historians 
have addressed certain elements of Payne’s ‘fascist minimum’ in the case of Primo de Rivera. 
It concludes with an examination of how the legacy of Francoism has shaped historical visions 
of Primo de Rivera. Chapter One explores the application of the idea of ‘charismatic 
leadership’ to Primo de Rivera. This concept, while integral to most understandings of fascism, 
has not been applied to the case of Primo de Rivera in a critical manner. Chapter Two explores 
how historians have understood the relationship of Primo de Rivera to fascist violence. Primo 
de Rivera has frequently been described as opposed to violence. Multiple documented 
instances of violent acts, as well as his violent rhetoric, have been relativised as coming from 
traditionally masculine ideals, rather than fascist aggression. The ‘poetic’ nature of his 
speeches, rather than their content or practical effect, has been the primary focus of 
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historians. Chapter Three examines the legacy of Primo de Rivera in the context of historical 
perspectives towards Francoism and the Spanish Right in general. The figures of Franco and Gil 
Robles have acted as a ‘lightning-rod’ for academic anti-fascism. Compared to the brutal rule 
of Franco, Primo de Rivera’s early death has meant that has been held up as a ‘lost alternative’ 
leader of Spain.  
 
Literature Review  
To understand the academic context of this thesis, it is necessary to introduce the foundations 
of two important historical fields: the historiography of generic fascism, as well as of Spanish 
fascism in particular. This section will introduce the development of the core of both these 
fields, but each chapter in this thesis will offer more specific historiographical background for 
its major theme. As such, charismatic leadership and the violence of fascism will be addressed 
in Chapters One and Two respectively. As Chapter Three involves the impact of how historians 
have utilised the category of fascism as an explanatory framework, the examination of Spanish 
fascism will be brief at this stage. 
Fascist historiography is an immense topic. Debates about its nature, its causes, its 
bases of support and its goals have lasted decades, and many remain unresolved. Disputes 
regarding its very definition are ongoing and are unlikely to be settled anytime soon. For the 
purposes of this thesis, there are two major conceptualisations of fascism that are important: 
Payne’s typological definition, and Griffin’s ideological definition. The name and concept of 
fascism derive from the movement and regime of Benito Mussolini in Italy. The idea of fascism 
as a universal phenomenon, rather than one unique to Italy, was first articulated by Marxist 
critics in the early 1920s, who viewed it as a form of violent and malignant capitalism.73 The 
accession of Hitler to power in 1933 strengthened Leftist antipathy to fascism, and the 
outbreak of the Spanish Civil War in 1936 was heralded as the first battle to save Europe from 
the spread of the fascist menace.74 Following the horrific revelations of fascist atrocities after 
the Second World War, many academics were sympathetic to the position outlined by Italian 
philosopher Benedetto Croce (1866-1952), who defined fascism as a ‘moral disease’ that 
needed to be extirpated.75 During post-war reconstruction, the victorious Allies were keen to 
reinforce a foundational myth of fascism as an unknowable, malicious force that imposed itself 
upon Italy and Germany, rather than as a popular revolt against the failings, perceived or 
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genuine, of democratic liberalism. While this hostile position was politically expedient, it did 
not foster critical historical enquiry into the nature of fascism. Instead, it promoted a 
‘demonological’ perspective of fascism as a bestial and unknowable force.76 Thus, academic 
perceptions of fascism typically remained simplistic and reductionist until the mid-1960s. 
The breakthrough in modern fascist studies emerged around the time of German 
historian Ernst Nolte’s (1923-2016) publication of Der Faschismus in seiner Epoche (1963), 
translated into English as Three Faces of Fascism (1965).77 His attempt at an ‘objective’ and 
‘detached’ look at fascism as a generic phenomenon has been hailed as a crucial milestone in 
the historiography of fascism.78 His lasting impact on the field was the introduction of a ‘fascist 
minimum’: a set of criteria that must be fulfilled in order to classify a movement or regime as 
genuinely fascist rather than simply ‘authoritarian’.79  
This methodology was utilised by Payne in 1980, when he outlined perhaps the single 
most influential definition of fascism.80 His definition has been described as effectively 
codifying what everyone already intuitively ‘knew’ fascism to be.81 This typological approach 
has been criticised for being too reductively descriptive, based essentially on the regimes of 
Mussolini and Hitler, and thus doing little to explain or understand fascism as a universal 
phenomenon.82 Critical historians also accuse it of being cumbersome: a lengthy checklist 
rather than a concise explanation. Regardless of these criticisms, Payne’s definition can be 
utilised to categorise political groups without recourse to complicated theoretical concepts, 
and thus it has been readily adopted. 
 Payne outlined three major categories of ‘Fascist Minima’ criteria. The first comprised 
the original elements of Nolte’s definition: the three ‘fascist negations’. Fascism was defined 
primarily by what it opposed, rather than what it sought to achieve: it was anti-Marxist, anti-
liberal and anti-conservative. 83 Payne added a section to Nolte’s Minima entitled ‘Ideology 
and Goals’, which included elements such as the creation of a new nationalist state and 
empire.84 Finally, and most importantly for this study, Payne outlined a section entitled ‘Style 
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and Organisation’. Two elements of Payne’s typological definition from this section each 
comprise a chapter of this thesis. The first element is a ‘Specific tendency toward an 
authoritarian, charismatic, personal style of command’, typically shortened to ‘charismatic 
leadership’.85 Personal, domineering leadership was one the major hallmarks of fascism, to the 
extent that fascist leaders have often been understood as the embodiment of their 
movement. The second element is the ‘Positive evaluation and use of, or willingness to use, 
violence’.86 Fascist movements generally adopted the style of a militia, rather than a 
traditional political party, and engaged in rhetoric glorifying virile, violent activism. Both 
elements have been readily understood by historians to apply to the Falange, but their 
application to Primo de Rivera has been confused. 
After a period of relative academic disinterest through the 1980s, generic fascism as a 
popular heuristic was almost single-handedly revived by the publication of The Nature of 
Fascism (1991) by Roger Griffin.87 Dispensing with criteria for a fascist minimum, Griffin 
instead sought to define fascism through reference to how fascists saw themselves. His short 
definition was ‘Fascism is a genus of political ideology whose mythic core in its various 
permutations is a palingenetic form of populist ultra-nationalism’.88 While this short definition 
of fascism required an entire book to explain, it will suffice to acknowledge that Griffin 
maintained an emphasis on both the leadership principle and fascist violence. According to 
Griffin, fascist ideology should not be dismissed as a mere cynical ploy to gain power, but as a 
genuine utopian belief in a new world order. This has been a highly controversial perspective, 
as critics have claimed it inherently downplays the practical issues and consequences involved 
in the quest for fascist domination.89  
Griffin’s perspective was a strident break from historical tradition, as many historians 
have maintained that fascism can only be understood through its practical, tragic impact. This 
position could be seen from the earliest Leftist anti-fascist publications like The Menace of 
Fascism (1934). Its author, British journalist John Strachey (1901-1963), denounced the fact 
that ‘Fascist theory is entirely subordinate to Fascist practice’, with its devotion towards killing 
and torturing any who believe in peace.90 This idea could also been seen in influential works of 
mainstream liberal history, such as A.J.P. Taylor’s (1906-1990) The Origins of the Second World 
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War (1961): ‘Everything about Fascism was a fraud. … Fascist rule was corrupt, incompetent, 
empty’.91 While only some Leftist academics like British historian Dave Renton (b.1972) 
maintain a similarly strident perspective today, British historian Roger Eatwell (b.1949) was 
nonetheless able to claim in 2013 that ‘most historians challenge the validity of ideological 
approaches, stressing the importance of studying practice’.92 The controversy has been further 
inflamed by Griffin’s proclamation in the mid-1990s that his perspective had become the ‘new 
consensus’ amongst academics, regardless of the fact that many prominent scholars have 
been uneasy with this shift in the debate.93 While controversial, Griffin’s influence has been 
immense.94  
Over the last three decades, historians have increasingly focussed on issues relating to 
gender and fascism. According to British historian Kevin Passmore, women were barely 
mentioned by historians of fascism until 1986.95 Yet, as explained by Italian historian Luisa 
Passerini (b.1941), ‘[g]ender is central to the articulation of the fascist discourse. All its 
interpreters have recognised this’.96 Fascism made fundamental distinctions in the roles of 
men and women in its vision for the future: men were to be the foundation of the nation’s 
workforce and political leadership, while women were generally to be relegated to traditional 
positions of motherhood and housekeeping. Put simply, fascism was an ‘idealisation of virility 
as a political imperative’.97 Through sustained historical investigation, recent scholarship has 
rejected the long-standing idea that women, both those involved in fascist movements and 
living under fascist regimes, were essentially passive in nature. Debates over the agency, and 
also therefore the culpability, of women in Europe through the 1930s and 1940s are now 
commonplace, bringing attention to a comparatively overlooked element of political history.98 
An example of this in the context of Spanish fascism is the work of British historian Mary 
Vincent (b.1960). Her chapter ‘Spain’ in Women, Gender and Fascism in Europe, 1914-45 
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(2003) gave a narrative history of the membership of Sección Feminina (Women’s Section) of 
the Falange and their influence within the Franco regime.99 
While gender has been a fruitful lens for historians of particular examples of fascism, 
theorists of generic fascism have been reluctant to acknowledge its usefulness. In 2003, 
Passmore attributed this to the fact that gender theorists have been receptive to the ideas of 
poststructuralism, while theorists of generic fascism have, instead, been hostile.100 As a result, 
Passmore argued, the field of generic fascism has been shielded from potentially useful 
theoretical approaches applying the lens of gender. He went even further in 2011, lamenting 
that ‘[n]early 40 years after second-wave feminism first challenged academe, theorists of 
fascism have yet to engage seriously with women's or gender history’.101 Passmore has 
suggested that an increased understanding of gender history on the part of historians of 
generic fascism would lead to significantly more sophisticated arguments.102 
The way in which historians of Spanish fascism have dealt with gender has been 
flawed, emphasising an unduly positive vision of Primo de Rivera. He has been framed as 
having a ‘masculine’ personality, as heroic, charming and relatable to reader and writer alike. 
This thesis suggests that such a view is the result of an uncritical acceptance of gender norms 
by historians. Historians of Spanish fascism have overwhelmingly been male and have thus 
perhaps inadvertently sympathised with the ‘gentlemanly’ violence and masculine dominance 
of Primo de Rivera’s personality. Without an explicit attempt at critiquing their own masculine 
perspective, historians have separated ‘real’ fascist thuggery from the seemingly harmless 
violence of Primo de Rivera with an apparent acceptance of the notion that ‘boys will be boys’. 
While this thesis does not explicitly use gender as a specific framework, it recognises that 
gender is an important and under-examined factor in the historiography of fascism. One of my 
goals is that by critiquing the dominant models of representing Primo de Rivera, this thesis will 
act as groundwork for further study in this regard. 
Critics and observers of the Spanish Republic and Civil War described many figures of 
the anti-Republican Spanish Right, and especially Franco himself, as fascist. In the wake of the 
Second World War, Franco’s close relations with the fascist powers meant that he was 
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frequently considered a fascist relic in a post-fascist age.103 In the early 1960s, however, it 
became the academic standard to limit the category of ‘Spanish fascism’ to the Falange led by 
Primo de Rivera.104 In an immensely influential book chapter published in 1964, Spanish-
American sociologist Juan Linz (1926-2013) argued that Franco could not be considered fascist 
due to the fact that his Movimiento Nacional lacked a genuine mass mobilisation of the 
population.105 For Linz, Spanish fascism died with Primo de Rivera, the only figure whom he 
believed capable of leading a truly fascist public mobilisation. Once the Falange was tamed by 
Franco, therefore, Spanish fascism effectively ceased to exist. Linz’ conception of the nature of 
Spanish fascism was immediately popular, and was readily adopted by Franco himself as a 
reprieve from charges of fascism.106 By 1974, Payne described this position as the ‘classic 
definition’ of Francoism, which demonstrated its popularity.107 Thus, ‘Spanish fascism’ was 
effectively reduced to the person of Primo de Rivera, and ‘a curio of history’: comparatively 
irrelevant, quaint and non-threatening.108  
In recent decades, however, historians have utilised increasingly nuanced applications 
of the concept of fascism in Spain. Given the importance of Franco’s regime, these attempts at 
reconceptualisation have not been especially interested in the Falange of Primo de Rivera. 
Spanish historian Javier Tusell (1945-2005), for example, successfully argued for a 
conceptualisation of the ‘early period’ of Franco’s rule (seen by different historians as lasting 
until some point between 1941 and 1945) as ‘semi-fascist’ in nature.109 Tusell’s perspective 
has allowed for a more effective understanding of the influence the Falange still had within 
the Movimiento Nacional during the period when fascism seemed likely to dominate Europe. 
Another example of the partial expansion of the concept of fascism is seen in arguments over 
the utility of ‘fascistisation’ as a concept. The idea has been generally accepted in relation to 
most of the Spanish Right during the Second Republic, meaning that they are understood to 
have adopted certain elements of fascism but not enough to be properly defined as fascist.110 
There is also the more controversial idea of considering Franco’s regime not as ‘semi-fascist’, 
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but as ‘fascistised’. This distinction is made by Spanish historian Ismael Saz (b.1952), who 
argues for an increased focus on the agency of the Falange within the Franco regime.111 This 
position has not been popularly accepted. These debates will be explored further in Chapter 
Three. 
 Over the last few years, the seemingly unassailable notion that Primo de Rivera’s 
Falange was the single embodiment of genuine political fascism in Spain has been challenged. 
British journalist Sid Lowe (b.1976) published a modified version of his PhD thesis in 2010, 
which was devoted to reconceptualising the JAP as a full-fledged fascist movement.112 
Hitherto, the JAP had been dismissed by historians as incompetent imitators of fascism 
through comical reference to their salute, a version of the Nazi salute with the arm only half 
extended (and thus supposedly physically representative of a half-hearted fascism).113 Mann, 
directly referencing Payne’s similar idea, implored the reader of Fascists to ‘[t]ry it – it feels 
too wimpish to be fascist’.114 Lowe has convincingly argued for the utility of considering this 
movement as ‘genuinely’ fascist: it had an intensely nationalistic programme, held mass rallies 
and imitated the external trappings of fascist style, and believed that violent action was 
necessary for Spain’s salvation.115 While Lowe’s argument has not yet had a major 
historiographical impact, it potentially marks the beginning of the end of the long-standing 
position that Primo de Rivera’s Falange was the only ‘real’ fascist movement of the Second 
Spanish Republic.  
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‘Charismatic Leadership’ and the Allure of Señoritismo 
 
Perhaps more than any other political phenomenon of modern times, the history of fascism 
has been dominated by the individuals associated with its leadership. The image of 
demagoguery encapsulated in the 1935 Nazi propaganda film, Triumph of the Will, with a 
commanding leader enrapturing an adoring crowd with impassioned speech, is inextricably 
linked with the notion of fascism. Fascist leaders are often described as the physical 
embodiment of their movement, and José Antonio Primo de Rivera is no exception.1 Historians 
have long held that charismatic leadership is a fundamental facet of fascism. Yet, the defining 
feature of Primo de Rivera has been his distinction from the image of typical aggressive 
invective. Stanley Payne has stated this exact point, claiming that ‘[t]here is almost universal 
testimony that José Antonio did not have the personal style, manner or temperament of a 
typical fascist leader’.2 Primo de Rivera has been portrayed as predominantly respectable, to 
the extent that in 1968 Hugh Thomas stated that ‘[w]ith the distance of time, José Antonio is 
an appealing figure.’3  
This difference in personality of Primo de Rivera from the fascist norm has fascinated 
historians. In 1988 Payne commented that ‘[i]t may be observed that the personality of José 
Antonio Primo de Rivera continues to exert fascination’.4 Ten years later, Paul Preston stated 
that ‘the fascination of [Primo de Rivera’s] multi-faceted personality cannot be gainsaid’.5 The 
source of this long-standing fascination was neatly summarised by British political scientist 
Andrew Dobson (b.1957) in 1989: ‘José Antonio’s señoritismo set him apart from the 
traditional demagogic nature of European fascism’.6 Roughly translated as ‘gentlemanliness’, 
señoritismo has been directly invoked as a rebuttal of the idea of Primo de Rivera as a typically 
charismatic fascist agitator, and has, instead, allowed a focus on his comparatively respectable 
lifestyle. This chapter argues that the señoritismo of Primo de Rivera has been held in direct 
                                                          
1 Nathanael Greene, Fascism (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1968), 247. 
2 Stanley Payne, Spain: A Unique History (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2011), 202. 
3 Hugh Thomas, “Spain,” in European Fascism, ed. Stuart Woolf (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 
1968), 289. 
4 Stanley Payne, “Recent Historiography on the Spanish Republic and the Civil War,” The Journal of 
Modern History 60:3 (1988): 547. 
5 Paul Preston, ¡Comrades! Portraits from the Spanish Civil War (London: HarperCollins, 1999), 75. 
6 Andrew Dobson, An Introduction to the Politics and Philosophy of José Ortega y Gasset (Cambridge: 




contrast to typical notions of what charismatic leadership entails. The consequence of this is 
an idealised image of Primo de Rivera seen as charismatic in a personal sense, but without any 
critical examination of how charismatic leadership actually affected the function of the 
Falange. 
 
The Life and Career of José Antonio Primo de Rivera  
To appreciate the way in which historians have approached the figure of Primo de Rivera, it is 
necessary to supply some details of his life, career and death. José Antonio Primo de Rivera 
was born in 1903 in Madrid to an aristocratic family. He was raised in Madrid, though he also 
spent time on his family estates in Andalusia. He graduated with a degree in law from the 
University of Madrid in 1923. While he worked as a lawyer through the 1920s, Primo de Rivera 
gained a reputation as a dilettante due to his love for fancy nightclubs and bars. After the fall 
of his father from the position of military dictator, Primo de Rivera took up politics, joining a 
monarchist group in 1930. He soon grew disenchanted with their conservative ethos. He was 
instead inspired by Mussolini’s success, especially in cultivating a mass movement in a manner 
his own father never accomplished, and he turned towards fascism. In 1933, he founded the 
Falange Española which, as we have seen, swiftly merged with Ramiro Ledesma’s JONS. Even 
after this merger, the Falange still struggled financially. It was propped up by monthly stipends 
from Right-wing industrialists from Bilbao who were intent on destabilising the Second 
Republic, as well as by the Italian Fascist Party through its policy of funding international 
fascist movements.7 The height of Primo de Rivera’s political success was his election to the 
Spanish parliament, the Cortes, in 1933 as an independent.  
The Falange based itself on a foundational document, written by Ledesma and 
inspired by the Nazis, the Twenty-Seven Points.8 The doctrine outlined by these points has 
been described by Payne as typically fascist in nature, though more overtly religious in 
sentiment.9 Some of its fundamental tenets were a conception of Spain as an indivisible 
empire with a sacred destiny, the need for a totalitarian anti-parliamentary dictatorship, 
freedom as only being possible as expressed through the nation, an opposition to Marxist-
style class struggle and capitalist-style economic exploitation, and a personal dedication to a 
life of action and sacrifice. Economically, the Falange stood for a form of state-syndicalism, 
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aimed at improving the lives of workers without resorting to internationalist socialism.10 Primo 
de Rivera’s two most famous rhetorical pronouncements were the ‘destiny of the universal’ 
and ‘the dialectic of fists and pistols’. The former was a ‘poetic’ vision of a new revitalised, 
nationalist Spanish empire as a ‘universal’ force, beyond simply a ‘territory’: an eternal 
historical force with a destiny of greatness.11 The latter was an outline of a belief in the 
legitimacy of political violence. While much has been made of the fact that Primo de Rivera 
seemed initially reluctant to embrace terroristic violence, he eventually relented, to the 
satisfaction of the Falange’s catastrophist funders. 
 In early 1935, Primo de Rivera expelled Ledesma from the Falange. Rather than 
disagreement over ideology or practice, this dispute was rooted in a clash between the two 
personalities, as Ledesma sought increased authority within the movement. Primo de Rivera 
was henceforth in undisputed control of the Falange. As previously mentioned, by early 1936, 
Primo de Rivera was in prison, where he maintained ready contact with his newly criminalised 
movement, which was swelling in numbers. After the failure of Franco’s coup, Primo de Rivera 
is often seen as having experienced something of a political revelation. He offered to attempt 
to broker a peace deal with Franco through the appointment of a new ‘compromise’ 
government, which in practice meant a government comprising political figures the Falange 
found amenable, but he was rebuffed. Historians have debated to what extent this was an 
earnest conversion towards democratic norms, or simply a cynical ploy to escape prison.12  
After a court martial trial for crimes against the Republic, Primo de Rivera was 
condemned to death and executed in November 1936. As we have seen, this news was 
received with pleasure by Franco, glad to be rid of a potential rival for dominance.13 Yet, 
Franco also exhibited ruthless political cunning and refused to acknowledge Primo de Rivera’s 
death, thereby establishing the cult of ‘El Ausente’, the Absent One. By the time proof of his 
death was undeniable, Primo de Rivera had become the primary martyr of Francoism. To 
commemorate his supposed sacrifices for the ideals of Franco’s new dictatorship, cries of 
‘¡José Antonio, Presente!’ were mandatory at public rallies, meetings and even schools.14 In 
this manner, his memory was co-opted by Franco from the moment of his death. After the 
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conclusion of the Civil War, Primo de Rivera’s body was exhumed and transported with great 
ceremony to the newly constructed Valley of the Fallen, a memorial built by political prisoners 
to serve as Franco’s tomb. The remains of both men reside there to this day, though in mid-
2017 a non-binding resolution was passed in the Cortes to disinter Franco, after the ruling 
conservative Partido Popular boycotted the vote.15 The future of the Valley itself remains a 
significant political issue, complicated by its consecration as a basilica by the Catholic Church. 
In summary, Primo de Rivera has been understood as the leader of a typically fascist 
movement which was co-opted by Franco and reduced to a bureaucratic shadow of its former 
self. 
 
Charismatic Leadership in Theory and Practice 
Charisma as a concept is readily associated with Primo de Rivera. When discussing him, 
historians frequently use the term ‘charismatic’. For example, in World Fascism: A Historical 
Encyclopedia (2006), three separate entries by two different historians all describe him as 
‘charismatic’. In contrast, other historical individuals within these entries are introduced 
without descriptive adjectives.16 In 2013, Spanish historian Francisco Romero Salvadó (b.1960) 
defined Primo de Rivera by his ‘dazzling charisma’.17 This use of the term might seem 
unsurprising, given that ‘charismatic leadership’ has been understood an integral element of 
fascism.18 Yet, regardless of charisma’s universality both in conceptualisations of fascist 
leadership and with regard to Primo de Rivera himself, in his case historians have not utilised 
charismatic leadership as a framework of historical understanding. Rather, they have simply 
used the term as a quick and simple way to describe his personality. 
The adjective ‘charismatic’ has positive connotations in modern society and is 
frequently ascribed to popular film and sporting stars. While this application of the term may 
seem standard, social scientists find it inappropriate. Initially an esoteric Biblical term relating 
to the grace of those touched by the Christian God, the modern conceptualisation of charisma 
can be traced directly to German sociologist Max Weber (1864-1920).19 In his posthumously 
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published, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft (1922), partially translated into English in 1947 as 
Economy and Society, Weber outlined the idea of ‘charismatic authority’, one of his three 
sources of political legitimacy.20 The religious origin of his concept was deliberate. Weber 
outlined the notion of ‘charismatic leadership’ as involving political legitimation being derived 
from  
 
supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional powers or qualities [that 
are] not accessible to the ordinary person, but are regarded as of divine origin or as 
exemplary, and on the basis of them the individual concerned is treated as ‘leader’.21 
 
This conception focuses on charisma as a relationship between a messianic figure and his 
followers, from the perspective of the foundation of power relationships, authority and 
control. Roger Eatwell has suggested that the popular usage of the term ‘charisma’ has moved 
too far from its Weberian social-scientific roots and thus become ‘debased’.22 As such, the 
heuristic value of the term for understanding power relationships has been undermined. As 
American sociologist Joseph Bensman (1922-1986) outlined in 1975, charisma 
 
by now is not only the name of a perfume and the title of a pop tune, the name of a 
laundry, and a shirt brand, but also widely applied to virtually every situation in which 
the popularity of a political or any public personality is involved.23 
 
This academic concern has not abated in recent years. For example, in 2005, American 
sociologist Christopher Adair-Toteff derided the existence of ‘charisma training’ workshops 
offered to businessmen to improve their public image, teaching confidence and elocution.24 
Beyond the confines of academia specifically devoted to studies of charismatic leadership, 
therefore, there is little critical examination of the specific meaning of the term. 
With The Spellbinders (1984), American sociologist Ann Ruth Willner (b.1924) led a 
shift away from a focus on the actual characteristics of charismatic leaders themselves. She 
admitted that Weber’s definition seems to justify a focus on the personality of the leader, the 
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‘magnetic’ qualities of the individual.25 For her, and subsequent academics, the more useful 
focus for understanding the charismatic bond is on the followers, the ‘magnetised’ and their 
‘magnetisability’.26 Charisma is thus understood as a relationship with a particular kind of 
power dynamic, rather than a personal characteristic. In academia more generally, however, 
this level of analytical sophistication regarding the term is absent. While Eatwell does not go 
so far as to agree with American sociologist William Spinrad, who argued in 1991 that the 
whole concept of charisma in an academic setting should be abandoned, he acknowledges 
that the fact that historians almost never seek to define ‘charisma’ in any way is a concern.27 
For Eatwell, historians have applied the concept of charisma far too liberally, without any 
attempt at justification or acknowledgement of its sociological connotations. This is evident in 
the case of Primo de Rivera, as almost all sources which have declared him ‘charismatic’ have 
not addressed what, precisely, that means. The term is mostly used freely in the ‘popular’ 
(rather than ‘academic’) sense, as essentially synonymous with ‘charming’, ‘eloquent’ or 
‘confident’.  
Despite these fundamental concerns regarding the precise meaning of charisma, 
‘charismatic leadership’ has become an integral element of studies of fascism. This is not to 
say that it has been utilised effectively, however. The importance of charisma is seen with 
Payne’s typological definition of fascism, and generally being understood as one of the most 
overt markers of fascism. The idea of charismatic leadership is inextricably linked with the 
‘fascist type’, seen as ‘harsh, authoritarian, sectarian, fanatical, and prone to violence’.28 This 
imagery originated from the archetypal fascist leaders, Mussolini and Hitler. Thus, many 
academics associate fascist charismatic leadership with crudity, appealing to the base instincts 
of their followers. The Penguin Political Dictionary (1939), for example, denounced Hitler, 
representative of fascism broadly, as ‘half-educated’ and ‘a pathological type’ dedicated to 
‘lying unscrupulously’.29 A 1947 report presented to the US Congress stated that fascist leaders 
demand ‘blind obedience’, with the threat of death to any who engaged in the ‘slightest 
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wavering’.30 In 1967, German-British historian Francis Carsten (1911-1998) explained the role 
of the fascist leader as ‘the mouthpiece of popular passions and hatreds’.31 A common 
element of fascist leaders was seen to be an irrational fanaticism and belief in their own skills 
and destiny.32 Perhaps the most influential construction of fascist leadership was British 
historian Ian Kershaw’s outlining of the ‘Hitler myth’. Hitler and his associates within the 
Ministry of Propaganda manipulatively sought to portray him in a particular manner, with the 
intention of building a cult of personality.33 This idea of manipulation of the masses, of 
deceiving them with fascist smoke and mirrors, remains powerful. Yet, these stereotypes do 
not neatly fit in the case of Primo de Rivera. The dissonance between these standard images of 
a typical fascist and the genteel demeanour of Primo de Rivera in his aristocratic lifestyle is a 
significant factor in Anglophone historical perceptions of the man.  
There have been few attempts to evaluate Primo de Rivera critically through an 
explicit lens of charismatic leadership. British historian Aristotle Kallis (b.1970) argued in 2006 
that it has been ‘long-held conventional wisdom’ to apply ‘charismatic’ qualities to fascist 
leaders in order to understand their appeal.34 Yet, he claimed that no systematic attempt to 
explore this relationship between leader and follower had been effectively undertaken beyond 
the confines of Hitler or Mussolini.35 He believed that ideas of ‘charismatic leadership’ as a 
foundational element of fascism were almost entirely derived from the cases of Mussolini and 
Hitler. While this phenomenon was readily studied in relation to Italy and Germany, lesser-
known fascist leaders were not being understood through this framework. To counter this 
trend, Kallis sought to apply the concept of ‘coterie charisma’ to a set of marginal fascist 
leaders, including Oswald Mosley and Primo de Rivera.36 The concept of ‘coterie charisma’ was 
developed by Eatwell in 2002 as a sub-type of charismatic leadership. This phenomenon 
relates to a devotion towards a specific individual by a close-knit band of dedicated followers, 
rather than mass appeal.37 In the case of Primo de Rivera, this coterie is considered to be the 
loyal core of dedicated Falangists who operated under him while the Falange was still a 
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marginal political entity, the ‘old-shirts’.38 Kallis stated that the Falange’s leader legitimised 
the movement with a pact with his set of close followers, whose relationship with him was 
similar to the Weberian ideal type of divine reverence leading to theoretically unconditional 
faith in the leader.39 Kallis did not consider Primo de Rivera for specific examination, but 
simply used him as an example, coming to identical conclusions in the cases of Mosley, Belgian 
Rex leader Léon Degrelle (1906-1994), and Corneliu Codreanu (1899-1938), leader of the 
Romanian Iron Guard. Similarly, when later insisting on the idea of Primo de Rivera having 
‘genuine domination of a charismatic community’, Kallis referred to multiple leaders of fascist 
movements at once, treating them all functionally equivalently.40 To my knowledge, this is the 
only systematic and comparative attempt at exploring the nature of charismatic leadership 
involving the Falange.  
It was not until 2007 that the first collected historical volume was published on the 
topic of charisma and fascism.41 This was almost three decades after Payne’s influential 
definition involving charismatic leadership was published. Even then, the primary focus on the 
volume was on ‘charismatised’ dictators, rather than leaders of fascist movements. The 
chapter on Spain, unsurprisingly, was written by Payne. Importantly for arguments that will be 
made in Chapter Three, it spent more than twice as much space discussing Franco as Primo de 
Rivera.42 Payne acknowledged that the followers of Primo de Rivera ‘did indeed respond to a 
kind of charisma, but the scope was so limited that he does not bear comparison with major 
charismatic figures’.43 This is an interesting statement in its dismissal of the importance of 
charisma, given the fact that Payne’s own definition of fascism highlights the centrality of 
charismatic leadership. It also demonstrates the academic interest in ‘major charismatic 
figures’ of fascism, which in practice are limited to Hitler and Mussolini. Payne’s chapter did 
not make reference to the earlier work about fascist charisma by Kallis, and came to the 
opposite conclusion. Payne did not invoke Eatwell’s understanding of coterie charisma, though 
he did imply that it might be applicable in a limited scope.44 
 Payne’s chapter also demonstrates the academic confusion and ambiguity regarding 
Primo de Rivera’s personal charisma. He stated that Primo de Rivera had personal charm that 
won him friends and admirers, as well as ‘a certain winsome – a charisma of at least a sort – 
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that attracted young followers’.45 Here, Payne directly conflates charm and charisma. This 
represents the ‘debased’ use of the term charismatic when dealing with the Falangist leader, 
in line with those concerns from scholars of charisma. Instead of characterising the leadership 
of Primo de Rivera through the sociological lens of charisma, as his own definitional typology 
should suggest, Payne defines Primo de Rivera’s leadership through the lens of personal 
charm: attracting followers through his ‘winsome’, a naïve appeal with tones of innocence. 
This perspective has a long history. When reviewing Falange, British historian Alastair 
Hennessy highlighted the idea that the Falange itself was only held together by the ‘sheer 
force and charm of [Primo de Rivera’s] personality’.46 In this construction, personal charm is a 
direct substitute for charismatic leadership. In the case of Primo de Rivera, therefore, concerns 
over the misuse of the term charisma seem well-founded. The following examination 
demonstrates that charisma, often associated with demagoguery and domineering control, 
relates to the Jefe of the Falange only as personal charm. As such, he has become personally 
idealised and depoliticised. 
 
The Construction of Primo de Rivera as a Depoliticised Individual 
Early scholarship of fascism placed great importance on the personality traits of its leadership. 
A respectable personality was seen as incompatible with fascist leadership. Anglophone 
historiography has often distinguished Primo de Rivera from ‘normal’ fascist leadership based 
on this point. An example of this can be seen in Spain (1942) by Spanish historian Salvador de 
Madariaga (1886-1978), a liberal pacifist who fled Spain for England in 1936. At a time when 
fascist leadership was generally understood by outsiders in terms of aberrant personality 
traits, Madariaga insisted that because ‘brave, intelligent and idealistic’ Primo de Rivera had 
‘an irrepressible sense of humour’, he was ‘utterly disqualified for [fascist] leadership’.47  
Historical emphasis on an idealised Primo de Rivera was established by the fact that 
several influential Anglophone authors knew him personally. These writers openly professed a 
personal liking for Primo de Rivera, even when they ardently opposed his movement. In this 
section, three specific case studies will be examined to illustrate this point: the summary of an 
interview with Primo de Rivera by American journalist Jay Allen (1900-1972), The Life and 
Death of the Spanish Republic (1940) by British journalist Henry Buckley (d.1972) and My 
Mission to Spain (1954) by American diplomat and historian Claude Bowers (1878-1958). 
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These works, among others, institutionalised a trend of viewing Primo de Rivera primarily as a 
likeable individual, and only secondarily as a fascist leader.  
Jay Allen has been seen by modern historians as among the most intellectual and well-
informed journalists covering the Spanish Civil War.48 In October 1936 Allen interviewed Primo 
de Rivera in prison, shortly before his execution. The account that Allen wrote of the meeting 
is highly regarded by academics, due to its proximity to Primo de Rivera’s death.49 Although 
they were not close enough to be considered friends, Allen and Primo de Rivera had met many 
times. Primo de Rivera had many friends within the British expatriate and ambassadorial 
community, so their social circles overlapped. Yet, the political passions of Primo de Rivera and 
Allen were entirely incompatible. While Primo de Rivera called for the destruction of the 
Republic, Allen was dedicated to its preservation. When the Civil War broke out, Allen actively 
lobbied across America for intervention on the side of the Republic, which offended American 
Catholic groups who tended to support Franco’s ‘crusade’ against the ‘atheism’ of the 
Republican government.50 His reports for the Chicago Tribune were eventually considered too 
sympathetic towards the Republican cause, and he was fired.51 Allen related years later to his 
friend Herbert Southworth that he ‘liked [Primo de Rivera] though [he] hated his crowd’.52 
Allen also confided in Southworth that he ‘had a sneaking sort of affection for José Antonio’, 
evoking a tone of semi-guilty ambivalence, yet also indicating something of a real personal 
rapport.53 This curious combination of emotions is evidenced in the interview with Primo de 
Rivera, published in the Chicago Daily Tribune and the London News Chronicle in October 
1936.  
By the time of the interview, Primo de Rivera had been imprisoned by Republican 
authorities for months, and his execution was only weeks away. Allen introduced Primo de 
Rivera as speaking English with a ‘charming smile’, and starved for news about ‘his boys’.54 
When the topic of conversation switched to the origin and role of violence in the Second 
Republic, Allen wrote that he did not feel comfortable pushing the issue with ‘this so 
handsome, so assured young aristocrat’ due to the growing anger of his Republican handlers 
who had strong feelings on this particular issue.55 When leaving the interview, Allen 
acknowledged ‘the prisoner’s magnificent presence’, and concluded with the following 
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statement: ‘There’ll be a trial… It will be a trial not only of the man but of Spanish Fascism. I 
can’t for the life of me imagine any circumstances which will save this young man.’56 It is 
significant that Allen chose to end on such a melancholy note. He was writing about a social 
acquaintance, rather than a distant political figure. Allen’s political persuasion indicates that ‘a 
trial of Spanish Fascism’ could justifiably result in nothing but the strictest punishment, yet he 
lingers on a tragic image of a doomed ‘young man’.  
Allen was even more upfront about his feelings in an updated version of the interview 
published a few weeks after the first. In the London News Chronicle, Allen expanded his article 
and was more candid about his relationship with Primo de Rivera. He wrote that ‘I was sorry, 
because I rather liked José Antonio as a person – however frivolous, wrongheaded and 
dangerous I thought his politics.’57 While Allen acknowledged the danger of fascism, he 
primarily characterised Primo de Rivera’s ideals as being ‘frivolous’, rather than deeply held. 
Allen supplied a new final sentence: ‘His situation is very bad. The least I can do is not to 
aggravate it.’58 Primo de Rivera is himself cast as a victim. Thus, Allen’s intensely anti-fascist 
and pro-Republican perspective was muted by his sympathy towards Primo de Rivera as a 
person.  
While Allen was among the earliest Anglophone authors to have their perspective 
shaped by a personal relationship with Primo de Rivera, he was not the most influential. The 
Life and Death of the Spanish Republic (1940) by Henry Buckley has been hailed as one of the 
most enduring accounts of the Spanish Republic.59 In particular, Preston claims that: 
 
One of the greatest joys of Buckley’s prose is to be found in his immensely perceptive 
portraits of the major political and military figures of the day which have profoundly 
coloured the later judgements of historians.60  
 
This is an apt assessment in the case of José Antonio Primo de Rivera. Buckley admitted in his 
book that he found it difficult to be critical towards political figures he found personally 
charming.61 He introduced Primo de Rivera with reference to British socialite Princess 
Elizabeth Bibesco’s (1897-1945) admiration for him, which Buckley claimed to have fully 
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shared.62 Buckley stated that he had always felt Primo de Rivera to be ‘both charming and 
courteous’.63 He emphasised this point, describing him as ‘[t]all, thirty, soft-voiced, courteous’, 
and wrote that ‘José Antonio was one of the nicest people in Madrid’.64 Buckley went into 
great depth about the personality and physique of Primo de Rivera: 
 
José Antonio was so tall and elegant that he could have had an enormous success in 
feminine society, but he took life very seriously and I think was so fond of literature, 
and especially of poetry, that the average society señorita had not a great deal of 
attraction for him.65 
 
Buckley reminisced about how they often ‘chatted in the lobbies of Parliament’, and that he 
found Primo de Rivera’s accent while speaking English very charming. Buckley sometimes 
visited Primo de Rivera’s office to borrow books.66  
While waxing lyrical about Primo de Rivera’s personal merits, Buckley thoroughly 
depoliticised him. The only reminder of his political career in violent terrorism can be seen in 
the aside: ‘[h]e looked very unreal in his role of a Fascist leader’.67 For Buckley, it seemed, 
Primo de Rivera was a friend who could be disassociated from the activities of his followers. 
Or, at least, that would be the case if not for an almost resigned recognition of the existence of 
the Falange. Buckley admitted: 
 
It would, of course, be a mistake to let oneself be led away too much by the personal 
charm of José Antonio and to overlook the fact that apart from the handful of young 
people of his own class who supported him, his organisation also had a number of 
paid followers who were not choice in their methods. Not to put too fine a point on it, 
they were simply hired gunmen.68  
 
This admonishment, however, is directed at the Falangist militants rather than the Jefe 
himself. The acknowledgement of the personal charm of Primo de Rivera potentially causing 
one to overlook his involvement with the negative elements of his movement is perceptive, 
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yet Buckley did not seem to have seriously utilised his own advice. In later sections of his book 
devoted to denouncing Falangist violence, Buckley never directly implicated Primo de Rivera, 
and thus the lasting image in his book is that of a friendly gentleman.69  
One final example of the personal relationship with Primo de Rivera affecting the 
conclusions made by early writers is seen in My Mission to Spain (1954) by Claude Bowers. 
This book is perhaps the most extreme example of the memorialisation of Primo de Rivera 
from a perspective of friendship. Bowers outlined his political perspective clearly, stating that 
‘[t]hroughout the war in Spain, after the active participation of the Axis became notorious, my 
sympathies were with the Spanish republicans and their democratic ideology.’70 A biographical 
article from 1987 stated that all Bowers’ life he was ‘a fervent partisan of liberal democracy’.71 
That such a man could nevertheless personally idealise the leader of Spanish fascism is thus 
significant.  
Bowers introduced Primo de Rivera in a chapter with the heading ‘Meanderings in a 
Magic Land’, evoking the kind of patronising imagery of Spain as something adrift from reality, 
a convention that has dogged historical writing on Spain for centuries.72 This implicitly set his 
meeting with Primo de Rivera as something alien to the political concerns of 1930s Europe. 
The image of Spain being separate from Europe, inhabited by a proud and passionate people, 
has assisted in framing Primo de Rivera as fundamentally different from other fascist leaders. 
Spanish fascism is therefore understood as ‘peripheral’ in nature, with the threat of Primo de 
Rivera’s ideology inherently less dangerous to Anglophone liberal democratic ideals.73  
Bowers wrote of their meeting in July 1933: ‘That afternoon, at a tea dance in the villa 
of a friend, I met an interesting youth destined for a tragic end’.74 He continued: ‘When I met 
him that day he had begun the organisation of the Fascist party’.75 Bowers, the man who in 
the preface of his book outlined that fascism was a ‘flood of barbarism’ and that the USA 
‘must be prepared to fight as the gallant loyalists of Spain fought and died’, stated here that: ‘I 
shall always remember [Primo de Rivera] as I saw him first, young, boyish, courteous, smiling 
and dancing that afternoon in the villa in San Sebastián’.76 Bowers asserted outright that, for 
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him, the ‘real’ José Antonio Primo de Rivera, or at least the one worth remembering for 
posterity, was a friendly youth dancing gracefully at a garden party.  
Primo de Rivera’s friendliness was a frequent theme even amongst those who did not 
know him personally. Hispanists differentiated him from typical fascism with an emphasis that 
he was on friendly terms with many of his political enemies. This ability to be courteous 
towards ‘enemies’ was seen as definitively ‘un-fascist’. One of the most important examples of 
this is seen in The Life and Death of the Spanish Republic (1943) by British Hispanist Gerald 
Brenan (1894-1987). Preston described this book as the first ‘truly’ historical work on 1930s 
Spanish politics, remaining ‘unequalled for its authenticity and feel’.77 Brenan only addressed 
Primo de Rivera in passing, but the image painted is concise and memorable. He claimed that 
‘José Antonio, as he is always called, was a young Andalusian of charm and imagination.’78 
Brenan based this upon the fact that ‘[e]ven [Primo de Rivera’s] enemies, the Socialists, could 
not help having a certain liking for him. In café discussions he used to insist that he was closer 
to them than to the Conservatives’.79 Payne followed this logic in Falange, emphasising that 
Primo de Rivera was on good terms with rival politicians due to his inherently charming and 
good-natured personality.80 Both the Spanish Right-wing press and some of the Falange itself 
criticised Primo de Rivera for his personal relationships with political opponents.81 Other 
Spanish fascists, who are seen to have lacked this magnanimous charm, have borne the brunt 
of historical criticism of Spanish fascism. In Spain 1808-1939 (1966), British historian Raymond 
Carr (1919-2015) summarised the prominent members of the Falange as ‘a collection of 
bizarre individuals’.82 Yet, he introduced Primo de Rivera as a man of ‘great personal charm’ 
whose ‘main ideas were simple, derivative, and poetic.’83  
The depoliticisation of Primo de Rivera continued beyond his life to include the 
manner of his death. In his bibliographical study, published in 1974, Luis Álvarez Gutiérrez 
summarised the general historical tone taken towards Primo de Rivera. He stated that, apart 
from the polemics of Southworth, essentially no historians approached Primo de Rivera from a 
critical perspective.84 He attributed this to the fact that ‘political adversaries are not interested 
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in reviving the memory of a tragically disappeared rival and prefer to maintain a discreet 
silence’.85 Álvarez Gutiérrez emphasised that ‘[a] death like José Antonio Primo de Rivera’s, in 
full youth losing his life for his ideals, produces respect, appeases the polemicists and 
encourages more even-handed and restrained judgements’.86 Though Álvarez Gutiérrez was 
critical of the hagiographic tone of almost all writing on Primo de Rivera, he supported the 
stance of ‘respecting’ Primo de Rivera due to the nature of his death. He dismissed 
Southworth’s historical credentials, describing him as a ‘known American critic’, and followed 
the conservative Anglophone trend by questioning Southworth’s status as a ‘real’ historian to 
discredit his work.87 Álvarez Gutiérrez explicitly contrasted Southworth with the ‘impartiality’ 
of Stanley Payne.88 He equated historical ‘objectivity’ with respectfulness. The idea that 
respect is inherently due to someone who died for their beliefs is peculiar, especially in the 
context of fascism. Yet, this idea was also espoused by Spanish historian Julio Gil Pecharromán 
(b.1955) in his biography of Primo de Rivera, José Antonio Primo de Rivera: Retrato de un 
Visionario (Portrait of a Visionary, 1996). He stated that, although he did not agree with many 
aspects of Primo de Rivera’s ideology, to avoid ‘sterile’ history, respect must be offered to ‘one 
prepared to die for his ideas’.89 He did not address the fact that these ideas were violently 
fascist in nature, and that those executed as fascists elsewhere in Europe were also on trial for 
the application of these very ideas. Pecharromán poetically concluded his book with the 
statement that, as Primo de Rivera was young when he met his death, he ‘has the right to 
occupy his place in History’.90 This is a strange statement, and it ascribes to Primo de Rivera a 
certain moral authority due to the nature of his early demise. While never so openly 
acknowledged, this idea has been representative of the position of Anglophone 
historiography. 
The importance of Primo de Rivera’s appealing charm in framing him as distinct from 
typical fascist leadership is demonstrated in The Spanish Right Under the Second Republic 
(1971) by Preston. He highlighted how Primo de Rivera ‘lacked the crudity of most charismatic 
leaders, the lunacy of Hitler or the buffoonery of Mussolini’, and was instead ‘cultivated and 
cosmopolitan, an eloquent and poetic character’.91 Preston’s outline of Primo de Rivera is 
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contrasted with the ‘rather deranged Ernesto Giménez Caballero’.92 The most telling 
statement of all comes with Preston’s conclusion regarding Spanish fascism in general, stating 
that ‘The Falange provided a taste of the irrationalism of fascism. But José Antonio was 
personally too normal to make a successful fascist leader.’93 This is statement underlines the 
common belief at the time that, for a fascist leader to be successful, they had to be 
fundamentally aberrant in personality.  
When personal charm is used as the primary means of judging a fascist leader, rather 
than an examination of their ideology or practice, ideas of an abberant personality as a fascist 
trait can reach absurd heights. This problem was demonstrated by Payne in 2006. Payne 
endorsed an extended quotation from a 2002 biography of Ledesma by Italian historian 
Luciano Casali (b.1946), in which the figures of Primo de Rivera and Ledesma were directly 
contrasted:  
 
In so far as José Antonio Primo de Rivera was to be a normal human in the structure of 
his personality (although with certain unusual talents), the combination of iron will, 
austerity, extreme intensity and cerebral fanaticism, [Ledesma] seemed more Russian 
than Spanish, a personality taken from a novel of Dostoyevsky, a starving student who 
becomes a revolutionary characteristic of the times of nihilist Russians.94 
 
While Primo de Rivera is a ‘normal’, if unusually talented, human, Ledesma is literally 
dehumanised, turned into a fictional character from a Dostoyevsky novel. For Casali, endorsed 
by Payne, without the ‘charm or personal charisma that was needed to be a great leader’, 
Ledesma was thus merely ‘a scathing radical theorist’.95 In this statement, ‘personal charisma’ 
is expressly outlined as a character trait. Payne expounded the full implications of this lack of 
‘personal charisma’: ‘any study of Ledesma should not be of his life (very short, ascetic and 
largely without incident) but of his politics and his ideas’.96 The historical judgement of a 
fascist ideologue based upon their political ideals seems appropriate. It is striking, therefore, 
that this fate is explicitly invoked only for Ledesma, and not the ‘normal human’ Primo de 
Rivera. 
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The Allure of Señoritismo 
As Primo de Rivera has been depoliticised due to his ‘non-fascist’ personality, historians have 
emphasised the ‘positive’ elements of his personality through a focus on his status as a 
señorito. This category incorporates three major elements that have been understood as 
positive: youth, physical attractiveness and an upper-class background. As such, this section 
will examine how historians have applied each of these elements, after first offering a brief 
explanation of the background of the concept of señoritismo itself. 
The term ‘señoritismo’ derives from the Spanish word ‘señorito’, which is the 
diminutive form of ‘señor’, meaning ‘lord’. It was translated succinctly by British historian 
Ronald Fraser (1930-2012) as ‘young gentleman’, though this does not quite incorporate the 
levels of ironic scorn the term evoked.97 The term was used by the Spanish public in a 
dismissive manner to castigate the perceived wastefulness of the lives of young aristocratic 
men who flaunted their inherited wealth with lives of public excess.98 The emblematic badge 
of señoritismo was a jacket and tie, worn about town at expensive bars and clubs. An 
alternative translation of the term señorito by American historian John Crow (1906-2001) was 
‘playboy’, which perhaps better reflects the ambiguously critical nature of the word.99 An 
emphasis on Primo de Rivera as a playboy señorito is the most obvious example of the 
gendered perspective of many historians. By emphasising ‘playboy’ traits, historians – 
overwhelmingly male, as mentioned in the Introduction – have trivialised the machismo and 
violence of Primo de Rivera, inferring that it was harmless or insignificant.  
 For mainstream politicians like José María Gil Robles, leader of the CEDA, the term 
señorito was a way to exclude men like Primo de Rivera from serious politics.100 This was a 
contemporary form of depoliticisation. As summarised by Southworth, the Spanish Right 
‘looked with indulgent indifference on the strange behaviour of this young aristocrat’, refusing 
to take him seriously.101 Spanish Leftists similarly outlined señoritismo in condescending terms, 
with leading socialist Luis Araquistáin (1886-1959) claiming that ‘a boy raised with pampering 
and comforts’ could never be an effective fascist leader, as ‘demagogic language is not 
possible to learn in books’.102 
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Primo de Rivera was aware of his negative image as a señorito, and acknowledged it in 
his speech given at the launch of the Falange Española in 1934. He attempted to downplay the 
impact of his aristocratic background on his political worldview: 
 
I should like to have this microphone before me carry the voice into every last 
working-class home to say: Yes, we wear a tie; yes, you may say of us that we are 
señoritos. But we urge a spirit of struggle for things that cannot concern us as 
señoritos; we come to fight so that hard and just sacrifices may be imposed on many 
of our own class.103 
 
Regardless of his attempts to distance himself from this idea of upper-class gentlemanliness, 
Primo de Rivera was never successful in this respect. This is important, given that shortly after 
the foundation of his movement, Primo de Rivera abandoned the public presentation of 
himself in a suit, instead favouring the Falange’s Fascism-inspired uniform of a blue shirt. In a 
study of Falangist self-representation in 2002, Mary Vincent made an insightful comment that 
this change in public image ‘goes almost unmentioned in historical studies’.104 The image of 
Primo de Rivera in a London-tailored suit has been more striking, and thus memorable, than 
that of him in a ‘traditional’ fascist-style coloured-shirt.  
 In historical summaries of Primo de Rivera, one of the most emphasised elements has 
been his youth. Youthfulness has implications of naivety, but also of idealism, passion and 
genuine conviction, with misguided goals potentially excusable due to a lack of life experience. 
Primo de Rivera’s supposed youthfulness is directly linked to these moral positions, rather 
than simply being a value-free temporal observation. This can be seen by the fact that ‘youth’ 
has been academically defined as encompassing the ages between 16 and 25.105 Born in 1903, 
Primo de Rivera was 30 years old upon the foundation of the Falange in 1933, and 33 when he 
died in 1936. Though perhaps young by the standards of politics, and certainly young at the 
time of his death, this seems slightly too old for such a universal emphasis on youthfulness. 
Youth has also been sociologically defined as a period of transition, between parental 
dependence and adult independence, which is not applicable to this period of Primo de 
Rivera’s life. It is true that the Falange was a youthful movement, with the majority of its pre-
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Civil War membership below the age of 21.106 However, Primo de Rivera was more than ten 
years older than most of his followers, and yet regarded similarly as a youth himself. Historians 
have rarely emphasised this age discrepancy when discussing Primo de Rivera’s youth. 
One of the fundamental paradoxes encountered by scholars within the field of ‘youth 
studies’ is that while ‘youth’ is an important social construction with real world impact, it 
evokes contradictory emotional responses from observers. It can be upheld as a moral virtue, 
as a time of idealism and vigour. But it is also a dismissive slur, for example in the context of 
‘youths’ as synonymous with young male delinquents.107 British sociologist Gill Jones (b.1942) 
summarised this impulse:  
 
‘Youthfulness’ thus conveys qualities, such as strength, beauty, idealism and energy, 
which are seen as desirable and coveted by older age groups, but on the other hand is 
also associated with ‘inferior’ characteristics of inexperience, lack of wisdom, hot-
headedness, experimentation, naivety, greenness, and lack of maturity and sense.108 
 
With recurring emphasis on the supposed youth of Primo de Rivera, whether intentionally or 
not, historians evoke these sorts of sentiments. Primo de Rivera benefits from both the 
‘positive’ and ‘negative’ qualities outlined above. The positive qualities are imbued in his 
character and idealism, while the negative ones used to excuse his adoption of fascist values. 
Sympathetic portrayals of Primo de Rivera frequently describe him as too ‘naïve’ to 
understand the full implications of fascism, and thus too confused to truly understand what he 
was doing.109 The moral idealisation of youth was famously outlined by US Senator Robert F 
Kennedy (1925-1968) in a speech to an anti-Apartheid gathering at Cape Town University in 
1966. In this speech, Kennedy highlighted that the fundamental values of humanity could be 
found in youth:  
 
Our answer is the world's hope; it is to rely on youth… This world demands the 
qualities of youth: not a time of life but a state of mind, a temper of the will, a quality 
of imagination, a predominance of courage over timidity, of the appetite for 
adventure over the life of ease.110 
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Kennedy was arguing that the bastion of fundamental human rights, and of liberal democracy, 
was found in the ideals of young people. In this construction, youthfulness is an inherent good, 
an agent of progress towards a better world. These qualities of youth are thus highly idealised. 
It is in this context that French Marxist historian Pierre Broué (1926-2005) could write in 1970 
that: ‘The founder and leader of the Falange, José Antonio, as he was known, was a young 
Andalusian of great charm, with all the qualities of youth in his favour, undeniably elegant in 
appearance.’111 Even an ardent ideological opponent of fascism could introduce Primo de 
Rivera as positively embodying ‘all the qualities of youth’. 
Anglophone commentary on the youth of Primo de Rivera was apparent from the 
outset of his political career. Youth was inseparable from the person of Primo de Rivera in 
newspaper reports, though specific reference to his precise age was not made. While he was 
not a major figure of Spanish politics, Primo de Rivera was mentioned in several articles. 
Shortly after the launch of the Falange, The Times ran an article entitled ‘Choice before Spain’. 
While warning of the risk posed by the fascism of the Falange, the article nonetheless 
described Primo de Rivera as ‘a promising young lawyer’. 112 Once they established Primo de 
Rivera as a relevant figure in Spanish politics, Anglophone newspapers almost exclusively 
referred to him as ‘young’. In a 1934 article in The New York Times, Primo de Rivera was 
mentioned by name three separate times, and in all instances his name was preceded by the 
word ‘young’.113 He was also occasionally described as ‘youthful’.114 By the conclusion of the 
Spanish Civil War, this idea was so entrenched that the title of a New York Times article 
referred to him simply as ‘Young Primo’.115 
Emphasis on Primo de Rivera as young extended through to academic historians and 
remains a common descriptor. In Falange, Payne summarised the character of Primo de Rivera 
as that of ‘basically a serious young man’.116 In ‘Spain’, a chapter from European Fascism 
(1968), Hugh Thomas invoked Primo de Rivera’s youth to distinguish him from the plethora of 
established politicians: ‘Since almost everyone had betrayed his father by the end, young 
Primo de Rivera found himself up against the entire established range of political parties’.117 
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More recently, Michael Mann described Primo de Rivera in 2004 as an ‘unusual and 
charismatic young leader’.118  
The way in which a focus on ‘youth’ can have an overtly idealising effect is seen in the 
work of American historian Gabriel Jackson. In his highly popular The Spanish Republic and 
Civil War, 1931-1939 (1965), he introduced the founder of the Falange as ‘[t]ypical of the 
ideals and confusions of a whole generation of youth.’119 He subsequently concluded his 
assessment of Primo de Rivera with the following: ‘There were several José Antonios – all 
dramatic, personally attractive, and naively egotistical… In all these qualities he was typical of 
his generation in Spain’.120 Jackson posited that Primo de Rivera was a ‘typical’ example of how 
Spaniards of his generation were engaged with politics. Rather than the singular leader 
traditionally associated with fascism, using charismatic authority to argue for a fascist future, 
Jackson described Primo de Rivera as simply a product of his time. Casting him as 
representative of a ‘whole generation’ is also problematic in the sense that it drastically 
overvalues his importance and influence over his peers (as well as overlooking the age 
discrepancy between himself and his young followers). It implies that he addressed concerns 
widely felt and was at least somewhat popular as a result. While the Falange was 
overwhelmingly populated by young men, it did not ever achieve any significant mainstream 
appeal, at least while Primo de Rivera was alive.  
Historians have also emphasised the physical appearance of Primo de Rivera in a 
manner which has reinforced a sympathetic perspective. Social psychologists have noted that 
people have a fundamental bias towards associating physical attractiveness with positive 
personality traits and moral character, including trustworthiness.121 This association of physical 
attractiveness with a morally upstanding nature has been noted to be so significant that jurors 
are less likely to convict attractive defendants, believing them less likely to be criminal in 
nature.122  
As with the emphasis on youth, an emphasis on the physical attractiveness of Primo 
de Rivera in Anglophone literature began during his lifetime. In The New York Times, articles 
relating to Primo de Rivera would sometimes feature a portrait of him, posing gracefully in his 
London-tailored suit.123 In one case, the newspaper article was predominantly about Prime 
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Minister Manuel Azaña (1880-1940) and his opposition to anti-democratic extremism, yet it 
was a large photographic portrait of Primo de Rivera that graced the page.124 Spanish 
aristocrat and eventual refugee, Constancia de la Mora (1906-1950), wrote in her 1940 
English-language autobiography about ‘young Primo de Rivera, the handsome, heart-breaking 
leader of the Falange’.125  
Historians continued to emphasise his good looks. Bowers wrote that:  
 
José Primo de Rivera [sic], eldest son of the Dictator, was young and darkly handsome. 
His coal-black hair shone glossily. His eyes were dark and keenly intelligent. His face 
was slender and of Andalusian hue. His manner was courtly, modest, deferential.126 
 
Later historians have been more succinct, simply introducing Primo de Rivera as ‘handsome’. 
Hugh Thomas wrote in The Spanish Civil War (1961) that ‘José Antonio was a tall, handsome 
lawyer’.127 In Mediterranean Fascism (1971), American historian Charles Delzell described 
Primo de Rivera as ‘the handsome, eldest son of the late General Miguel Primo de Rivera’.128  
Apart from youth, the fundamental requirement to be a señorito was to come from 
upper-class family. As a practising lawyer, Primo de Rivera did not quite fit the definition of 
señorito as idle, but his lifestyle and social background nevertheless ensured the public’s 
perception of him as one. For historians, the aristocratic heritage of Primo de Rivera has been 
a significant distinction from typical fascist leaders. Ideas of nobility in both heritage and 
temperament, sometimes expressly linked, have meant that he has been disassociated from 
his followers.  
The class composition of the Falange has been a point of historical debate. In the 
1960s, when academic conceptualisations started moving away from denouncing fascism as 
too barbaric and pathological to be properly understood, the dominant view was that the 
social base of fascism was the lower-middle class, the petite-bourgeoisie.129 Thus, in the 
important early volume on generic fascism, European Fascism (1968) edited by British 
historian Stuart Woolf (1931-), both British historian Hugh Trevor-Roper (1914-2003) and 
American historian Norman Kogan (1919-2011) framed fascism as primarily the preserve of 
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the lower-middle class.130 Delzell asserted the importance of class analyses of fascism, and the 
unusual class-position of Primo de Rivera: 
 
In differentiating fascistic regimes from backward-looking authoritarian systems it is 
important to keep in mind that demagogic leaders like Hitler and Mussolini did not 
emerge from the traditional ruling classes. Instead they usually rose from a different 
and humbler social stratum (though there were some exceptions, such as the 
aristocratic José Antonio Primo de Rivera in Spain and Sir Oswald Mosley in Britain).131  
 
The dominance of the lower-middle-class thesis was criticised by Israeli historian Zeev 
Sternhell (b.1935) in 1976.132 By 1980, the thesis was generally acknowledged as outdated and 
simplistic. 133 Support for fascism has increasingly been understood to have come in various 
ways from across all classes. In the case of the Falange, however, the idea of the lower-middle 
class as the bastion of fascism has still had a considerable influence. As the Falange never 
achieved electoral success, receiving only 0.7% of the 1936 vote, the focus on class and 
fascism in Spain has thus been more interested in the composition of the movement itself. 
Generally understood, Primo de Rivera and his Falange Española were a group of upper-
middle class students with an aristocratic core, while Ledesma and the JONS were in line with 
the stereotypical conception of fascism as a movement of the petite-bourgeoisie. In this 
manner, especially in earlier historical writing, the negative elements of Falangism were 
attributed to those who originated from the JONS and were from a lower-class background, 
while the respectable elements of Falangism originated from the aristocratic sensibilities of 
Primo de Rivera and his ‘court of litterateurs’.134 Some historians have deliberately invoked 
this class division within the Falange to denounce Ledesma and the more activist members of 
the Falange, portraying them as comparatively ‘plebeian’ in nature.135 
An emphasis on Primo de Rivera’s noble heritage in Anglophone literature can once 
again be traced back to journalism of the 1930s. The same article in The Times that first 
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described Primo de Rivera as a ‘promising young lawyer’ also noted that he was the ‘Marques 
de Estella’.136 In the tiers of Spanish nobility, José Antonio Primo de Rivera ranked among the 
highest. The ‘marquesado’ (marquessate) of Estella was granted by Spanish King Alfonso XII in 
1877 to José Antonio Primo de Rivera’s great-uncle. The title was inherited by Primo de 
Rivera’s father, and was amplified in scope by King Alfonso XIII in 1923 as a reward for seizing 
control of the state in a military dictatorship, with the granting of the position of grandee. This 
‘grandeza de España’ was the second-highest position within the Spanish aristocracy, just 
below the royal family, and was granted at the discretion of the monarch. Upon the death of 
his father in 1930, José Antonio Primo de Rivera inherited this title.  
By April 1934, the characterisation of Primo de Rivera as the ‘young Marques Primo de 
Rivera’ became standard in Anglophone journalism.137 The repeated emphasis on his noble 
heritage would have evoked sympathy in the readership, at least in the case of Britain, where 
issues of social class and respectability have been linked for centuries.138 With higher positions 
within the social strata granting increased levels of social prestige, the rank of ‘gentleman’ was 
reserved for highly educated men of at least middle-class background.139 Thus, by ensuring 
Primo de Rivera’s aristocratic titles were obvious, his level of respectability was set forth. In 
articles relating to his imprisonment and execution, The Times used the same stock phrase of 
‘Don José Antonio Primo de Rivera, Marques de Estella, son of the former dictator’.140 Given 
the political context of Britain at the time, with conservative newspapers supporting the 
British government’s policy of non-intervention, the indignity of a respectable nobleman being 
tried and executed by a supposedly ‘Communist’ Spanish Republic could be seen as tragic. This 
is evident in how Primo de Rivera’s social standing was repeatedly invoked in The Times’ 
article of 20 November 1936, ‘Trial of Spanish Fascist’. Subtitled ‘A Vigorous Defence’, the 
article states that ‘Don José Antonio Primo de Rivera, Marques de Estella, son of the former 
dictator… was condemned to death at Alicante last night.’141 The author returns to the notion 
of aristocracy when highlighting the familial values of the defendant: ‘Don José, who 
vigorously and dramatically defended himself, his brother and his brother’s wife… made a 
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warm defence of his father, who, he said, died deserted by his friends.’142 The combination of 
the familiarity of a first name, and emphatic deference to title seen in the phrase ‘Don José’, 
offered a sympathetic perspective. Even if it was simply standard editorial practice to use full 
titles of figures, without explicit intention to engender reader sympathy, the image of inherent 
respectability remains. 
This emphasis on the positive characteristics of Primo de Rivera’s aristocratic 
upbringing continued from journalism to historical writing. A significant example can be seen 
in The Martyrdom of Spain (1938) by Spanish writer and law professor Alfred Mendizabal.143 
This book was readily embraced by Left-leaning academics writing in Britain at the time, and 
was thus influential in that sphere. The Martyrdom of Spain was among the first book to adopt 
the idea of distinguishing Primo de Rivera from the ‘moral crimes’ of his followers based on his 
class background. Mendizabal clearly outlined his distaste for fascism, which he categorised as 
‘harmful and dangerous to the mental health of its partisans and to the orthodoxy of many 
simple Catholics’.144 While he expressed liberal-minded hostility towards the Falange in 
general, he did not extend this to its leader: 
 
A mass of wildly heroic literature continued to feed the inflamed Phalangists, of whom 
the only truly brave man was their leader, José Antonio Primo de Rivera, too noble, 
too fine a character for his following of wild men, who often reproached him for his 
breadth of view and his understanding of others.145 
 
Bravery is a trait Mendizabal attributed only to those of refined upper-class origin.  
An extreme example of the admirable nobility often seen as inherent in Primo de 
Rivera’s social background is the work of American journalist Charles Foltz (1910-2005). In The 
Masquerade in Spain (1948), Foltz denounced an array of Spanish fascists based on physical 
appearance and personality traits. He claimed that ‘Giménez Caballero [was] a bad poet and 
parlor intellectual’ as well as ‘temperamental’, that ‘Juan Aparicio [a co-founder of the JONS] 
was an egg-headed little man, who acquired ludicrous Napoleonic airs’, that ‘Antonio 
Bermudez Cañete [a journalist involved with the JONS] was a hack writer’, and rejoiced that 
‘Ramón Iglesias Parra [a member of the Falange’s organisational committee] was finally put 
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away safely in an asylum for lunatics’.146 When denouncing these fascist figures, Foltz based 
his criticism on personality and physique, rather than an attempt to engage with their beliefs 
or actions. This is brought into stark relief when he introduced Primo de Rivera as ‘an 
aristocrat, the cultured, well-travelled, and carefully educated son of General Miguel Primo de 
Rivera’.147 Rather than flippant criticism, Primo de Rivera’s social background is highlighted in 
an expressly adulatory manner. ‘Young Primo de Rivera’, Foltz waxed lyrically, was ‘not just 
another Spanish Fascist. He sincerely believed in social revolution.’148 In this construction, 
‘sincerity’ seems inextricably tied to social class. An examination of issues surrounding Primo 
de Rivera as a genuine revolutionary will be addressed in Chapter Three.  
Sometimes historians have simplistically asserted that the aristocratic nature of Primo 
de Rivera inherently elevated him morally above other fascist leaders. In The Rise of Fascism, 
Carsten asserted without evidence that ‘[i]t seems unlikely that either Hitler or Mussolini 
would have impressed this born aristocrat [Primo de Rivera]’.149 This is a strange conclusion, 
given Primo de Rivera’s well-known respect for Mussolini.150 Carsten simply assumed that a 
‘born aristocrat’ would be too sophisticated to indulge in such traditional fascist charismatic 
leadership. As disapproval of Hitler and Mussolini is understandably viewed by historians as a 
positive character trait, Carsten’s aside casts Primo de Rivera in a positive light for no reason 
beyond his class background.  
An even stronger example of aristocratic roots being understood as intrinsically 
positive can be seen in Preston’s The Spanish Right Under the Second Republic (1971). He 
wrote that a defining characteristic of Primo de Rivera was ‘an element of idealistic “noblesse 
oblige” reminiscent of Young England’.151 The reference to noblesse oblige invokes imagery of 
a well-intentioned, if paternalistic and condescending, desire to assist the lower classes. The 
image of a kind-hearted aristocrat offering goodwill from above, even at the expense of the 
material comforts of his own class, is much less threatening to the social order than the usual 
images of a fascist leader as an upstart lower-class rabble-rouser. This idea of gentleman as 
less threatening to established interests had a practical effect on Spanish politics, as the 
Spanish catastrophist financiers of fascism were considerably more enthused by Primo de 
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Rivera’s respectable background than by Ledesma, and thus more willing to fund the merged 
Falange’s activities.152 Primo de Rivera’s comparatively respectable social position meant that 
he was able to appear less threatening to established conservative interests, perceived as less 
devoted to radical social and economic reform. Preston goes further than the idea of noblesse 
oblige, though, by directly invoking Young England. This was a Victorian era political 
movement in Britain, based around romantic, paternalistic conservatism of Tory aristocrats 
from the sports fields of Eton, Cambridge, and Oxford. Their leader, British Prime Minister 
Benjamin Disraeli (1804-1881), has been lauded as among the country’s best. Thus, to invoke 
this patriotic liberal democratic heritage when discussing the nature of Spanish fascism is to 
sentimentalise it, at least in the eyes of British readership.  
The most explicit example of the moral authority granted to those of an aristocratic 
background was seen in Biographical Dictionary of the Extreme Right Since 1890 (1990) by 
British historian Philip Rees (b.1941). He asserted that Primo de Rivera ‘was devoid of the acid 
of resentment which seethed in petit-bourgeois fascists like Ledesma’.153 Instead of ‘seething’ 
with acidic resentment, something reserved for those of lower social background, the 
aristocratic nature of Primo de Rivera has ensured that his ideals have been associated with 
romanticism. 
The idea of Anglophone historians being inherently more positive towards upper-class 
political leaders has been directly raised in the context of Sir Oswald Mosley and his British 
Union of Fascists. Mosley was the only other fascist leader of the period from an aristocratic 
background, and has been a very controversial figure in British historiography. While generally 
denounced by historians, the few attempts at rehabilitation have been based on his 
aristocratic heritage. The inherent ‘romance’ of aristocratic life has recently come to the fore 
in the public’s perception of Mosley. A prominent television series produced by Channel 4 in 
1998 dramatised the life of Mosley, focusing on issues of love and passion within his 
aristocratic social circle.154 British political commentator Nick Cohen (b.1961) has argued that 
English culture has internalised the idea that high society is inherently admirable, and that 
Mosley’s position as ‘a toff’ has resulted in an unjustified sympathetic academic treatment.155 
This argument could be equally applied to British historians of Primo de Rivera and his 
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señoritismo. There is even a very similar parallel in a public presentation of Primo de Rivera 
from an aristocratic, romantic perspective which downplayed his fascist career. In 2015, a 
musical production opened in Madrid entitled Mi Princesa Roja (My Red Princess). This 
musical focussed on the life of Primo de Rivera as a heroic and dashing figure, with the central 
plot a politically-sanitised love affair with Elizabeth Bibesco (which has been rumoured since 
the 1930s but never proven).156 English-language journalistic commentary was interested in 
the relevance of this to the British aristocracy, framing the Bibesco as the ‘daughter of Lord 
Asquith’.157 Left-leaning Spanish literary responses were critical. They argued that the desire of 
the director to ‘reclaim’ the noble hero of Primo de Rivera was historically unconvincing.158 
Yet, the fact that such a play had its primary focus on ‘a story of impossible love’ amongst the 
gentry demonstrates the allure of the intrigues of aristocratic life.159 This fascinating glamour 
of high society is absent in narratives of ‘typical’ fascist leaders, who are unable to benefit 
from this humanising perspective. 
British historians of Oswald Mosley have addressed the issue of depoliticising a fascist 
leader since the 1970s. In striking contrast to the continued adulation for Primo de Rivera’s 
señoritismo, academics have criticised authors sympathetic to Mosley for focusing on his 
personality over his political impact. British historian John Vincent (b.1937) succinctly stated in 
1975 that ‘concentration on “Mosley the man” makes his political significance harder to 
assess, not easier’.160 He concluded that ‘separating Mosley from his [political] context’ had 
unfortunate ‘apologetic significance’.161 This criticism, subsequently well-acknowledged by the 
British historians, has had little impact on the historiography of Primo de Rivera. 
 
Conclusion 
The concept of charismatic leadership has not been utilised effectively by historians of Spanish 
fascism. This is despite the fact that it nominally constitutes one of the two most important 
criteria of most definitions of fascism. While it has become a well-established truism that 
fascist leadership was inherently charismatic in nature, serious attempts at applying the term 
to Primo de Rivera have been almost non-existent. While historians frequently assert the 
charisma of Primo de Rivera, this understanding of ‘charisma’ is essentially indistinguishable 
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from ‘charm’. The perspective of Primo de Rivera as a ‘debonair’ gentleman is thus distinct 
from the traditional perspective of fascist leaders as morally reprehensible and responsible for 
the crimes of the adherents of their movements.162 The unusual nature of this kind of 
personalisation and depoliticisation of a historical political figure has been addressed by 
Preston recently, albeit in the context of Franco rather than Primo de Rivera. He expressed 
incredulity over a recent biography on Franco written by Payne and Spanish journalist (and 
former neo-Nazi) Jesús Palacios.163 Preston stated that ‘[o]ne of the things that I find 
extraordinary … is that there are references to how handsome Franco was, how muscular, how 
gallant – and stuff that’s really obsequious.’164 Preston argued that deference to positive 
personal traits of historical figures has no place in academic history. Yet, in the case of Primo 
de Rivera, this ‘obsequiousness’ has been prominent. With charismatic leadership thus 
demonstrated to have been of little use in historical understanding of Primo de Rivera, it is 
important to assess historical approaches to the other prime element of fascism: political 
violence. 
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Primo de Rivera as the Non-Violent Jefe of a Violent Terroristic 
Movement 
 
Historians have frequently excused José Antonio Primo de Rivera of responsibility for the 
violence of his movement, despite considerable evidence linking him both to its justification 
and its practice. The Falange has been understood as typically violent for a fascist movement. 
They held weekly drills of their party militia, the leadership spouted rhetoric endorsing 
violence, and they operated a death squad, the Falange de la Sangre (Blood Phalanx). 
Nevertheless, historians have frequently upheld Primo de Rivera as ‘non-violent’, expressly 
distancing him from his own public rhetoric. A recent example of this is seen in Michael 
Mann’s description of Primo de Rivera as ‘squeamish’.1 In this construction, blame for the 
Falange’s violence is shifted to subordinate officials and restless young activists. 
This chapter argues that Primo de Rivera’s relationship with violence has been 
generally misrepresented by Anglophone historiography, with the result that he has 
consistently been portrayed as violence-averse. This approach has reinforced the 
mythologised perspective of Primo de Rivera as a heroic, dashing figure. To contextualise 
historians’ reluctance to associate Primo de Rivera with violence, it is necessary to outline how 
the issue of violence has been understood in relation to fascism. Therefore, the first section of 
this chapter explores the role of violence in the realm of fascist studies, the violence of the 
Falange, and how historians have approached the political violence of the Second Republic 
more generally. With this academic context established, the second section of this chapter 
argues that historians have often claimed Primo de Rivera was personally opposed to violence, 
which was not the case. Examples of direct violence by Primo de Rivera are represented as 
commendably masculine and heroic. The third section of this chapter argues that the fact that 
Primo de Rivera’s overtly violent rhetoric has often been framed as essentially poetic in 
character has had the effect of minimising the consequences of his statements in historical 
narratives. By dismissing the distasteful violent element from Primo de Rivera’s typical fascist 
ideas, many historians have managed to thereby portray these ideas as commendable, 
without reconciling their otherwise standard academic opposition to fascism. This has the 
result of framing his rhetoric as comparatively harmless, regardless of the political violence it 
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directly inspired. I will critique this position through the lens of Roger Griffin’s focus on taking 
fascist rhetoric ‘seriously’.2 Utilising Griffin’s framework and understanding Primo de Rivera’s 
violent rhetoric as a genuine statement of fascist values avoids artificially distancing him from 
the violent outcomes he publicly endorsed.  
 
Violence in the Histories of Generic Fascism and Modern Spain 
Political violence has been an integral element of the history of fascism and the Spanish 
Second Republic. Violence has been one of the most significant components of definitions of 
fascism, as fascists luxuriated in violent rhetoric and action. As the Falange has been widely 
viewed as the standard example of Spanish fascism, it too has readily been denounced as a 
violent, terroristic movement. Primo de Rivera’s repeated public endorsement of violence in 
defence of fascist ideals readily aligns with the actions of the Falange in the streets. This 
section argues that politicisation of historical debate over the moral culpability of violence in 
the Second Republic has had a major impact on historical perspectives on Primo de Rivera. The 
effect of this has been a relativisation of Primo de Rivera into a ‘lesser evil’ by those on the 
conservative side of a major polemical schism regarding ‘blame’ for the fall of the Second 
Republic. With Republican violence an immensely passionate topic of contemporary academic 
debate, historians like Stanley Payne have reified Primo de Rivera into a victim, rather than an 
agent, of violence. 
Violence has been central to historical understandings of fascism. The typical 
conception of fascism was neatly summarised by American historian Allen Douglas in 1984:  
 
Fascism, violence and storm troopers: in the popular mind the three are inseparable. 
The same could be said, on a more sophisticated plane, of the scholarly discourse on 
fascism. In an area in which so little consensus reigns, this seems to be one of the few 




Most catalogues of ’fascist minima’ have, for example, included paramilitary 
formations; and fascism has been seen to have a predilection for violence both on the 
level of ideology and that of tactics.4 
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Payne’s typology contains two separate criteria to this effect: (1) ‘Attempted mass 
mobilisation with militarisation of political relationships and style with the goal of a mass party 
militia’ and (2) ‘Positive evaluation and use of, or willingness to use, violence’.5 While Payne 
admitted that the full extent of his typology will not apply to all fascist movements, the 
existence of two separate definitional criteria of violence and militarism demonstrate how 
important they were considered to be. Payne maintained this version of the ‘fascist minimum’ 
in A History of Fascism, 1914-1945 (1995), thereby demonstrating the continued relevance of 
this perspective.6 In fact, in 2006 Payne went further, stating that ‘special valorisation of war 
and violence’ was an essential ‘key value and goal’ of fascism.7 Debates over the nature of 
fascism in that same year involved claims that violence is fascism’s defining characteristic.8  
Fascist violence has often been understood as even less legitimate than other forms of 
political violence. This position has been influenced by the academic focus on the horrors of 
Nazism. Ernst Nolte was unequivocal on this point in his seminal The Three Faces of Fascism 
(1965): 
 
Sociological or psychological explanations do not exhaust the nature of fascist 
violence. It contains something of original evil, of cynical contempt for human beings, 
and diabolical delight in the humiliation of another human being, a dark love of force 
for its own sake.9 
 
This kind of language no longer commonly features in academic discourse. For many 
historians, the ‘demonological’ approach offers no critical insight into fascism’s function and 
appeal.10 Fascist violence has still nevertheless been understood as distinct from other forms 
of political violence. This is due to fascism’s rhetorical embrace of violence itself as a force for 
good, rather than simply a practical means to an end.11 British political scientist Daniel 
Woodley recently demonstrated the continuing academic hostility towards fascist violence, 
concluding that it needed to be distinguished from other forms of mostly-Leftist violence, 
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based on their differing goals.12 As the goals of fascism were diametrically opposed to 
‘emancipatory violence’, it cannot be morally equated with violence that sought to grant 
freedoms to oppressed and marginalised groups.13  
Due to the Falange’s prominent involvement in political violence during the Spanish 
Republic, historians have understandably denounced it as a violent, militaristic movement. In 
The Spanish Civil War (1961), Hugh Thomas highlighted its ‘provocatory power’, and narrated 
tales of Falangists ‘riding around in motor cars armed with machine guns, [doing] everything 
they could to increase disorder’.14 He later referred to Falangists as ‘busy with their 
assassinations and street fighting’, which were understood as the Falange’s main political 
functions.15 In 1968, Payne outlined violence as a fundamental practice of the Falange, though 
he did not implicate Primo de Rivera by name.16 In 1996, British historian Michael Richards 
claimed that a mission of the Falange ‘was to bring about a revaluation of violence’ by overtly 
supporting it, and Paul Preston stated that it ‘continued to work hard to create an atmosphere 
of disorder’ designed to ‘ensure the escalation of a spiral of mindless violence’.17 In 2000, 
British historian Nigel Townson (b.1959) defined the Falange as ‘miniscule but highly militant’, 
emphasizing that violent action was a fundamental feature of the movement which self-
identified as a militia.18 Thus, when Primo de Rivera is not personally mentioned, the Falange 
has been understood through the lens outlined by Roger Griffin, who claimed that ‘the 
extolling of militaristic values… is a central theme of the rhetoric, ritual and style of all inter-
war fascisms’.19 
In his 1933 speech proclaiming the foundation of the Falange Española, Primo de 
Rivera drew on violent imagery and expressly endorsed political violence. For Payne in 1961, 
and for many subsequent historians, this speech was euphemistically considered ‘tensely 
poetic’.20 The academic focus on the ‘poetic’ qualities of Primo de Rivera’s rhetoric will be 
explored below. The overt recourse to violent activism is prominent in the speech:  
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Finally, we desire that if on some occasion [a system of authority, of hierarchy, and of 
order] must be achieved by violence, there be no shrinking from violence. Because 
who has said – while speaking of ‘everything save violence’ – that the supreme value 
in the hierarchy of values is amiability? Who has said that when our sentiments are 
insulted we are obliged to be accommodating instead of reacting like men? It is very 
correct indeed that dialectic is the first instrument of communication. But no other 
dialectic is admissible save the dialectic of fists and pistols when justice or the Patria is 
offended.21 
 
This ‘dialectic of fists and pistols’, framed by Primo de Rivera as the obvious response required 
when ‘reacting like men’, has been understood as a summation of the role of violence in 
fascist ideology. Primo de Rivera’s rhetoric of violence was reiterated in a 1934 speech in 
Valladolid, in which he announced the fusion of the Falange Española and the JONS. After 
denouncing the evils of liberalism and socialism, he concluded his address: 
 
We will not satisfy our aspirations by rearranging the state in some way. What we 
want is to give back Spain optimism, self-confidence, a clear and forceful life-style. 
That is why our group is not a party: it is a militia. That is why we are not here in order 
to become deputies, under-secretaries or ministers, but in order to fulfil, each in his 
place, whatever mission we are commanded to undertake… We have no personal 
ambitions, except, perhaps, the ambition to be in the forefront of danger.22 
 
As early as 1968, historians have understood that fascist justifications for violence involved 
high-minded claims of the righteous nature of their actions.23 Yet, as will be demonstrated, 
many Hispanist historians have refused to take Primo de Rivera’s statements as a serious 
statement of genuinely held ideology.  
Primo de Rivera’s justifications for violence were also demonstrated through his 
private correspondence, which demonstrates that his public violent rhetoric was not detached 
from his own views. In 1933, he sent a letter to his friend Julián Pemartín (1901-1966), in 
which he sought to address criticisms against fascism. In this letter, Primo de Rivera affirmed 
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that ‘violence is not systematically reprehensible, but only when it is contrary to justice’, and 
continued: ‘Why, therefore, should violence used against a victorious sect which spreads 
discord, disavows national continuity and obeys instructions from abroad… disqualify the 
system which such violence implants?’24 A year later, in a secret letter to Franco in support of 
a military coup, Primo de Rivera asserted that his ‘resolve to go out into the street with a gun 
in defence of Spain’ was unwavering.25 
While Primo de Rivera spoke openly about the moral validity of violence, the Falange 
Española did not immediately engage in practical violence upon its foundation in 1933. This 
initial hesitation has been instrumental in those historical attempts to cast him as non-violent. 
After Leftist attacks on Falangist street-vendors selling the movement’s magazine did not 
instantly inspire retaliatory violence, Primo de Rivera was denounced in the Right-wing press. 
He was accused of being the leader of ‘Franciscanism’ (a pacifist Catholic mendicant order) 
rather than fascism.26 While Primo de Rivera initially responded with a public pledge that the 
Falange was unwilling to stoop to ‘criminal’ retaliatory violence, by mid-1934 he had 
authorised the creation of Falangist death-squads and abandoned the principle of non-
response to violent provocation.27 With Spanish Leftists cognisant of the failures of socialists to 
halt the rise of fascism in Italy, Germany and most recently Austria, they became increasingly 
determined to deny the Falange space in the Spanish political sphere. In this climate, 
retaliatory violence continued, mostly in the form of street battles between rival groups, but 
also in the form of political assassinations. 
When discussing Primo de Rivera directly, historians have been reluctant to associate 
him with the violence of his movement. As seen in Chapter One, early writers on Spanish 
fascism embraced the vision of Primo de Rivera as too gentlemanly to be involved in violence. 
Subsequent historians have often been even more overtly defensive. In 1972, Thomas 
asserted that ‘[Primo de Rivera] himself was not really a man of violence, though his speeches 
provoked unrest and terror’.28 The apparent contradiction inherent in this statement is not 
addressed. Similarly, British historian Jack Gibbs claimed in 1973 that ‘the pacific José 
Antonio… found that his followers took too literally some of his more picturesque oratory’.29 
Spanish historian Vicente Sánchez-Biosca claimed in 2009 that the words of Primo de Rivera 
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have been retrospectively understood as ‘allegories, parables or predictions of a visionary, 
rather than as the prescriptive ideology of a political leader’, in spite of how he was 
understood by his followers at the time and how historians have damned the ideals of other 
fascist leaders.30 
While most historians have not adopted as extreme a view as Thomas, a mainstream 
perspective on the issue revolves around ‘ambiguity’. First outlined in Falange by Payne, this 
perspective was itself initially adopted by Thomas, who claimed that Primo de Rivera ‘was 
himself still ambiguous on the subject of violence’.31 The peculiarity of this perspective can be 
seen in a quote by Francisco Romero Salvadó, who stated in 2016 without clarification that 
‘[a]lthough ambiguous on the subject of violence, [Primo de Rivera] advocated the so-called 
dialectic of fists and guns’.32 No reason explaining any ‘ambiguity’ was supplied. 
Apart from concerns regarding the Falange specifically, the issue of political violence 
has been integral to historical studies of the Spanish Republic. A 2017 issue of The Journal of 
Contemporary History dedicated a special section to the topic of violence and the Spanish Civil 
War, in which British historian Richard Evans (b.1947) claimed that this issue is maybe the 
most controversial topic in any field of contemporary history.33 Apportionment of blame for 
this violence has been a concern for historians on both sides of the Left-Right political divide. 
The Spanish Republic is often understood through the lens of an inevitable cycle of escalating 
violence between Leftist and Rightist militants, described by Spanish historian Manuel Álvarez 
Tardío (b.1972) as ‘permanent mid-level violence which resulted in an unstoppable trickle of 
deaths’.34 Conservative historians have been accused of understanding the Republic primarily 
through hindsight, assuming that it was doomed to fail.35 From this somewhat teleological 
position, the argument that the failure of the Republic was inevitable leads to the conclusion 
that the military insurrection was justifiable. Other works have sought to counter the idea of 
the inevitability of the failure of Republic. They have demonstrated that, while serious, 
political violence in 1936 before the military coup was not uncontrollable. Progressive 
historians maintain that a teleological understanding of the Republic as doomed to fail has had 
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the effect of reinforcing Francoist claims of historical legitimacy.36 Left-leaning Spanish 
historian Eduardo González Calleja (b.1962), for example, argues that Rightist anti-Republican 
media at the time was invested in portraying a sense of catastrophe, and that the actual 
situation was far less cataclysmic than often assumed.37  
In a systematic attempt to determine which groups were the most implicated in 
violence, Álvarez Tardío stated in 2013 that, even with special scrutiny of primary evidence, it 
was often impossible to determine which parties had instigated violent street battles.38 He 
lamented that it is therefore difficult to address conclusively the ‘particularly pertinent’ 
question of responsibility for initiating violence.39 Another complication is that the number of 
casualties is not necessarily aligned with which party instigated the violence. In his analysis of 
political violence in the specific context of the national election in 1936, Álvarez Tardío 
concluded that, by far, the two most violent political groups were the Falange and the 
Socialists, with the Socialists initiating more conflict and causing more deaths than the 
Falange.40 The idea of Primo de Rivera as reluctantly forced into violence against his will has 
been helped by the fact that Leftists were apparently the more violent force in practice.  
When conservative historians such as Payne ascribe culpability for the breakdown of 
democracy to the Spanish Left, the issue of Falangist violence is necessarily relativised. 
González Calleja outlined that any study of political violence in the Spanish Republic 
necessarily involves elements of polemic, as to ascribe blame to one party is to exonerate their 
opponents.41 In 2016, British historian Helen Graham (b.1959) denounced the tendency of 
seeking to blame Leftist activism as the predominant source of political violence as a neo-
Francoist Manichaean worldview, explicitly seeking to cast Rightist violence as genuinely 
defensive in nature.42 These ‘revisionist’ historians derided by Graham understand the 
Falange’s violent nature almost in line with its own propagandistic view of itself, as defensive 
in nature. In this view, Primo de Rivera was a victim of Leftism, rather than an agent of 
violence himself. By contrast, progressive historians such as Preston attribute culpability for 
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the Civil War to those on the Right who launched the rebellion. From this perspective, 
Falangist violence was an obvious precursor, and Primo de Rivera is therefore much less likely 
to be distanced from the actions of his followers.  
 Stanley Payne is the most influential proponent of assessing Primo de Rivera as a 
‘lesser evil’ than the Leftists. As he has been the dominant voice of Anglophone literature on 
Spanish fascism, his perspective has been of immense importance in shaping the general 
historical narrative. In Spain: A Unique History (2011), Payne detailed that he has felt an 
antipathy towards ‘the Spanish left’ for most of his academic career, which has had a strong 
impact on the tone of his work.43 In The Spanish Revolution (1970), Payne sought to oppose 
the traditional sympathy for the Spanish Republic, and thus blamed its failure on the actions of 
Spanish Leftists.44 Payne’s desire to reframe the narrative was so strongly expressed that the 
leader of Francoist regime history, Ricardo de la Cierva, openly thanked Payne in 1972 for 
leading an Anglophone vanguard towards rejecting liberal ‘myths’ about the Spanish Right 
being at fault for the Civil War.45 Blaming the Spanish Left necessitated framing Falangist 
violence as less important than Leftist violence. For example, Payne emphasised a sense of 
unfairness with the way that the Falange was shut down by the government for terrorism, 
when on that basis  
 
the Socialist party, the Communist party, POUM [a Marxist party], and CNT [an 
anarchosyndicalist party] ought also to have been closed down. In addition to 
engaging in intermittent terrorism, they had attempted armed rebellion against the 
constitutional Republic, something that the Falange had not yet done.46 
 
In 1971, American historian Richard Robinson (1940-2013) argued a similar point, that ‘Primo 
de Rivera’s Falange and its youthful gunmen began a campaign of counter-terrorism against 
the extreme left’.47 The implication is that Falangist violence was indeed, as they themselves 
portrayed it, ‘defensive’ in nature. In 2008, Aristotle Kallis argued forcefully against taking the 
conceptualisation of fascism as defensive in nature seriously. He demonstrated that fascist 
leaders across Europe universally sought to project a defensive image. According to Kallis, 
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even Hitler claimed a fundamental aversion for violence, supposedly only resorting to it only 
when ‘necessary’ for his country.48 To grant credence, even implicitly, to the idea of Spanish 
fascism as ‘defensive’, therefore, is antithetical to the study of generic fascism. 
The evolution of Payne’s perspective on violence in the Spanish Republic 
demonstrates the way an anti-Leftist position can relativise Falangist violence into something 
comparatively acceptable. In 1973, Payne simply stated that terrorism was ‘initiated by the 
victorious revolutionary [leftist] groups’. However, by 1987, his tone had changed: Falangist 
rhetoric, which was ‘romantic in the extreme’, did not initially embrace violence, ‘which was 
well taken care of by leftist antifascists’.49 Payne stated that the period of Falangist non-
violence lasted until June 1934, which was less than a year after its foundation as the Falange 
Española and four months after the merger with the JONS.50 This is not a particularly long 
time, especially given the fact that mid-1934 was more than two years before the beginning of 
the Civil War. By 2003, Payne described this apparent commitment to non-violence as 
explicitly commendable: ‘Without doubt, one has to recognise the moral merit in that the 
Falange waited so long to respond to the numerous deaths committed by the left’.51 By 2006, 
Payne openly described Falangist violence as the fault of the Spanish Left: ‘leftist concern 
about fascist violence had become a self-fulfilling prophecy… The Socialists sowed the 
whirlwind and reaped the consequences.’52 He argued that it was the conscious and deliberate 
policy of the Left-wing government, led by Prime Minister Manuel Azaña, to allow Leftist 
violence while oppressing the Falange. He stated:  
 
The official arrest report on José Antonio simply read ‘Arrested as a fascist’, though no 
legislation existed which made it illegal to be a ‘fascist’ any more than to be a 
Communist or anarchist. Three days later a Madrid court ruled the entire party an 
illicit organisation for illegal possession of arms and violent activities. In this manner 
‘fascism’ would simply be abolished in Spain by decree. The whole affair was an 
example of the extreme politicisation of justice under the leftist regime, for there was 
a long list of leftist organisations that had engaged in much more illicit possession of 
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arms and violent activities than had the Falange, though none of them was 
outlawed.53 
 
The democratic republic is in this construction a ‘Leftist regime’ that unjustly and illegally 
oppressed the Falange. From Payne’s perspective, Primo de Rivera is disassociated from the 
primary source of violence. Payne takes this anti-Leftist position even further, claiming that 
Primo de Rivera only truly embraced violence at this turning point, as he ‘had given up hope of 
normal political relations or due process of law under the left Republican regime’.54 In this 
narrative, Falangist involvement in an insurrectionary conspiracy, after advocating violent anti-
democratic ideals for years, only occurred because of the unfair treatment Primo de Rivera 
received from a capricious Left-leaning Prime Minister.  
The strident position taken by Payne is further demonstrated in The Spanish Second 
Republic Revisited (2013). The explicit purpose of this edited volume was to counteract the 
politicisation of Spanish history and return to a more ‘objective’ perspective.55 In practice, this 
meant an affirmation of Rightist perspectives as ‘empirical’ and thus historical in nature, and 
Leftist perspectives as rooted in myth and flawed methodology.56 This Rightist pretence as a 
self-proclaimed bastion of historical objectivity has been notably criticised by British historian 
Chris Ealham (b.1965), whose work has sparked significant and hostile polemic amongst 
Spanish historians.57 In his contribution to the volume, Payne denounced the ‘radical 
subjectivism’ of twenty-first-century humanities, which ‘is strongly influenced by the 
ideological emphases of Political Correctness, the post-Marxist ideology of the Western left 
[and] the dominant ideology of the Western world’.58 He argued that the major goal of the 
historiography of Spain should be to combat the idea that the Spanish Republic was a 
legitimately democratic entity worthy of historical sympathy.59 He asserted that the Republic 
fundamentally denied political rights to conservatives, and was thus ‘a not very democratic 
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Republic’.60 Thus, the political passions of historians’ views on the morality and culpability of 
political groups during the Second Republic has greatly influenced their historical analysis. 
In accusing the Spanish Left of ‘causing’ violence and casting the Falange as primarily 
the victim of violence, Payne and other anti-Leftist historians have abstracted the situation in 
Spain away from its European context. British historian Vernon Bogdanor (b.1943) argues that 
political violence in Europe in the interwar period cannot be extricated from an understanding 
of the rising threat of fascist domination across the continent.61 In the case of Spain, Leftist 
organisations expressly invoked the spectre of Germany and Austria, where socialists had 
failed to combat the threat of fascism until it was too late. While the Falange itself may not 
have cast the first stone in Spain, fascism had violently usurped liberal democracies in three 
major European countries, after the fall of the Republic of Austria in May 1934. The Falange 
was the embodiment of that same malignant force attempting to establish itself in Spain.  
Historians in non-Spanish areas of fascist studies have criticised the positive 
relativisation of fascist violence through comparative and condemnatory reference to the 
violence of Leftist activists. In relation to Italian fascism, for example, British historian George 
Talbot critiqued historians who have constructed fascists as victims of violence, which he felt 
unjustly shifts moral culpability.62 With victims highlighted on both sides, fascists and anti-
fascists alike can be denounced as morally responsible for a generalised sense of violent 
disorder. Talbot argued that this is a simplistic and false equivalence, given that ‘[t]o be a 
victim… is not necessarily to be in the right’. 63 Thus, for Talbot, the violence of anti-fascists has 
no bearing on the moral respectability of fascist violence. His criticism aptly applies to Payne’s 
works. 
 
Primo de Rivera’s ‘Non-Violence’ as a Personal Characteristic 
Primo de Rivera’s señoritismo has set him apart from other fascist leaders who have been seen 
as embodying personal traits associated with fascist violence. Payne himself admitted in his 
semi-autobiographical Spain: A Unique History (2011) that, although he had no sympathy for 
the fascist aims and practice of the Falange, he ‘made some allowance for the charismatic 
qualities and intentions of José Antonio Primo de Rivera’.64 Payne attributed this making 
allowances for Primo de Rivera to the fact that he himself had embraced a ‘youthful 
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romanticism’ in his writing, which conveyed a sense of ‘the human drama of the Spanish 
disaster of those years’.65 As a result, Payne was able to portray Primo de Rivera as innately 
averse to violence, in a manner which is hard to reconcile with evidence of Primo de Rivera’s 
involvement in violent activity. There are many examples of Primo de Rivera engaging in 
violence, but only a few standard examples are typically mentioned in historical works. In 
these few cases, historians have glamorised the violence as an expression of gallant and 
offended masculine dignity. Rather than being violence-averse, there is ample evidence to 
suggest that Primo de Rivera was in fact violence-prone. This is an important conclusion, given 
the extent to which the personality of Primo de Rivera has been fused with the ideology of the 
Falange in mainstream histories of Spanish fascism.  
 Historical understanding of the violence of Primo de Rivera has been negatively 
impacted by historians’ lack of a critical perspective on the issue of masculinity and gender. 
While historians acknowledge that fascism involves the exaltation of ‘virility’, a violent form of 
hypermasculinity, they have nonetheless distanced Primo de Rivera from the practical 
implications of this. As addressed in the previous chapter, the violence of Primo de Rivera is 
not seen as ‘thuggish’ in ‘typical’ fascist style, but as apolitically ‘masculine’. Traditional 
masculinity, seen in the praise of strength and forcefulness, has thus been far more palatable 
to the generally-male historians of Spanish fascism. Yet, this perspective adopts uncritically the 
Falange’s own self-conceptualisation as a masculine movement and is akin to the sympathy 
for fascism that has been so opposed by historians of fascism. Pilar Primo de Rivera, the sister 
of José Antonio and dedicated leader of the Sección Feminina, held as a point of pride that 'the 
men of the Falange were too much men to involve us [women] in those duties [street-
fighting]', and Falangist hagiographies emphasised that ‘our women have never worn 
trousers’.66 Liberal historical emphasis on manliness as a virtue in the context of Primo de 
Rivera as a fascist leader has thus not received sufficient critical examination. 
The major incident of personal violence perpetrated by Primo de Rivera occurred in 
1930, when he assaulted General Gonzalo Queipo de Llano (1875-1951) in a Madrid café for 
insulting the memory of his father. In 1961, Thomas stated that ‘José Antonio was always 
ready to fight anyone who ventured to criticise his father, and indeed his career was in some 
ways simply an attempt to vindicate the old dictator.’67 Given that one of the most enduring 
historical images of General Primo de Rivera was Henry Buckley’s description of him as a 
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‘national Father Christmas’, this motivation of defending his father has been used to excuse 
and justify Primo de Rivera’s violent acts.68 His violence is thus represented as respectably 
masculine in nature: he was protecting the honour of his late father. After Queipo de Llano 
publicly denounced General Miguel Primo de Rivera shortly after his death, Primo de Rivera 
sought revenge for this slight against his family and went to Queipo de Llano’s home to seek 
redress. He was refused entry. That night he went with his brother Miguel to a café 
frequented by the General. Upon confirming his identity, Primo de Rivera punched Queipo de 
Llano in the face, dropping him to the floor.69 The General swiftly returned to his feet, and 
returned a punch, after which a brawl ensued. The police were called, and Primo de Rivera 
was dishonourably discharged from the military reserve.70 
Historical reception to Primo de Rivera’s actions in this instance has been remarkably 
positive. Journalist Jay Allen, who conducted the interview with the imprisoned Primo de 
Rivera, recounted to his friend Herbert Southworth some years after the incident: ‘As I think 
you know, I had a sneaking sort of affection for José Antonio. I had been present when he and 
Miguel took on Queipo de Llano in a café on the Alcalá – lovely fight they had!’71 Primo de 
Rivera’s violence is thus understood as something akin to a youthful romp. The idea of 
understanding this incident primarily as an act of familial duty extends to the current day. In 
2015, Preston engaged in a critique of General Queipo de Llano, who he derided as a 
‘psychopath’ and an ‘assassin’. With Queipo de Llano as the villain of the piece, Primo de 
Rivera’s attack was framed within the context of duty-bound honour: ‘Since José Primo de 
Rivera [General Primo de Rivera’s brother] was an old sick man with no sons, the dictator’s 
eldest son, José Antonio, took it on himself to defend the honour of his family.’72 No indication 
is given by Preston that this ‘defence’ is condemnable.  
When Primo de Rivera was involved in Falangist violence, he has been praised for his 
heroic bravery. While out patrolling in his car in 1934, a bomb was thrown onto his windshield. 
It failed to detonate and Primo de Rivera leapt out in chase, firing the gun he was carrying in 
an attempt to kill his attackers.73 For this action, Claude Bowers hailed Primo de Rivera as ‘of 
the breed of Dumas’ Musketeers’, and portrayed his violence as noble and respectable, an 
embodiment of masculine virtue.74 In 1994, American communications scholar John 
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Hammerback (1938-2012) summarised the historical consensus by commenting on Primo de 
Rivera’s ‘remarkable courage and daring’. 75 The violence of these two incidents is thus 
understood uncritically through an ideal of traditional masculinity. Historians, overwhelmingly 
men themselves, have framed his actions as ‘manly’, and therefore understandable or even 
laudable. When they describe Primo de Rivera’s supposed aversion to violence, therefore, 
they distinguish his apparently heroic, virile masculinity from typical fascist thuggery. This is 
despite the fact that heroic masculinity was the proclaimed framework for understanding 
fascism’s ‘new man’. A striking example of this can be seen in the work of Payne. In Fascism in 
Spain, 1923-1977 (1999), he provided a quotation from Spanish author Heleno Saña, which he 
insisted represents ‘a balanced commentary’: 
 
José Antonio wanted to convince, not to impose, as did many of his supporters and 
followers. At the bottom he was a seducer, not a dictator. He believed in the dialectic 
of fists and pistols as a last resort, but such bravado must be understood as a 
concession to the times, not as an essential expression of his way of being. Violence 
and pistolerismo were a common instrument in his time, employed by all the radical 
parties, not just the Falange.76 
 
While there is a begrudging acknowledgement that Primo de Rivera did embrace violence, his 
endorsement of violent struggle against a democratic regime is cast euphemistically as 
‘bravado’. It also does not acknowledge that ‘as a last resort’ was the inevitable position that 
would be taken by the Falange were it dedicated to success, given its repeated electoral 
failure. It implores the reader to realise that the violence endorsed by Primo de Rivera was not 
representative of ‘an essential expression of his way of being’.  
There has, however, been an undercurrent of historical scholarship that has rejected 
the glamorisation of Primo de Rivera’s violent tendencies. This scholarship presents Primo de 
Rivera’s personal characteristics as closer in line to the standard image of the fascist leader. As 
a result of Preston’s efforts, this perspective has recently become more mainstream. Herbert 
Southworth was the first to argue strongly for an assessment of Primo de Rivera’s personality 
in typically fascist terms. In 1967, he asserted in passing that, below the thin veneer of 
aristocratic respectability, Primo de Rivera had the temperament of a ‘pimp’: violent and 
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controlling.77 He thus explicitly rejected the dominant perspective on this topic, instead 
framing Primo de Rivera’s violent tendencies as harmful rather than as respectable manliness. 
The first systematic historical challenge to the traditional image of Primo de Rivera was Ian 
Gibson’s En Busca de José Antonio in 1980. As previously mentioned, Gibson’s book was only 
ever published in Spanish, which limited its international impact. Even when directly 
addressed by Anglophone scholarship, Gibson’s work has typically been categorised as 
polemically hostile in nature. For example, in Fascism and Pre-Fascism in Europe, 1890-1945 
(1984) by Philip Rees, five out of the ten recommended works on Spanish fascism were written 
by Payne, while Gibson’s book was listed separately as ‘Anti-José Antonio polemic in the 
Southworth tradition’.78  
Gibson believed that to understand the nature of the Falange, one needed to 
understand the nature of Primo de Rivera. Given the historical emphasis on the personalities 
of other fascist leaders, and the supposed synthesis between Primo de Rivera and the Falange, 
this claim is reasonable. Gibson sought to go beyond the Francoist mythologisation and what 
he regarded as the insufficiently critical examination by Anglophone authors. He stated that 
‘[w]e still do not have a satisfactory study that shows the authentic José Antonio’.79 For 
Gibson, an ‘authentic’ picture of Primo de Rivera necessarily had to grapple more effectively 
with the topic of violence. As such, he outlined a detailed examination of individual acts of 
violence undertaken by Primo de Rivera. Gibson pointed out that Primo de Rivera’s career in 
fisticuffs began during his days at university, when he was renowned for his propensity to 
engage in physical confrontations with ‘energetic participation’.80 Gibson rightly categorised 
the incident with Queipo de Llano as an assault, and highlighted that this incident is always 
excluded from Francoist hagiographies, as it does not fit in with the preferred image of ‘el 
Ausente’ as a tragic martyr for the nationalist cause.81 Gibson noted that there were ‘many 
more episodes in which the irrepressible violence of José Antonio surfaced’.82 He referred to a 
newspaper interview with a Falangist secretary regarding the manner in which Primo de Rivera 
reacted to news about the Falange being prosecuted with illegal weapons charges. The 
secretary claimed that Primo de Rivera behaved in a very threatening manner, before 
suddenly grabbing an inkpot from his desk and hurling it at their head, causing an injury that 
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took over two weeks to heal.83 Gibson took perhaps the most strident position regarding the 
personal violence of Primo de Rivera, and his responsibility for the violence of the Falange:  
 
There is no doubt that José Antonio became, literally, ‘uncontrollable’, prey to a 
violence, a biblical wrath, capable of frightening his own collaborators and which led 
to outrages of the worst kind.84 
 
This version of Primo de Rivera is much more in line with traditional visions of fascist leaders. 
Gibson also highlighted that early Francoist hagiographies of Primo de Rivera, written 
by those who knew him well, made frequent references to examples of personal violence by 
their leader. For example, Francisco Bravo (1901-1968), in his hagiography José Antonio: El 
Hombre, El Jefe, El Camarada (1939) recalled that Primo de Rivera regularly threatened to 
force anyone who missed Sunday militia training to drink castor oil.85 This is a horrific infliction 
of an oral laxative, made famous by Mussolini’s Blackshirts. Gibson claimed that José Antonio: 
Biografía Apasionada (1941) by Felipe Ximenez de Sandoval (1903-1978), another 
hagiographer of Primo de Rivera, contains no fewer than fifteen separate references to ‘the 
use of the disgusting and humiliating “laxative sanctions”’.86 Gibson was aware that his 
perspective on Primo de Rivera did not fit the established norm. However, he insisted his 
version of Primo de Rivera fit much better ‘with what we have seen of his violent actions in 
cafes, the Cortes and other locations’.87  
The only subsequent historian who has taken a similarly sustained critical view of 
Primo de Rivera was Preston in ¡Comrades! Portraits from the Spanish Civil War (1999). This 
book has gone a long way to rehabilitate Gibson’s pioneering text. Preston argued that Primo 
de Rivera did not reject violence at a fundamental level as previous Anglophone historians had 
claimed: ‘behind Primo de Rivera’s polished exterior there lurked a violence which occasionally 
turned him into a cheap brawler and even found its way into his theoretical statements’.88 
Referring to incidents ignored by traditional accounts of the political life of Primo de Rivera, 
Preston supplied numerous examples that debunk the idea of a ‘non-violent’ Primo de Rivera. 
Preston outlined examples of Primo de Rivera demanding duels with those who insulted his 
father and threatening to shoot anyone who called him ‘Pepe’, a usual diminutive associated 
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with his name.89 Preston also recounted a separate instance of violent aggression by Primo de 
Rivera within the confines of parliament. This incident involved Primo de Rivera knocking 
down a Leftist deputy while ‘sneer[ing] “Thank me because I’ve helped you get to the front 
bench for once in your life, albeit rolling on the floor”’.90 On another occasion Primo de Rivera 
threatened to assault a Catalan student leader for dining in the same expensive restaurant as 
him.91 Furthermore, Preston maintained that Primo de Rivera spoke of the ‘joyful 
irresponsibility’ inherent in attacking socialist newspaper kiosks, as well as the fact that he 
enjoyed personally administering ‘laxative sanctions’.92 Preston noted that Primo de Rivera’s 
violence was not impulsive or blindly aggressive, but that it was instead a coldly calculated 
judgement.93 This implies deliberate, reasoned intent: violence expressly used to further the 
goals of the Falange. 
Preston’s critique of Primo de Rivera’s supposed non-violence is beginning to attract 
mainstream support.94 By 2003, Stanley Payne accepted that ‘some form of [personal] 
violence was not unknown to [Primo de Rivera]’.95 Payne recounted that Francoist biographies 
of Primo de Rivera took pride in ‘the resounding slaps with which José Antonio ended many 
discussions’, and he categorised the assault on Queipo de Llano as a ‘treacherous act’.96 Yet, 
Payne still attempted to maintain Primo de Rivera’s non-violence at a political level. He stated 
that, while Primo de Rivera may have had ‘a certain disposition towards violence’ at a personal 
level, this incident demonstrated the dominance of ‘the fists’ over ‘the pistols’ in his famed 
dialectic.97 Payne reassured the reader that there is no evidence that Primo de Rivera ever 
used a gun, though he does not address the traditional narrative of Primo de Rivera’s armed 
response to an attack on his life in the streets of Madrid, or the many accounts of him keeping 
a loaded pistol for protection.98 Thus, while the tradition of Primo de Rivera as personally 
gallant was losing its credibility, Payne retreated back to the staple image of Primo de Rivera 
as politically opposed to fascist violence. The resilience of Payne’s perception of Primo de 
Rivera as fundamentally non-violent on some level is of great importance to the general 
                                                          
89 Ibid. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Ibid., 79. 
92 Ibid., 78. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Chris Bannister, “José Antonio Primo de Rivera: Catholic Fascism,” in Right-Wing Spain in the Civil War 
Era, ed. Alejandro Quiroga et al. (London: Continuum, 2012), 92. 
95 Payne, “José Antonio Primo de Rivera,” 186.  
96 Ibid., 186. 
97 Ibid., 188. 
98 Ibid.; Luis Bolin, Spain: The Vital Years (London: Cassel, 1967), 140. 
71 
 
historical understanding of Spanish fascism, given how monumentally influential his works 
continue to be. 
 
Primo de Rivera’s Violent Rhetoric as ‘Poetic’ rather than Practical 
Historians have disassociated the violent rhetoric of Primo de Rivera from the violent practice 
of the Falange. While Primo de Rivera was frequently overt in his appeal to the morality of 
force in the quest for a fascist Spain, his rhetoric has been primarily understood through its 
poetic quality. According to Preston, ‘no politician incorporated the rhetoric of violence so 
lyrically into his oratorical repertoire’.99 Primo de Rivera himself defined the Falange as a 
‘poetic movement’.100 While historians have understood that Primo de Rivera’s violent 
rhetoric directly inspired violence, they have nonetheless insisted that the metaphorical and 
literary nature of his oratory meant it was distinct from typical fascist demagoguery. The 
poetic qualities of Primo de Rivera have cast him as an ‘ambiguous’ supporter of violence, 
despite a literal interpretation of his words. ‘Poetry’ has been understood by academics as an 
inherently positive force, and thus its invocation has spared Primo de Rivera from the 
historical denunciation that other fascist leaders have received. Anglophone historians, most 
evidently Hugh Thomas, have therefore approached the fascist rhetoric of Primo de Rivera as 
inherently more respectable, based not on practical content or goals, but on rhetorical 
lyricism. This framework of analysis trivialises the threat fascism posed to liberal democracy. 
Following Griffin’s insistence on taking fascist rhetoric seriously, the violence of Primo de 
Rivera can be effectively understood within the context of generic fascism in a manner that 
does not idealise him.  
Primo de Rivera’s distinction from ‘harsh’ fascist demagogues has become his primary 
characteristic. For many academics, poetry is upheld as something intrinsically positive, as an 
indication of ‘civilisation’ and a respected field of academic study. A strong association 
between poetry and liberal idealism can be seen in a quote by English literature scholar 
Matthew Burushko, who asserted that ‘poetry is numbered among freedom’s lamps’.101 British 
historian Robert Payne (1911-1983) stated in The Civil War in Spain 1936-1939 (1963) that 
‘ideally all history should be written by poets’.102 The practical effect of this perspective is that 
‘poetic’ figures, including fascists, are granted a certain indulgence denied to others. Their 
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poetry is understood as their defining characteristic, with fascist ideals framed as an 
unfortunate aside. In The Appeal of Fascism (1970), by English historian Alistair Hamilton 
(b.1941), a foreword is offered by famed British anti-fascist poet Sir Stephen Spender (1909-
1995). Spender commended Hamilton for understanding that, while prominent British poets 
W.B. Yeats (1865-1939) and Ezra Pound (1885-1972) had sympathies towards fascism, their 
high standard of poetic work made them merely ‘tragically mistaken’, rather than actively 
pernicious. In contrast, Spender was impressed that various ‘inferior’ artists, unable to be 
idealised for their poetry, were instead ‘judged severely’ by Hamilton.103  
‘Poetry’ has been seen as an innate character trait of Primo de Rivera. While a small 
number of Primo de Rivera’s poems have survived, historians have not shown much interest in 
them. In the few times they have been mentioned, they have been criticised for lacking quality 
– even an early Francoist hagiographer admitted that ‘José Antonio was not a very good 
poet’!104 Instead, his poetic image is derived from his public statements made as the leader of 
the Falange, which are understood as being beautifully crafted prose. The reification of Primo 
de Rivera as a poetic figure was codified by Payne in 1961. This was because his monograph 
was the first systematic history of the Falange, and Primo de Rivera himself repeatedly 
emphasised that he viewed the Falange as an inherently poetic organisation. In the Falange’s 
foundational speech in 1933, Primo de Rivera made this point clear: 
 
The peoples have never been moved by anyone save the poets, and woe to him who, 
before the poetry which destroys, does not know how to raise the poetry which 
promises!... In a poetic movement we shall raise this fervent feeling for Spain; we shall 
sacrifice ourselves.105 
 
Payne claimed that the Falange ‘was a peculiarly Spanish phenomenon’ in the sense that it 
was primarily ‘emotional’ rather than ‘ideological’, and that this was seen in ‘the temper of 
[the] political spirit [of] the Falange’s founder, José Antonio Primo de Rivera’.106 Payne 
endorsed the perspective of Juan Ignacio Luca de Tena (1897-1975), editor of the monarchist 
newspaper ABC, who told Primo de Rivera in 1933 that ‘I suspect that your fascism has sprung 
from your great heart rather than from your brilliant intelligence’.107 Poetry is thus cast not as 
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a stylistic choice of rhetoric, but as something fundamental to his very being. The importance 
of this can be seen in by Payne’s titling of a chapter ‘Poetry and Terrorism’. In this section, we 
learn that Primo de Rivera embodied ‘poetry’, while his followers embodied ‘terrorism’.108 
The extent to which Payne, in 1961, was dedicated to the idea of an intrinsically poetic 
Primo de Rivera can be seen in his conclusion to his book. Payne described Primo de Rivera’s 
rhetoric as ‘frequently wholesome and sometimes even sublime’.109 Payne embraced the 
rhetoric primarily for its beautiful prose. The final paragraph of his book ensures that the 
emotional, poetic nature of Primo de Rivera is the lasting image in the mind of the reader:  
 
It was the emotional quality of their dialectic that led the Falangists to their doom… 
Perhaps nowhere more than in Spain, the decade ending in 1945 brought on a 
cataclysmic disillusion. There remained only a nostalgic and ambiguous afterglow of 
the passions that once burned so fiercely.110  
 
Subsequent historians overwhelmingly endorsed the poetic character of Primo de 
Rivera. Summarising Primo de Rivera’s ‘main ideas’, Raymond Carr in Spain 1808-1939 called 
them ‘simple, derivative, and poetic’.111 The ‘romantic and rhetorical violence’ was understood 
as ‘wild poetry’, rather than a genuine call to arms. British historian Rod Kedward’s (b.1937) 
Fascism in Western Europe (1969) defined Primo de Rivera’s ideals as simply a ‘poetic 
romanticism of young literary men’.112 When addressing the increasing violence of the 
movement, Kedward stated that ‘[Primo de Rivera’s] ideology, poetry and ideals had only 
superficial effects on [the Falangist militia’s] activism’.113 Kedward constructed the poetic 
nature of the leader as antithetical to fascist violence. The explicitly idealising effect of poetry 
is directly addressed in Fascism (1968) by American historian Nathanael Greene. Greene 
highlighted Primo de Rivera’s ‘idealistic, poetic style of nationalism’, and continued: ‘A gentle, 
benign leader, and a ‘poetic’ fascism? Perhaps’.114 A particularly striking example came from 
Salvador de Madariaga in 1976, when he boldly asserted that ‘[d]espite his speeches and 
statements, José Antonio was a poet who saw Spain in a dream as beautiful and unreal and 
who impatiently wished to make it an immediate reality’.115  
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In The Spanish Right Under the Second Republic (1971), Preston summarised the 
contemporary historical perspective. He claimed that because the ‘elegant and poetic’ Primo 
de Rivera was leader of the Falange Española, the movement ‘was as innocuous as a political 
movement could be’.116 The violence of the rhetoric of his foundational speech was not 
mentioned. He continued: ‘[The Falange Española] came into contact with harsh reality in 
February 1934, when there was a merger with the JONS’.117 Preston did not give agency to 
Primo de Rivera in this clash with ‘harsh reality’. He instead cast the experience as passive, 
with a merger with the JONS simply occurring. Yet, this merger was deliberately sought by 
Primo de Rivera.118 The ‘harshness’ brought by the JONS was depicted as separate and 
incompatible, with the inherent poetry of the pre-merger Falange Española. Preston then 
asserted that, after the merger, the ‘pseudo-Nazi’ practical elements of the new movement 
were developed by Ramiro Ledesma, while Primo de Rivera simply provided the ‘emotional 
tone’.119  
Hugh Thomas was amongst the most vocal proponents of understanding Primo de 
Rivera through the lens of poetry. He repeatedly referred to Primo de Rivera’s fondness for If, 
the most famous poem by British poet Rudyard Kipling (1865-1936).120 Thomas sought to 
associate Primo de Rivera’s poetic nature with a deep-seated feeling of Anglophilia. This poetic 
Anglophilia was used by Thomas in The Spanish Civil War to portray Primo de Rivera as 
‘genuine’, as opposed to traditional ideas of fascists as duplicitous.121 Later, Thomas 
represented Primo de Rivera’s political outlook as having ‘allowed an echo of Shelley into his 
thoughts’.122 Unlike the example of Kipling, which had roots in Primo de Rivera’s own interest 
in poetry, this reference was envisioned solely by Thomas himself. It is a striking comment, 
likely the strongest demonstration by any historian of the idealisation inherent in embracing 
poetry as a primary defining characteristic. The work of British romantic poet Percy Bysshe 
Shelley (1792-1822) has long been associated with nonviolence or ‘one of its approximate 
cognates, “passive resistance” or “civil disobedience”’.123 His work has been cited as influential 
on the actions of Mohandas Gandhi and the student protesters in Tiananmen Square in 
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1989.124 To invoke Shelley as a metaphor for the thoughts of Primo de Rivera is to associate 
the leader of a fascist movement which engaged in violent street conflict with the very 
concept of nonviolent resistance. Thomas immediately followed this notion of Shelley with 
Primo de Rivera’s statement relating to people only being moved by the poets, to which 
Thomas concluded: ‘Such was José Antonio Primo de Rivera’.125  
The incongruity of Thomas’ exaltation of poetry with general academic understanding 
of fascism is demonstrated in his collected volume of Primo de Rivera: Selected Writings 
(1972). This book was released as part of a collection of texts edited by French-American 
historian George Steiner (b.1929) called Roots of the Right: Readings in Fascist, Racist and 
Elitist Ideology. In the General Editor’s preface, Steiner wrote that the purpose of the edited 
collection was to examine the ‘often lunatic and nakedly barbaric’ visions of fascism that 
‘[have] come so near to destroying our civilisation and [are] so still alive’.126 He claimed that 
these ‘black books’ containing ‘elitist, racist and fascist theory’ were important, as they 
brought together, for the first time in English, evidence to consider ‘the intractable puzzle of 
the co-existence in the same mind of profound inhumanity and obvious philosophic and 
literary importance’.127 While this description would perhaps be criticised today for too readily 
invoking fascism as a ‘demonology’, it nevertheless demonstrates the discord between 
Thomas’ views and the more traditional perspective. The purpose of this collection, therefore, 
was to understand an ‘enemy’, in order better to protect the democratic way of life. Yet, 
Thomas’ introduction to the works of Primo de Rivera bore no resemblance to this mission. 
After dismissing Primo de Rivera’s role in violence, Thomas once more utilised the framework 
of poetry. He declared Primo de Rivera ‘more that of a Hamlet than that of the man of destiny 
which fascist propaganda so imperiously demanded’.128 This portrays Primo de Rivera as a 
tragic hero doomed by unfortunate circumstance, echoing the Falange’s own self-image as 
heroic.  
The long-standing historical reception of Primo de Rivera as poetic in character can be 
critiqued using the generic fascist framework of Roger Griffin. Griffin has championed the 
cause of taking fascists at their word. This is not to sympathise with their aims, but to 
understand better what they sought to accomplish. Griffin’s goal was to counter the general 
perception of fascism as a ‘fraudulent’ movement, with all its stated goals a smokescreen that 
                                                          
124 Ibid. 
125 Thomas, “Spain,” 292. 
126 George Steiner, “General Editor’s Preface,” in José Antonio Primo de Rivera: Selected Writings, by 
Hugh Thomas (London: The Trinity Press, 1972), 7. 
127 Ibid., 8. 
128 Thomas, José Antonio Primo de Rivera, 17. 
76 
 
clears once it is in power. This perspective is still controversial, as some critics maintain that 
taking fascist leaders’ ideology seriously necessarily rehabilitates them, but it is increasingly 
popular amongst academics interested in fascism.129 With poetic style taking precedence over 
a literal reading of Primo de Rivera’s violent rhetoric, historical perspectives on his ideology 
have implicitly downplayed his stated position in favour of the ‘emotional’ tone outlined by 
Payne. Using Griffin’s framework in the case of Primo de Rivera has the exact opposite effect 
that his detractors have feared: taken ‘seriously’, Primo de Rivera’s rhetoric is understood as 
genuinely violent in nature. Rather than rehabilitate him, therefore, the methodology of 
Griffin’s ‘new consensus’ re-aligns the historical perspective towards the undercurrent of 
historiography that has sought to link Primo de Rivera’s violent rhetoric to the violence of his 
movement. 
Hammerback explicitly invoked Griffin’s approach in his 1994 study of ‘José Antonio’s 
Rhetoric of Fascism’.130 Hammerback was directly inspired by Griffin’s desire to understand 
fascist rhetoric and used Primo de Rivera as a case study to examine fascist ideology.131 He 
referred to the fact that historians have seen the ideas of Primo de Rivera as essentially 
synonymous with his movement. This ‘melding of man and movement’, therefore, means that 
an examination of Primo de Rivera’s rhetoric can allow a fundamental understanding of the 
‘perplexing dynamics’ of the Falange itself.132 Hammerback readily acknowledged the poetic 
nature of Primo de Rivera’s rhetoric. Yet, rather than exalting it as an admirable, innate 
personal characteristic, he critically explored how it was used to outline the ideals of the 
Falange. He demonstrated that the poetic quality of Primo de Rivera’s rhetoric ‘dangerously 
accentuated his audience's faith in his sermonizing while de-emphasizing its capacity for 
independent judgment’.133 As a result, these followers ‘would enthusiastically—and at times at 
risk to their lives—carry out some of humankind's most cruel, catastrophic and horrifying 
acts’.134 Thus, in Hammerback’s construction, Primo de Rivera was responsible for the violence 
of the Falange: ‘José Antonio's rendition of fascist discourse’ led to the violent actions of his 
followers.135 Hammerback asserted that Primo de Rivera’s explicit recourse to a poetic style 
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demonstrated his skill in inspiring young men ‘to sacrifice all for the truth’.136 Most 
importantly, he took Primo de Rivera’s legitimation of violence as an earnest statement of 
ideology rather than a metaphorical flourish, given its direct and significant impact on the 
actions of the Falange’s membership.137 Following from the truism that has generally held 
since 1961 that José Antonio was synonymous with the Falange, there is thus no reason to 
distinguish the poetic elements from the violent elements of his speeches.138 
Hammberback’s position, inspired by Griffin’s revitalisation of fascist studies, strongly 
aligns with the Left-wing historical approaches to Primo de Rivera since the pioneering works 
of Southworth. One of the explicit goals of Gibson’s En Busca de José Antonio was to relate the 
violence of the Falange to the violent rhetoric of its leader, rather than continue the tradition 
of dismissing the issue as ambiguous. He claimed that: ‘gleaning through the writings and 
speeches of the jefe of the Falange, it is easy to collect a small anthology of juicy observations 
about the theme of violence and its legitimacy as a political instrument’.139 Along with the 
previously introduced examples of his ‘dialectic of fists and pistols’ and his letter to Julian 
Pemartín, Gibson highlighted a revealing speech of 1935 in which Primo de Rivera 
commemorated the fusion of Falange Española and the JONS on its first anniversary: ‘This was 
the first act of its propaganda, and with the spirit of all vigorous things, it ended in gunfire. 
Almost always, to begin by shooting is the best manner to understand each other’.140 While 
this is obviously exaggerated bluster, its justification and exaltation of practical violence is 
indisputable. Gibson quoted Primo de Rivera expressing violent dissatisfaction with the status 
quo on another occasion in 1935: ‘We will not conform with a lack of shooting in the streets 
because they say that things are going well. If necessary, we will launch into the street to make 
sure things do not stay as they are’.141 In the context of the contemporaneous fatal street 
warfare, this legitimation of violence seems entirely congruent with ‘the dialectic of fists and 
pistols’ being more than simple metaphor. Gibson concludes that the primary theme of Primo 
de Rivera’s public speeches related to violence and virility, with the only truly manly response 
to the supposed threats to Spain being active martial participation within the Falange.142  
While Gibson’s work has been underappreciated, British historian Sheelagh Ellwood 
(b.1949) has been more successful in seeking to link Falangist rhetoric to Falangist practice. In 
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1988, she insisted strongly that ‘[o]n one point, however, the Falange was not ambiguous and 
that was the legitimacy of the use of violence for the achievement of political ends’.143 The 
invocation of the word ‘ambiguous’, that has defined Primo de Rivera’s relationship with 
violence amongst mainstream historiography, expressly to deny its relevance was likely a 
deliberate decision. In The Spanish Holocaust (2012), Preston mused that Ledesma was 
‘probably reassured by the fact that, when recruiting started for the Falange, new militants 
had been required to fill in a form which asked if they had a bicycle – a euphemism for pistol – 
and were then issued with a truncheon’.144 He subsequently directly attributed the violent 
exhortations to action in Primo de Rivera’s speech at the merging of the Falange Española and 
the JONS. In a more violent recount of this event than has been traditional, Preston pointed 
out that it was ‘the provocative speech’ of Primo de Rivera that ‘fired up the audience to rush 
out and fight the workers in the streets’.145 Thus, Primo de Rivera is not shielded from the 
results: ‘Shots were fired and, at the end of the day, with many broken heads on both sides, 
there was one Falangist dead. Those leftists involved who could be identified would be shot by 
the rebels during the Civil War’.146  
The unusual way Primo de Rivera has been distanced from the violence of the Falange 
can be seen in the contrast with the historiography of Oswald Mosley and British fascism. As 
with the Falange, the BUF has been inextricably linked with violence for decades.147 Street 
fights involving British fascists were common, and the party is remembered for its 1934 rally at 
the Olympia Exhibition Hall in London where anti-fascist protesters were beaten en masse.148 
The violence of the BUF was not as extreme as the Falange, as it did not engage in political 
assassination, yet Mosley’s image was nonetheless irreparably tarred with the political fallout 
from this incident.149 Unlike with Primo de Rivera, there has been little attempt to assert 
Mosley’s ‘ambiguity’ towards violence at a personal level, apart from the publications of his 
son Nicholas who claimed his father was ‘unique amongst fascist leaders in that… [he was] 
against his followers being responsible for violence’.150 The closest academia has come 
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towards rehabilitation of Mosley’s relationship with political violence was Oswald Mosley 
(1975), a biography of the British fascist leader by British historian Robert Skidelsky (b.1939). 
Skidelsky interviewed Mosley extensively, and admitted his fondness for the man.151 This 
openly apologetic take on the history of the BUF was intensely controversial.152 While even 
Skidelsky accepted that Mosley embraced violence as a political tool, he nonetheless sought to 
emphasise that in the context of violence the BUF ‘was sinned against [more] than sinning’ 
and that a generalised sense of political tension made violence inevitable even beyond 
Mosley’s intent.153 In response to this biography, Vernon Bogdanor argued that any attempt to 
disassociate a fascist leader from the actions of his followers was inherently apologetic in 
nature, and thus morally unacceptable.154 British historian Richard Thurlow agreed, stating 
that ‘Fascism was a leadership movement’, and regardless of any influence of its membership 
it was fundamentally the leader who was the responsible party.155 Thurlow emphasised this 
point by concluding his review of Oswald Mosley with a quotation from The Rubaiyat of Omar 
Khayyam, a collection of eleventh-century Persian poetry:  
 
The moving finger writes and having writ 
 Moves on: nor all thy piety or wit 
 Shall lure it back to cancel half a line 
 Nor all thy tears wash out a word of it156 
 
Thurlow therefore concludes that a fascist leader must be judged by their words and deeds, 
and not excused from the ramifications that follow. The mainstream and widespread criticism 
directed by these British historians towards apologists of Mosley has no significant equivalent 
in Anglophone history of Spanish fascism and Primo de Rivera. 
 
Conclusion 
The way historians have grappled with the issues of Primo de Rivera’s relationship with 
violence has been simplistic and misleading. Given the extent to which a propensity for 
                                                          
151 Robert Skidelsky, Oswald Mosley (London: Macmillan, 1975), 11. 
152 Robert Skidelsky, “Reflections on Mosley and British Fascism,” in British Fascism, ed. Kenneth Lunn 
et al. (London: Croom Helm, 1980), 78. Skidelsky’s book sparked an entire collected volume of 
responses, including this defence of his original work. 
153 Skidelsky, Oswald Mosley, 19. 
154 Vernon Bogdanor, “A Deeply Flawed Hero,” Encounter 44:6 (1975): 70. 
155 Richard Thurlow, Fascism in Britain (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987), 147. 
156 Richard Thurlow, “The Black Knight,” Patterns of Prejudice 9:3 (1975): 19. 
80 
 
violence has dominated discourse of generic fascism, it is striking how easily Primo de Rivera 
has been excused from violence simply due to his ‘masculine’ charm. His personal taste for 
violence has been well-established, but remains underemphasised in historical portraits of 
him. His violent rhetoric has long been lauded for its lyrical quality. When examined through 
the lens of Griffin’s ideological perspective, this apparent schism between the ‘violent’ Primo 
de Rivera and the ‘poetic’ Primo de Rivera can be effectively bridged. As a result, Primo de 
Rivera can be examined through the lens of generic fascism without undue recourse to his 
supposed exceptional, non-violent nature.  
Having thus demonstrated the sympathetic perspective from two distinct angles in 
Chapters One and Two, the final chapter of this thesis will examine the place of Primo de 
Rivera in liberal Anglophone scholarship through a broader lens. It will explore the 
complicated impact of the legacy of Francoism on historical scholarship of Spanish politics, 
which has relativised the figure of Primo de Rivera into a comparatively harmless, 




The Impact of the Franco Regime on the Legacy of Primo de 
Rivera 
 
The legacy of José Antonio Primo de Rivera is unique amongst fascist leaders. No others died 
in their prime, only to be memorialised by a long-lasting regime which was nominally inspired 
by their values.1 While academics involved in fascist studies have almost universally defined 
the Falange under Primo de Rivera as genuinely fascist, the debate over the nature of the 
subsequent Movimiento Nacional and Francoism itself has been far more controversial. As 
explained by Spanish historian Joan María Thomàs (b.1953), ‘[o]ne of the most fundamental 
“knots” of Spanish history is whether Franco’s regime can be considered fascist or not’.2 This 
‘knot’ remains highly politicised: in 1981 Preston lamented the fact that ‘an eagerness to 
exonerate the Franco regime from the taint of fascism’ was the goal of mainstream 
conservative historians.3 In contrast, in 2000 Juan Linz bemoaned that the obsession with 
denouncing Franco as ‘fascist’ had taken precedence over historical understanding.4 These two 
competing narratives have shaped the historical image of Primo de Rivera, ensuring that he 
has always been seen as a comparatively lesser evil than Franco.  
This chapter argues that the early death of Primo de Rivera and co-option of his 
Falange by Franco ensured his relatively positive reception by historians. It does so through an 
examination of two separate, but interrelated, historiographical quirks regarding Spanish 
fascism. Firstly, this chapter demonstrates that even though a strict definitional approach has 
limited ‘real’ fascism in Spain to the Falange, this is not how anti-fascist contemporaries and 
subsequent anti-fascist historians have understood the situation. As Primo de Rivera died 
before the Nationalist victory in the Civil War and thus played no direct role in the ‘atrocity 
phase’ of Francoism, he has not been a target of particular hostility in critiques of Spanish 
fascism.5 This chapter then argues that historians have upheld the ideology of Primo de Rivera 
as a revolutionary alternative to the bureaucratic oppression of the Franco regime. Payne’s 
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Falange was influenced significantly by the perspective of old-shirt Falangists like Dionisio 
Ridruejo (1912-1975), who believed that the ideals of Primo de Rivera bore no resemblance to 
Francoist reality. Following from this, the general Anglophone perspective has approached the 
fascist ideology of Primo de Rivera as being a lost alternative to Francoism. Franco has thus 
been the emblematic ‘villain’ of academic discussion of Spanish fascism, while Primo de Rivera 
has been comparatively unscathed by academic hostility. Historians’ passions over competing 
narratives, both anti-fascist and anti-Republican, have thus reinforced and even utilised 
standard tropes of an idealised Primo de Rivera.  
  
‘Fascism’ as a Denunciation Aimed Beyond Primo de Rivera 
While since the mid-1960s mainstream academics have believed that authentic fascism in 
Spain was limited to the Falange under Primo de Rivera, during the Spanish Republic anti-
fascists used the term much more loosely. They saw the Spanish Right in general as a fascist 
threat. After the outbreak of the Civil War, Franco was understood as the embodiment of 
Spanish fascism. While Primo de Rivera was subsequently categorised as the only ‘real’ 
Spanish fascist politician by historical consensus, he was dead shortly after the war began and 
thus had no direct involvement with the following regime. As a result, historians grappling 
with the issue of whether fascism existed in Spain have focused on the dictatorship led by a 
contemporary and sometime-ally of Hitler and Mussolini. Historians have therefore used the 
label of fascism as a weapon of moral denunciation against Franco, not Primo de Rivera. The 
obvious target has always been the man with actual practical power, rather than the martyred 
figurehead.  
 The fate of the Spanish Republic has been a cause célèbre for intellectuals since the 
1930s. After the outbreak of war, many Anglophone writers immediately hailed the conflict as 
a struggle between democracy and fascism. The primary villain in these passionate historical 
approaches was Franco. Having seen Germany succumb to Nazism only three years earlier, 
prominent liberal Anglophone writers and academics embraced the war in Spain as the 
beginning of a counter-offensive against fascism. In their eyes, a Francoist victory would allow 
fascism to spread across Europe.6 The passionate fear of the fall of the Spanish Republic can be 
seen in Spain in Revolt (1936) by American Communist writer Harry Gannes (1900-1941): 
‘Spain is becoming a pivot on which the world may turn either its fascist or democratic side to 
the rising sun of the future’.7 The fate of Spain was thus seen as inextricably linked with the 
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future of European democracy. Fascism’s attempts at ‘groping towards a world system’ 
needed to be halted.8  
The widespread and passionate association of Franco with the evils of fascism can be 
seen in Authors Take Sides in the Spanish Civil War (1937). This pamphlet collated reflections 
of prominent British intellectuals on the conflict. It claimed that, in such a monumental conflict 
between democracy and fascism, public figures were morally bound to take a side.9 As this 
pamphlet was published by the Left Review, and was thus supportive of the Republican cause, 
the question it asked was inherently loaded: ‘Are you for, or against, the legal Government 
and the People of Republican Spain? Are you for, or against, Franco and Fascism?’10 The 
respondents overwhelmingly condemned ‘Franco and Fascism’.  
With Franco’s overt adoption of the language and style of the Falange, and his 
association with the two extant fascist leaders in Europe, the description of Franco as a fascist 
leader was plausible. The fact that his Movimiento Nacional comprised a forced merging of a 
variety of Right-wing organisations also confirmed many Left-wing academics’ fears about a 
generally fascist Spanish Right. Thus, Katherine Stewart-Murray, the Duchess of Atholl (1874-
1960), could write in 1938 that ‘[i]f the Spanish Republicans are crushed, it means the end of 
liberty, justice and culture, and the merciless extermination of all suspected of caring for these 
things’.11 Encapsulating the drive of anti-fascism amongst British intellectuals at the time, 
Atholl proclaimed that saving the Spanish Republic was the best way to save Europe from 
fascism.12 In British Communist Arthur Koestler’s (1905-1983) Spanish Testament (1937), the 
denunciation of the Falange as being functionally identical to Italian and German fascist 
parties did not mention Primo de Rivera by name, but it denounced Gil Robles.13 American 
Communist author Frank Jellinek’s (1908-1975) The Civil War in Spain (1938) dismissed Primo 
de Rivera and insisted that: ‘[t]he real Fascism in Spain was never young Primo de Rivera’s 
pistol-dramatism but the insidious Catholic propaganda for the brotherhood of master and 
man’.14 The violent actions of the Falange were thus downplayed as trivial in comparison to 
the much larger threat posed by Franco, Gil Robles and the reactionary Catholic Church.  
Mainstream academia agreed upon the fascism of Franco for decades. American 
journalist Herbert Matthews (1900-1977) argued in 1957 that the fight against fascism would 
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not be won until Franco’s defeat. According to Matthews, the Nationalist army, rather than 
Primo de Rivera, was the true font of Spanish fascism.15 In his highly influential book Spain: 
The Root and the Flower (1963), a mainstay of American undergraduate reading lists for 
decades, John Crow stated that: 
 
The most tragic thing of all is that today, with Italian fascism long since dead, and 
Hitler long since gone to his just reward, General Franco still survives as the head of 
his own Spanish fascist state. His survival is a gross reminder that we did not 
completely win the war against fascism.16 
 
The nature of Franco’s regime as fascist was initially understood as a political fact. In 
1945, international interest in promoting co-operation and peace between countries led to the 
establishment of the United Nations. The inclusion of Spain in this organisation was vetoed by 
the UK, the USA and the USSR due to its relationship with the Axis powers.17 The Security 
Council was so troubled by the perceived threat posed by Spain that it appointed a special 
committee to examine how best to address these concerns. The committee was damning, 
stating that: ‘In origin, nature, structure and general conduct, the Franco regime is a fascist 
regime patterned on, and established largely as a result of aid received from, Hitler’s Nazi 
Germany and Mussolini’s Fascist Italy.’18 As a result, the General Assembly voted to exclude 
Spain from the United Nations, as a fascist government could not be welcomed into the 
international community.19 The political hostility exhibited towards Spanish fascism was both 
overt and practical. The pariah status of Franco’s Spain was short-lived, however, as the 
burgeoning Cold War ensured that the American government lobbied for Spain to be included 
in the Marshall Plan as early as 1948, though this was prevented due to European 
opposition.20 By 1955, geopolitical concerns meant that Spain was admitted to the UN with 
little political controversy, becoming a bulwark of anti-Communism and a staunch US ally.21  
The academic assumption of Franco’s regime as fascist in nature was significantly 
undermined through the late 1960s, after the increasing popularity of Linz’ conceptualisation 
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of Franco’s regime as ‘authoritarian’ rather than fascist. As previously mentioned, Linz argued 
that Francoist Spain lacked genuine mobilisation of mass support, something which he 
considered fundamental to a definition of a fascist regime.22 He claimed that any chance at a 
genuine fascist Spain died with Primo de Rivera. Contemporaneous historians of generic 
fascism were initially reluctant to dismiss Franco as fascist. In 1966, British historian Hugh 
Seton-Watson claimed that Spain was ‘plausibly still fascist’ without further explanation.23 In 
1968, Stuart Woolf mentioned the ‘anachronistic survival of [a] fascist regime in Spain’.24 Yet, 
as mentioned in the introduction, by 1974 Linz’ perspective of Franco as fundamentally non-
fascist had become dominant. 
Although Linz’ argument was highly influential, many historians have refused to drop 
accusations of fascism against Franco’s regime. With emphasis on the violence and repression 
of the dictatorship, these historians have viewed the designation of authoritarianism as 
trivialising the horrors involved in the destruction of the Spanish Republic and subsequent 
brutal rule.25 The widespread adoption of the term authoritarianism was especially galling 
given the fact that Franco himself used it to describe the Spanish regime.26 As such, detractors 
of Francoism have insisted upon the designation of his regime as ‘fascist’.27 The importance of 
denunciation of Franco’s regime for many academics can be seen in the words of British 
historian Michael Richards. In 1996, he defined Franco’s victory as ‘an actual loss of the future 
itself, a loss of hope, as millions of Spaniards were robbed of a sense of identity and dignity’.28 
In this context, a desire for historians to define Franco’s regime in the harshest possible terms 
is understandable, and ‘fascist’ remains perhaps the strongest charge possible against a 
government. This can be seen, for example, in the prose of American writer Arthur Landis’ 
Spain: The Unfinished Revolution (1975), which denounced the ‘betrayal’ of the Spanish 
Republic’s resistance to ‘this first onslaught of World Fascism’.29 Herbert Southworth, in an 
entry on ‘Fascism, Spanish’ in The Historical Dictionary of the Spanish Civil War (1982), stated 
bluntly that: 
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The danger to Spanish democracy in 1936 came not from the second-rate intellectuals 
of the Phalanx, not from Primo de Rivera, a would-be general without foot-soldiers, 
but from Franco, Mola, and the other military conspirators and their moneyed and 
monarchist backers.30 
 
Recent academic debate regarding the role of fascism in Spain has focused on 
Francoism in the late 1930s and early 1940s. The current historical consensus is that, while 
Franco himself may not have been a true fascist, his regime went through an early phase of 
‘semi-fascism’. Javier Tusell defined semi-fascism as a ‘temptation’ towards fascism that 
Franco never truly yielded to.31 Critics have suggested that this distinction between periods of 
semi-fascism and subsequent authoritarianism, with a definable transition point, is too 
simplistic and does not fully appreciate the lasting influence of the Falange as part of the 
Francoist regime’s government. The downplaying of residual fascist influence is considered to 
be too exculpatory in nature.32 The sheer violence involved in the early years of Franco’s rule, 
with up to 50,000 Republicans executed in the decade following the end of the Civil War, has 
meant that ‘the question regarding the nature of the Franco regime can never claim to be 
definitively closed’. 33 Spanish historian Javier Rodrigo, for example, has recently argued that 
Franco’s regime should be considered fascist due to its policy of concentration camps.34 For 
Rodrigo, it is ‘incomprehensible and disconcerting to hear the insistence on distinguishing 
Spain from the rest of the fascist family’, asking rhetorically whether ‘if Franco’s regime had 
fallen in 1945 (instead of decomposing in 1975–78), would the consensus around its definition 
as fascist not be broadly accepted?’35  
The other major analytical framework used to examine the Spanish Right during the 
Second Republic is the idea of the ‘fascistisation’.36 ‘Fascistisation’ posits that other Spanish 
political figures and organisations should be seen as having certain elements of fascist style or 
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ideology without fully adopting fascism. The labelling of the Falange as the only ‘real’ form of 
fascism in Spain has had the effect of setting it apart as fundamentally distinct from other 
‘non-fascist’ Right-wing groups.37 ‘Fascistisation’ as a concept, therefore, allows an exploration 
of Spanish politics without strict recourse to artificially constructed academic boundaries. This 
allows for a more nuanced construction of an interrelation between Rightist groups.38 It also 
has the indirect effect of spreading moral ‘culpability’ for fascism across many individuals. 
Elements of fascist thought and practice can thus be more effectively identified in figures such 
as Gil Robles and José Calvo Sotelo (1893-1936), the leader of the Renovación Española. As a 
result, in recent historiographic trends regarding Spanish fascism, Primo de Rivera has not 
been a figure of particular interest. 
The idea of ‘fascistisation’ aligns with the manner in which contemporary anti-fascists 
understood fascism. Henry Buckley, for instance, outlined the view in 1940 that the true fascist 
threat was not Primo de Rivera: ‘Gil Robles and Calvo Sotelo had all the Fascist tricks; they 
would sit glaring at their political opponents always ready to jump up and launch into a furious 
and bellicose tirade against Bolshevism in general.’39 Preston emphasised that the neat 
separation of other Spanish Rightist groups from fascist influence has been an artificial and 
unhelpful process. In forcing this artificial separation, Preston argued, a fruitful comparison 
with the experiences of fascism in other countries is sidelined.40 Therefore: 
 
If Spanish fascism can be reduced to the squalid hybrid founded by José Antonio Primo 
de Rivera then other groups of the authoritarian right, like the CEDA or Renovación 




Accordingly, the narrow definition of Spanish fascism with Falange Española obviates 
the need for examination of the fascist features of other rightist groups and of the  
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Franco regime itself.42 
 
For him, the reification of Primo de Rivera as the sole example of a Spanish fascist leader 
superficially and ‘neatly sidesteps a number of thorny interpretative and ideological problems’ 
regarding the impact of fascism in Spain.43 By 1987, British historian Martin Blinkhorn (b.1941) 
argued that: 
 
Those on the Spanish left in the 1930s who viewed Carlism, Alfonsism, CEDA 
accidentalism and Falangism as the four horsemen of a single ‘fascist’ apocalypse 
grasped an essential truth.44 
 
For Blinkhorn, there was enough ideological overlap and practical cooperation that to 
categorise only the Falange as fascist was artificial and unhelpful. Long-understood as the 
standard figure of Spanish fascism, Primo de Rivera is not generally involved in current 
historiographical trends and controversies in the study of Spanish fascism. As a result, his 
reified image as a depoliticised gentleman persists, adrift from the vigorous polemic regarding 
the moral implications of Francoism as fascism.45 
In recent years, the debate over Franco’s relationship with fascism has become 
increasingly acrimonious. The flashpoint for this outburst was the publication of Preston’s The 
Spanish Holocaust (2012). Preston acknowledged the significance of the term he used in his 
title, given its association with the extermination of up to six million Jews and millions of other 
victims by the Nazi regime and its allies. He nevertheless asserted that, in the context of the 
systematic killings undertaken by Franco, the term is useful.46 His explicit purpose was to 
counter the fact that ‘[t]o this day, General Franco and his regime enjoy a relatively good 
press’, which he ascribes to historians maintaining Francoist myths of economic progress.47 
Preston’s monograph demonstrates the degree to which Left-leaning historians have also 
failed to identify Primo de Rivera as one of the primary ‘villains’ of Spanish history in the early 
                                                          
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Martin Blinkhorn, “The Iberian States,” in The Social Bases of European Fascist Movements, ed. Detlef 
Mühlberger (London: Croom Helm, 1987), 344. 
45 George Blum, The Rise of Fascism in Europe (London: Greenwood Press, 1998), 89. The comparative 
irrelevance of Primo de Rivera to general discourse on fascism is seen by the fact that a section entitled 
‘Biographies: The Personalities Behind Fascism in Europe’ contains an entry on Franco, but not Primo de 
Rivera. 
46 Paul Preston, The Spanish Holocaust (New York: W. W. Norton, 2012), xi. 
47 Ibid., xii. 
89 
 
1930s. In the section entitled ‘The Origins of Violence and Hatred’, Primo de Rivera was barely 
mentioned. Instead, Preston discussed in depth the ideals of the CEDA.48 When Preston did 
mention the Falange, his scorn was reserved for Onésimo Redondo, the co-founder of the 
JONS, who has always been a very marginal figure in histories of Spanish fascism.49  
Preston’s book, with its inflammatory title, spurred a series of hostile academic 
exchanges.50 Chris Ealham sparked the ire of many conservative historians when he accused 
them of hiding behind a smokescreen of ‘objectivity’ while defending Francoist myths.51 He 
specifically criticised the idea that apologist historians have deliberately avoided criticising 
Franco’s regime to the full extent that it deserves: ‘There is a real determination to distance 
Franco from European fascism by defining him as anything but fascist’.52 He thus aligned 
himself with Left-leaning Spanish historians such as Julián Casanova (b.1956) and Ángel Viñas 
(b.1941), who both argue forcefully that Francoism was fundamentally a form of fascism.53 In 
response, conservative historians such as Manuel Álvarez Tardío have hit back, claiming that 
Leftist historians intent on denouncing Franco as fascist are themselves captive to historical 
myths.54 Spanish historian Fernando del Rey argued that political violence itself has become a 
politicised weapon of a Spanish historiography dominated by ‘memory wars’.55 Conservative 
historians, often denounced as neo-Francoist revisionists, have responded to Ealham’s claims 
by intensifying their criticisms of the Second Republic, implicitly framing the Falange as less 
responsible for the collapse of Spanish democracy. The result has been further entrenchment 
of two incompatible understandings of Francoism.56 In this climate, academic research has 
been overshadowed by the personally hostile attitude taken by the protagonists in these 
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disputes, often resorting to petty insults.57 With the primary point of contention being the 
validity or otherwise of ascribing the label of fascism to Franco and Francoism, and the moral 
consequences of doing so, there has been little historical interest in the figure of Primo de 
Rivera. Instead, Franco has borne the brunt of academic scorn. 
 
Primo de Rivera as a Revolutionary Alternative to Francoism 
Dissident Falangist and liberal Anglophone historiographies of Primo de Rivera have aligned in 
the portrayal of him as a ‘revolutionary’ alternative to the ‘blandness’ of Franco’s 
conservatism. This is, unsurprisingly, the view of dedicated fascists dissatisfied with the staid 
reality of Franco’s regime. However, it is puzzling that liberal Anglophone historians should 
share such a view of Primo de Rivera. This section argues that the Anglophone historiography 
of Primo de Rivera has frequently considered him something of a ‘lost alternative’ to Franco 
whose personal brand of fascism would have at least been properly ‘revolutionary’ in a 
socioeconomic sense. Firstly, this section demonstrates that Anglophone historians, through 
their reliance on the works of Payne, have been considerably influenced by the positions of 
dedicated Falangists. The perspectives of dissident old-shirt Falangists José Luis de Arrese 
(1905-1986) and Dionisio Ridruejo were granted great authority in Payne’s Falange. Secondly, 
this section argues that as a result, since the 1960s Anglophone historians have seen Primo de 
Rivera as ‘genuine’ in his devotion to revolution. Especially in these early decades of 
scholarship on fascism, ‘revolution’ was understood as something inherently progressive. 
Spared from the negative associations of fascist rule, his ideology has been upheld as 
comparatively commendable due to the spectre of Franco and his conservative militarism. As a 
result, he has been seen as a ‘lost leader’ of Spain. Finally, a case study demonstrating the 
unusual nature of historians’ embrace of Primo de Rivera as a lost alternative leader is 
demonstrated through reference to the historiography of Oswald Mosley. In stark contrast to 
Anglophone historians’ sympathy towards Primo de Rivera, their harsh criticism of those few 
who have sought to rehabilitate the image of Mosley as a ‘lost alternative’ is much closer to 
the mainstream historical understanding of fascism. 
 In developing his historical image of Primo de Rivera in Falange, Payne drew 
inspiration from the anti-Franco perspective of dissident old-shirt Falangists. These men 
admired Primo de Rivera and believed that the conservative Francoist state had betrayed the 
Falange’s fascist idealism. While the Franco regime adopted the style and trappings of the 
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Falange, the relationship between the bureaucratic elements and the passionate visionaries of 
the ‘original’ Falange was often complicated. After an initial conflict over the leadership of the 
movement, the old-shirts soon accepted their position in the hybridised governmental 
structure.58 By the late 1950s and early 1960s, during the time of Payne’s research in Spain, 
several outspoken old-shirts were openly criticising Franco. In doing so, they invoked the 
image of a lost opportunity seen in the passionate ideals of Primo de Rivera. On the 
anniversary of Primo de Rivera’s death in 1958, dissatisfied Falangist Luis de Arrese gave a 
speech over the National Radio. At the time of his speech, Arrese’s political career had been 
stymied by his continued devotion to old-shirt ideals. His bureaucratic career progression had 
stalled since 1945, since he had been vocally supportive of Nazism and Franco sought to 
distance his regime from Hitler towards the end of the Second World War.59 At the time of his 
speech, he had the essentially honorary position of leader of the paramilitary wing of the 
Movimiento Nacional. In response to Arrese’s speech, Franco demoted him to Minister for 
Housing.60 The anti-Francoist ideals espoused by Arrese had a significant impact on Payne, 
which is evident from the way the speech is quoted and framed in the conclusion of his book. 
Payne wrote that ‘twenty years of Francoism had brought nothing of the “new Spain” that 
José Antonio had once dreamed of’, and supplied the full text of Arrese’s speech to 
demonstrate this point: 
 
José Antonio: … Are you satisfied with us? 
I do not think so. 
And I think not because you struggled against materialism and egotism, while today 
men have forgotten the grandeur of your words only to run like thirsty madmen down 
the path of materialism and egotism. 
Because you wanted a Fatherland of poets and of dreamers eager for a difficult glory, 
while men seek only a catering, round-bellied Fatherland, full of starch, though it 
possesses neither beauty nor gallantry.61 
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The idealism inherent in the rhetoric of Primo de Rivera was thus directly contrasted with the 
typical, conservative nature of Franco’s Spain. Satisfaction with material comfort, at least for 
the wealthy classes, was derided. Arrese continued: 
 
Because you preached sacrifice, while men look from one side to the other in order to 
hide themselves. 
Because you despised money, while men lust for money, and business is 
superimposed upon duty, and brother sells brother, profiteering with the humble and 
the trials of the Fatherland.62 
 
In contrast to the idealised image of the Spanish economy reformed entirely into the 
revolutionary syndicalism of the Falange’s Twenty-Seven Points, Arrese denounced the 
entrenched capitalism of Franco’s Spain for betraying the brotherhood of Spain.  
 
Because men confound your slogan of being better with getting along better. 
Because spirit becomes carnal, sacrifice becomes gluttony, and brotherhood becomes 
a vice. 
Because you called a cortege of thousands of martyrs that they might serve us as 
standard and guide, and yet men have not seen in the blood of your followers and 
example, and they find its memory uncomfortable, and they are annoyed when we 
repeat in their ears, closed to all generosity, our monotonous insistence on the 
example of our martyrs, to the extent that some exploit the fallen as a platform on 
which to climb or a springboard for business and self-indulgence.63 
 
Arrese insisted upon the fascist ideal of virile activism, while regime functionaries had long 
since come to dominate the Movimiento Nacional. He poignantly concluded that: 
 
José Antonio, you are not satisfied with us. You who watch from your place, from your 
twentieth of November, with a profound sense of melancholy and scorn. You cannot 
be satisfied with this mediocre, sensual life.64  
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The degree to which Payne sympathised with this view is demonstrated by the fact that 
following this extended quote, he concluded that ‘[Arrese’s] exposition of the dismal situation 
then prevailing … carried with it little hope for the future’.65 Shortly afterwards, Payne stated 
that: ‘Amid the unpleasant realities of Franquismo, it seemed almost unreal to recall the 
political career of José Antonio Primo de Rivera. That the regime invoked his memory on every 
occasion appeared a trifle incongruous.’66 He confirmed an idealistic image of Primo de Rivera 
when he claimed that ‘[Primo de Rivera’s] political career was inherently tragic’.67 Thus, Payne 
condemned the rule of Franco and gave credence to Arrese’s vision of Primo de Rivera as an 
inspirational figure.  
While Arrese’s speech was an effective summation of old-shirt disillusionment, the 
most influential Joseantonian anti-Franco perspective was that of Dionisio Ridruejo. Ridruejo 
was, like Arrese, dedicated to fascism and supported Nazi Germany during the Second World 
War. He was the Minister for Propaganda from the Civil War until 1941, when he was 
dismissed for criticising the dominance of conservative military values over Falangist goals. By 
1955 he was secretly dedicated to anti-Francoism, and by the early 1960s he converted to a 
more democratic idealism.68 In many narratives, Ridruejo has enjoyed very similar adulation 
from historians as was granted his ‘intimate friend’, Primo de Rivera: he has been described as 
a young and talented intellectual.69 Historians have highlighted his role as ‘the poet of party’, 
as he wrote the words to the Falange’s marching hymn, Cara al Sol (Facing the Sun) in 1935.70 
When asked whether the label of ‘moral fascist’, as per the claims of Michael Mann, should 
apply to Primo de Rivera, Preston instead suggested that the term was more appropriate for 
Ridruejo.71 British historian Rob Stradling commented in 2013 that the ‘essential paradox’ of 
Ridruejo as ‘a convinced fascist who was not only a brave soldier and an accomplished poet 
but also a genuinely nice guy’ has meant that historians have treated him in an overly positive 
manner.72 He expressed surprise that: 
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Even Paul Preston, a scholar not given to overlooking the vices of Francoism, cannot 
find a word to say against Ridruejo and even makes a bemused attempt to excuse his 
fascist enthusiasm – this about a man who in his autobiography confessed to having 
been an outright admirer of the Nazi New Order.73 
 
Stradling made an interesting point when he claimed that ‘commentary on Ridruejo has been 
written from the moral perspective of his remorse’.74 While Ridruejo maintained an 
idealisation of Primo de Rivera and his values, Stradling implied that historians have been too 
keen to sympathise with Ridruejo because of his shift towards democratic anti-Francoism late 
in his life. This idea of redemption from a fascist youth is fascinating and could be examined in 
the case of Primo de Rivera in future studies. Some Anglophone literature has sought to 
portray Primo de Rivera as undergoing a fundamental political shift towards liberal democracy 
in his final weeks. This notion fits within the scope of undue idealisation of Primo de Rivera 
and warrants closer analysis, but it is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
When researching his PhD, Payne spoke with Ridruejo extensively. Later in life, Payne 
acknowledged that his thesis would not have been possible without the insight and assistance 
offered by Ridruejo.75 Ridruejo claimed that the time for inspirational leaders had passed, and 
had thus aligned himself with an anti-Franco, liberal movement calling for legitimate 
democratic suffrage.76 Payne recounted in 2011 being inspired by ‘[h]is generosity and his 
effort to be honest, objective and self-critical’, as well as his ‘deep moral concern not to repeat 
the errors of his youth but to make amends for them’.77 Yet, while Ridruejo admitted later in 
life that ‘many of [Primo de Rivera’s] ideas now seem[ed] to [him] immature and others 
contradictory and mistaken’, Payne still empathised with Ridruejo’s unyielding devotion to 
Primo de Rivera as a man.78 In 1987, Payne asserted that ‘[p]erhaps the best brief portrait of 
José Antonio was written by one of his most sensitive and able young supporters, Dionisio 
Ridruejo’.79 Payne extensively quoted Ridruejo’s glowing endorsement of Primo de Rivera: 
 
In 1935, outside of Falangist circles, I personally became acquainted with José Antonio 
Primo de Rivera, an appealing and intelligent man of great gallantry and dialectical 
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elegance, possessed of sure personal honour, who added to these qualities a note of 
delicacy and timidity that was enormously attractive… He impressed me as has no 
other man since… I never have, and never shall, cease to feel for the figure of Jose 
Antonio the great respect and vivid affection that he inspired in me then.80 
 
The authority Payne granted to these dissident Falangist perspectives meant that 
Primo de Rivera was upheld by Anglophone, ostensibly anti-fascist, historians as a ‘genuine’ 
revolutionary figure. No other fascist leader has been so readily accepted in this manner. To 
understand the significance of the early designation of Primo de Rivera as a ‘revolutionary’ 
fascist, it is important to understand how contested and controversial the term has been in 
relation to fascism. While certain historians, most prominently George Mosse (1918-1999), 
readily characterised fascism as a revolutionary phenomenon, this view was not widely held.81 
Opponents of such an understanding have argued that categorising fascism alongside 
established ideologies such as liberalism or socialism inherently legitimises it, in a form of 
unjust historical rehabilitation.82 More popular, especially amongst the early fascist studies 
scholarship of the 1960s, was the understanding of fascism as ‘reactionary’: of ‘reacting’ to 
threats of liberal/leftist progress and retreating to visions of the past. Historians thus saw 
fascism as a rejection of ‘modernity’.83 Romanian-American historian Eugen Weber (1925-
2007) critiqued this position in 1974, exploring the ideas of ‘revolution’ and ‘counter-
revolution’ (essentially a synonym for reaction). He stated that the application of these terms 
has inherent symbolic meaning, ‘with an ethical burden that even the mass media perceive’.84 
Weber argued that for many academics, ‘revolution’ was a normative term that held inherent 
value as a ‘progressive’, ‘Leftist’ phenomenon. ‘Revolution’ was thus a force for good, an 
‘authorised version’ of political progress. Weber stated that ‘[s]ince revolution = good, 
counterrevolution = bad. Hence the importance of dubbing what we consider bad counter-
revolutionary.’85 As a result, many historians felt that fascism could not be categorised as 
‘revolutionary’. The potentially scandalous nature of this position was understood by Weber, 
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who stated that ‘At any rate, whether we like it or not, whether we trust or not, the 
revolutionary project [of fascism] is clear enough… Sacrilege? It may seem so to us, scarcely to 
participants.’86 In a manner that would not become mainstream until Griffin’s The Nature of 
Fascism in 1991, Weber argued for the consideration of the views of fascists themselves. 
Weber’s insight into the nature of fascism has remained controversial, and the Leftist 
understanding of revolution still holds considerable sway. Marxist historians, unsurprisingly, 
have maintained the view of revolution being an inherently ‘good’ thing. British Marxist 
historian David Renton (b.1972), for example, holds that considering fascism ‘revolutionary’ 
removes any academic utility of the term.87 Some prominent liberal historians oppose treating 
fascism as revolutionary in nature due to the practical effects of fascist rule. American 
historian Robert Paxton (b.1932) denies the revolutionary character of fascism. He stated in 
1998 that ‘rather than making the social structure or the economic system more just or free’, 
as their rhetoric claims, ‘their revolution consists of hardening the character… of the 
community’.88 Blinkhorn questions the heuristic value of conceptualising fascism as 
revolutionary, claiming it raises more questions than it answers.89 Thus, as mentioned earlier, 
Eatwell can claim that ‘most historians challenge the validity of ideological approaches, 
stressing the importance of studying practice’.90 
Regardless of the academic controversy over the nature of fascism, historians have 
readily understood Primo de Rivera as a genuinely revolutionary figure. At the time of 
Falange’s publication in 1961, ‘revolution’ was still understood as fundamentally Leftist, in the 
manner that Mosse sought to debunk. This can be seen in the academic reviews of Payne’s 
Falange. Lee Wearing in The Historian, for example, marvelled at the examination of ‘the real 
founder of Falange Española’:  
 
José Antonio favoured a national totalitarian state which would work for the benefit of 
all classes and respect the dignity of man, individual cooperation and sacrifice for the 
common good, control of the national economy through workers’ syndicates, land 
reform, nationalisation of credit, and the achievement of these aims through violence 
if necessary.91 
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Characterising these goals in something of a positive manner, he concluded: ‘So Spanish 
fascism instead of being reactionary, as is sometimes thought, was really revolutionary.’92 
Similarly, American historian Rhea Marsh Smith (1907-1991) wrote about the ‘intricate 
problem’ that ‘the Falange was a movement, fascist in organization but revolutionary in 
concept’.93 This was seen as unusual and confusing, with fascism and revolution typically 
understood as two distinct phenomena. As such, Primo de Rivera did not fit neatly into 
traditional understandings of fascist leadership. In his review of Payne’s Falange, American 
Hispanist Peter Earle (b.1937) concluded that: 
 
We need not forget that the miserable history of Spain since 1936 is more than 
anything else the work of a self-seeking clique of unimaginative men, and that their 
Machiavellian clutch has kept Spain in a position of political and economic degradation 
which in Western Europe is comparable only to that of Portugal.94 
 
American political scientist Ben Burnett insisted in 1962 that Primo de Rivera was ‘the hero, 
the martyr, the troubadour, the transcendent reference, the perfect symbol – in short, 
everything that the leaders of the “New Spain” were not’.95 In 1967, Gerald Brenan decried the 
execution of Primo de Rivera a tragedy, as the Movimiento Nacional ‘threw up no men of 
ability’ to replace him and oppose conservative Francoism.96  
The influence of the image of Primo de Rivera as a lost leader of Europe extended 
widely. British historian David Lewis made a stunning aside in Illusions of Grandeur (1987), a 
book about the BUF:  
 
Had [Primo de Rivera’s] premature death not robbed Europe of one of fascism’s most 
able leaders it would have been fascinating to have observed how he might have dealt 
with the reactionary conservatism represented by Franco and the army rebellion.97 
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As a non-specialist in the case of Spanish fascism, Lewis represents the large number of 
historians who have significantly relied upon the specialist work of Payne. Such a glowing 
statement would be unthinkable in the case of other fascist leaders. It is also interesting to 
note that idealisation of Primo de Rivera has extended to his actual proficiency. When 
considering the abject political failure of the Falange prior to the outbreak of the Civil War, 
describing Primo de Rivera as ‘one of fascism’s most able leaders’ appears incongruous at the 
very least.  
To understand the significance of Anglophone historians embracing Primo de Rivera as 
a lost hero, it is useful to contrast Anglophone outrage over attempts to rehabilitate Oswald 
Mosley in a similar manner. In Oswald Mosley, Skidelsky framed Mosley explicitly as a lost 
leader of Britain, in contrast to what he understood as the weak and ineffectual leadership of 
the Labour Party.98 There was significant academic backlash to this idea. Without the context 
of idealistic martyrdom dominating the narrative (Mosley lived until 1980 and continued to 
espouse similar political views until his death), mainstream historians have understood that 
idealising the leadership of a fascist leader as a lost cause has potentially dangerous 
consequences. Vernon Bogdanor insisted that the terrible political realities of the twentieth 
century impose ‘peculiar and severe obligations’ on historians of fascist movements.99 In his 
view, as previously mentioned, any attempt at rehabilitating Mosley was fundamentally 
immoral. British historian John Vincent (b.1937) echoed this view, dismissing the work as ‘not 
a book about Mosley but a book about Mr Skidelsky’s interpretation of Mosley’.100 He 
lamented that because Skidelsky believed in the historiographical tradition involving exaltation 
of ‘brilliant men’ who attempt to solve the world’s problems are stifled by ‘untalented hacks’, 
Mosley is portrayed as a hero.101  
In the decades since these criticisms of Oswald Mosley were published, the 
historiography has supported their perspective. Skidelsky’s claims that Mosley could have 
been a great leader of Britain, with sweeping and positive economic reforms, have been 
expressly linked to his own personal admiration for the man, rather than historical reality.102 
His perspective has been debunked and dismissed. The contrast between the Anglophone 
historiography’s response to sympathetic visions of Oswald Mosley and José Antonio Primo de 
Rivera is indicative of the unusual position taken in the treatment of Spanish fascism. 
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Historians of fascism have long outlined the dangers that the radical Right has posed, and still 
does pose, to European liberal democratic traditions. In the case of Mosley, mainstream 
historiography has expressly rejected a perspective of idealisation as inappropriate. 
An important point regarding the revolutionary fascist nature of Primo de Rivera’s 
ideology was mentioned briefly by Payne in Fascism in Spain, 1923-1977 in 1999. Payne 
acknowledged that ‘if [Primo de Rivera] had survived he would ultimately have been 
discredited by the practical results of another disastrous fascist regime’.103 This is a very 
significant statement to make, as it completely undermines the narrative of a lost leader. It is 
an open acknowledgement that the idealistic rhetoric of Primo de Rivera was not somehow 
special amongst fascist leadership. This is a very important shift in perspective, moving the 
understanding of Primo de Rivera much more in line with the condemnation of other fascist 
leaders. The fact that it took until 1999 to be articulated in such a clear manner demonstrates 
the extent to which the idealised image of Primo de Rivera has taken hold. Yet, Payne did not 
elaborate on the implications of this statement, nor draw any particular attention to the 
manner in which this conclusion differs from what has been argued in the previous decades. 
 
Conclusion 
Political passions surrounding the Second Republic continue to influence historical opinion on 
Primo de Rivera. The legacy of Francoism dominates historical and political debates over the 
nature of Spanish fascism. Academics who are hostile to Francoism will continue to insist upon 
categorising Franco as a fascist, while others will maintain their insistence on his non-fascist 
character. This debate, including all its complicated and interwoven threads, has sidelined and 
reified the standard image of Primo de Rivera as a comparatively marginal figure. He has been 
invoked by conservative historians in a comparatively positive manner to bolster, whether 
consciously or not, their side of an intractable polemical divide. Academic hostility towards 
Francoist atrocities and banalities alike has ensured that Primo de Rivera has been 
remembered as more of a fallen hero than fascist agitator.  
 
                                                          




 The Need to Reconsider the Figure of Primo de Rivera within 
the Historiography of Spanish Fascism 
 
In 1999, Paul Preston claimed that many important Anglophone historians of Spain had been 
‘seduced’ by the allure of José Antonio Primo de Rivera. This thesis has demonstrated this 
charge. Academic views on fascism have been overwhelmingly hostile, to the point that in 
1981 British historian Tim Mason (1940-1990) suggested that ‘furnishing an apologia’ for 
fascism ‘is perhaps the most serious charge which can be made against serious historians’.1 
Yet, mainstream academic descriptions of Primo de Rivera have generally concurred with the 
views of unrepentant Falangists. In 1989, American historian Victoria Enders conducted an 
interview with Consuelo Muñóz Monasterio (1900-1993), a member of the Sección Feminina 
from 1937 to 1984, about her life in the Falange. Throughout this interview, Muñóz 
Monasterio emphasised that Primo de Rivera was charming and handsome, stating that ‘José 
Antonio was marvellous. … Physically he was very handsome, very attractive’.2 She lauded his 
aristocratic bearings and dignity.3 She dismissed any suggestion that Primo de Rivera 
supported violence, claiming that anyone who criticised his ‘dialectic of fists and pistols’ was 
being ‘malicious’, as he ‘said books, books and books of wonderful things, all positive’.4 
Instead, she emphasised that his doctrine was poetic in nature.5 She was dedicated to the idea 
that Primo de Rivera was socially progressive and a genuine revolutionary.6 These ideas, held 
by academic historians, have been critiqued through this thesis. 
 Guided by the foundational question of why Primo de Rivera has been spared the 
historical denunciation typically seen in the case of fascist leaders, this thesis has focused on 
three issues. In Chapter One, I argued that, although the idea of charismatic leadership has 
been integral to definitions of generic fascism, it has not been effectively applied to the case of 
Spanish fascism. Instead, Primo de Rivera has been understood through the alternative lens of 
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señoritismo, of gentlemanliness. Historians have approached fascism as a movement 
dominated by its leaders, and thus the apparently personable demeanour of Primo de Rivera 
has been given prominence in historical works. Contrasted with stereotypes of fascists as 
vicious and aggressive, he has been depoliticised and portrayed as a charming, friendly 
personality, in spite of his position as a paramilitary leader.  
 In Chapter Two, I argued that historians have not properly grappled with Primo de 
Rivera’s relationship with violence. Instead they have frequently, without sufficient 
justification, distanced him from the impact of his violent rhetoric and downplayed his own 
propensity towards violent action. Primo de Rivera has been abstracted from the 
consequences of violence, with blame attributed to his followers without sufficient 
examination of his direct involvement. A fascination with the nature of his fascist oratory, seen 
as comparatively ‘poetic’ in contrast to fascist stereotypes, has reinforced this idea of 
‘ambiguity’ towards violence. Historians have insisted that poetry was somehow antithetical 
to violence, which has been repeatedly used to excuse Primo de Rivera from the charge of 
being violent.  
 In Chapter Three, I expanded the scope of the thesis to argue that the practical, 
political, ideological and emotional legacy of the Spanish Republic, the Spanish Civil War and 
the Franco regime have dominated the historiography of Spanish fascism. These complex 
interactions have coalesced in a manner that has made Primo de Rivera relatively incidental in 
academic debates over the nature of Spanish fascism. He has nonetheless remained the 
standard example of Spanish fascism, irrespective of his relatively marginal role in the political 
upheavals of the 1930s. Instead, argument over the nature of Francoism, and to what extent it 
can or should be ‘tarnished’ by being labelled fascist, remains the main source of impassioned 
polemic. As a result of the contrast between the Falangist ideals of Primo de Rivera that 
Franco claimed to uphold on the one hand, and the politically repressive reality of Francoist 
dictatorship on the other, historians were ready to describe Primo de Rivera as ‘genuinely’ 
revolutionary, at a time when other fascist leaders were pointedly denied such a classification. 
As ‘revolution’ as a concept was for many decades understood as inherently loaded with 
Leftist and progressive values, this label made Primo de Rivera comparatively palatable to 
liberal Anglophone historians. Anti-Franco ideals have even enshrined Primo de Rivera as a 
morally superior lost alternative to Franco, in a strange alignment of liberal Anglophone and 
dissident Falangist perspectives. Historians’ embrace of the supposed idealism of Primo de 
Rivera, highlighted in contrast to the pragmatic calculations of Franco, has not appropriately 
addressed the fact that his ideals were fundamentally fascist in character. 
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Historical dispute over the nature and importance of Spanish fascism shows no signs of 
abating. While the place of José Antonio Primo de Rivera within that historiography has been 
stable, Sid Lowe’s recent work on the JAP’s relationship to ‘genuine’ fascism shows that even 
the most fundamental assumptions about the nature of Spanish fascism can be effectively 
challenged. Given that ‘political violence [is] the most pressing topic within the current 
historiography of twentieth-century Spain’, historians should reconsider Primo de Rivera’s role 
in this area in line with the criticisms I have highlighted.7 Thus, my analysis of gaps and 
inconsistencies in the academic literature on the Falange has the potential to spur a critical 
reengagement with the standard historical tropes related to the figure of Primo de Rivera. By 
highlighting past and ongoing concerns within the field, this thesis suggests that an increased 
acknowledgement of the problems it addresses would result in a more insightful perspective 
towards Spanish fascism.  
The conclusions of this thesis also serve as a useful consideration for the field of fascist 
studies in general. One key point that my research demonstrates is that an overreliance on a 
single historians’ perspective has the potential to reify a misleading historical narrative. While 
this occurrence is hardly a risk in the dynamic historiographies of Italian Fascism and Nazism, 
English-language historiographies of the ‘peripheral’ fascisms are less robust. Stanley Payne 
has been the main authority on the topic of Spanish fascism, with his 1961 book Falange still 
frequently referenced as the main or even only source utilised by other historians. This 
dominance demonstrates the allure historians have felt to simply refer to an established 
expert in lieu of further historical examination.  
Likely the most important contribution of this thesis to the wider field of fascism 
studies is the idea that greater care needs to be taken with the focus on the individual figures 
of fascist leadership. As fascism is seen as probably the most leader-centric modern political 
force, it is understandable that historians have focused on fascist leaders. Yet, the way Primo 
de Rivera has been interpreted shows how the centrality of Italy and Germany to studies of 
fascism has negatively impacted historical perspectives on smaller fascist movements. 
Stereotypes of fascist personality based on Mussolini and Hitler are well-ingrained, as 
demonstrated by the way that Rob Stradling portrayed the idea of Dionisio Ridruejo being ‘a 
                                                          
7 Peter Anderson, “Knowing and Acknowledging Spain’s Dark Civil War Past,” Journal of Contemporary 
History 52:1 (2017): 130. 
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nice guy’ as strange and potentially confronting.8 Historical figures with such genteel or 
‘poetic’ exteriors have thus not been integrated effectively into studies of fascist leadership.  
Finally, there is the simple concern that contemporary liberal democratic norms 
remain under threat from a resurgent form of aggressive, exclusionary nationalism. In recent 
years, there have been attempts to reconcile the highly divergent fields of the studies of 
generic fascism and ‘neo-fascism’.9 Scholars of neo-fascism, alongside some historians of 
generic fascism including Griffin, argue that fascism still poses a direct threat today.10 This idea 
has been resisted by more conservative historians such as Payne, who instead insist that 
fascism as a historical concept has no value being applied beyond the 1940s.11 Even those 
historians who agree that ‘fascism’ is not a useful approach to understanding modern 
aggressive Right-wing movements still readily accept that democratic norms are under 
increasing threat. British historian Philip Morgan (b.1949) claimed in 2006 that although he 
struggled to categorise modern forms of far-Right movements as truly fascist, he felt obvious 
sympathy for Griffin’s perspective. He concluded that ‘[s]ince eternal vigilance is what is, even 
now, required, then Griffin’s analysis might at least enable us to identify and relocate the 
enemy’.12 Ten years later Richard Evans reiterated the point that ‘we are living in difficult 
times and we need to be vigilant’ against anti-democratic Right-wing threats.13 In this political 
context it should be the duty of historians to critically, and effectively, examine past figures 
who espoused fascist values and anti-democratic violence. Regardless of his personal quirks, 
his rhetorical prowess, or his distaste for Franco, José Antonio Primo de Rivera’s relevance to 
history is his position as a fascist leader. The fact that mainstream Anglophone historiography 
has been comparatively positive should be reason for greater reflection on the part of 
historians of fascism. Through a more nuanced understanding of how and why Primo de Rivera 
has been treated so differently from other fascist leaders, historians will be able to achieve a 
greater understanding of their own conceptualisations of fascism as a political phenomenon.  
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194. 
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